FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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AMERICA AT WAR

The First Year

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THIS has been a year of hope deferred, of tragedy, of the most acute danger this nation has ever faced, a year of great defeats and great victories, a year in which the United States has found its soul, mustered its strength, organized its armies, and commenced its long, hard forward march to victory. It has been a year of crisis, but of crisis met, endured and passed. It has seen, probably, the turning point of the war.

This can be said because during the past summer and fall the enemy was held in check within the bounds of Europe and within the limits of the Western Pacific. As Churchill wisely warned, the American offensive in the Solomons and the Anglo-American campaigns in North Africa are not the beginning of the end; but they may mark, as he said, "the end of the beginning." Slowly but surely the strategic initiative is shifting to the United Nations. The future will depend more upon what we do than upon what the enemy does. We can still lose the war, but if we do so it will be because of our own mistakes and weaknesses, not primarily because of the enemy's strength. For the strength of the Axis is commencing to be outmatched and the inestimable advantages of the initiative are passing to our side.

The year began in disaster. The Japanese "sneak" attack on Pearl Harbor did much more damage than was admitted at the time. The Navy's report published a year later showed that eight battleships, ten other men-of-war, a floating drydock, and some 250 Army and Navy planes, were destroyed or damaged by the Japanese carrier-based air attack. Five of the battleships, the *Arizona*, *Oklahoma*, *California*, *Nevada* and *West Virginia*, were sunk or beached; three other battleships, the *Pennsylvania*,

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Maryland and *Tennessee*, and three cruisers, the *Helena*, *Honolulu* and *Raleigh*, were damaged. The *Arizona* blew up and was a total loss; the *Oklahoma* and the old target ship *Utah* capsized and still lie keels-up in their berths near Ford Island; the destroyers *Cassin* and *Downes* blew up. But all the other ships, even including the minelayer *Oglala* which capsized, have been raised and have been or will be repaired. Plane losses and the small damages to installations have been made good long ago, and today "Pearl Harbor" is but an awful memory.

For six months after December 7, 1941, we went from bad to worse. But now at the year's end we have progressed to a position where we can undertake strategic offensives in both hemispheres. The size of the American Army and Navy has been more than doubled. Our global lines of communication have been maintained and strengthened and guarded by garrisons at strategic points. Close to a million Americans have been transported overseas. In this same year a number of important strategic areas have been lost by the Allies — Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, the "Donbas," part of the Caucasus. But others, the vital ones, have been held — the Middle East, India, China, Moscow, the bulk of the Caucasus oil areas, Britain, Alaska-Aleutians, Hawaii. Today, the United Nations are far stronger in numbers of men, ships and planes, in resolution, military leadership, organization and purpose, than they were a year ago. The enemy has been checked, even though not completely halted. With our allies we have commenced the long and sanguinary process of reconquering what was lost.

With this change in the strategic picture has gone a profound change in the art of war. Tactically, the defense has overcome many of the advantages enjoyed initially by the offense. What started in 1939 as a limited war became in 1942 a global one. Space, time and distance factors have intervened in the affairs of nations, and those which at first were amateurs in the art of war — the United Nations — are becoming professionals. Attrition practised by our side has replaced Blitzkrieg on the Axis side. On land and at sea the defense is catching up with the offense. The quick victories of the past will no longer be possible for the Axis. The converse is also true, however. We must remember now when we are assuming the offensive that we cannot expect rapid triumphs over a defensive that has gained new strength.

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II

It was the second six months of the American participation in the war that witnessed the shift from the defensive to the offensive by the United Nations.[1] The summer of 1942 had long been looked forward to as the great time of crisis. These were the months in which Hitler had been expected to make his supreme effort to eliminate Russia and in which it had been thought that Japan would try to burst the bounds of the Western Pacific by pushing further southward or by invading India or Siberia.

These attempts *were* made; the summer of 1942 *was* a time of crisis. That the attempts were repulsed, that the Axis did not conquer areas which if taken would have made victory for the United Nations virtually impossible, was of course due only in part to the United States. We bore the main brunt of the Pacific fighting; our defeat of the Japanese at the Coral Sea and Midway saved Hawaii and may have saved Australia. American and British lease-lend aid to Russia and American and British psychological support were undoubtedly important factors in the Russian summer campaign. The United States and Britain together sent Russia 3,052 planes, 4,048 tanks and vast amounts of other equipment. But Russia saved herself chiefly by her own efforts. The present more favorable strategic complexion of the war is mainly due to the fact that Russia is still fighting.

In the winter and spring of 1942, the Axis *guerre de course* had been so successful — particularly along the American coasts — that there seemed a likelihood that the German submarine might win the war. The first and most fundamental job facing our armed forces was to meet this menace. We had to secure our transoceanic supply routes by: (1) anti-submarine measures; (2) the construction of additional ships and cargo planes; (3) the development and garrisoning of new naval and air bases; and (4) the establishment of new air ferry and cargo-carrying routes.

The first and most important anti-submarine measure undertaken by the United States was the establishment of an adequate coastal defense organization to supplement the transoceanic convoy system. Various "sea frontiers" were organized — along the East Coast, in the Caribbean, on the Gulf Coast, and on the

[1] *Editor's Note:* For preceding articles in this series by Mr. Baldwin see "America at War: Three Bad Months," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1942, and "America at War: The Second Quarter," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1942.

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West and Northwest Coasts. By May 14, 1942, the first coastwise convoy system was started, so that ships could move under escort from Maine to Florida, many of them stopping overnight in harbors or in mined and protected anchorages along the coast. On July 1 the convoy system was extended to the Caribbean and the Gulf areas, and since then it has been speeded up, perfected and extended. As a result, coastwise submarine sinkings have showed a marked decline. Along the East Coast, sinkings have been negligible since May 14; and even the world figures showed that July, August, September and October were relatively better months for the United Nations than many previous months of 1942. Army and Navy and civilian aircraft and Navy and Coast Guard ships and small boats, all operating under naval command, have been responsible for this improvement.

But though conditions have improved along our coasts, the ship sinkings have continued at a high rate on the Murmansk convoy route, and there also have been heavy losses on the trans-atlantic routes. The Nazi submarines, forced seaward as our coastal defenses improved, shifted southward to the Trinidad area, the eastern coast of South America, the West Coast of Africa and the region of the Cape of Good Hope. In the North Atlantic, they reinstituted the tactics of the "wolf pack" and on the Murmansk route they were aided by planes.

Fortunately, Japanese submarines have done comparatively little commerce raiding, and what they have done has been rather ineffective. There have been five or six "scares" along the West Coast and for a time there was a small Japanese submarine concentration in the Gulf of Alaska, but none of it accomplished much.

In the meantime, while our anti-submarine measures were reducing ship losses we were increasing the rate of ship construction. As these lines are being written, American shipyards are turning out an average of more than three ships a day. During the summer the rate of construction passed the rate of destruction, and by the end of the year the United States will have accomplished its objective of building eight million deadweight tons of new shipping in 1942.

Simultaneously the program of building cargo planes on a large scale was commencing to yield results. Many B-24 Consolidated bombers were converted for freight and military passenger transport, and this plane and the C-54 (Douglas DC-4) proved to be

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perhaps the finest cargo planes of the year. But these planes carried only a tiny fraction of the tonnage transported by ships; their value lay chiefly in the speed with which they could rush important air express items to distant destinations.

One of the things we had to do to make our transoceanic supply lines secure was to develop and garrison new bases. The Hawaiian Islands — kingpin in the whole structure of our Pacific strategy — were greatly strengthened, and bases along the connecting air and sea links to Australia were developed and garrisoned. As the first year of our part in the war came to an end, it was announced that American forces were holding Palmyra and Canton Islands, and, of course, Samoa, the Fijis and New Caledonia; while American troops were also stationed in New Zealand, Australia, the New Hebrides and other Pacific points. Other American forces garrisoned bases in the Caribbean-Panama area, and in South America, East and West Africa, and the Middle East. American troops were in India and China, and others were in Canada and Newfoundland, as well as in Labrador, Greenland and Iceland, and, of course, in Alaska and the Aleutians. The strength of all these garrisons, both land and air, was built up during the year, with the result that all bases exposed to possible enemy attack are now strongly protected. This naturally has resulted in a dispersion of our forces, but it provided much-needed security for our supply lines to the theaters of action.

The development of air ferry and transport routes across the oceans also helped to solve the problem of supply. Bombers were literally delivered around the world. In the case of fighter planes, the bulk of the deliveries was made by ship, but some were flown to Russia and across the Atlantic and Pacific. The war gave a terrific impetus to the blazing of new air trails, and before the year ended Atlantic and Pacific air crossings were so numerous and so frequent as to be a commonplace.

Despite the increased effectiveness of our anti-submarine measures, the German submarine campaign still offered a serious threat, as the year ended, to our global lines of communication and supply. Between 250 and 400 Nazi submarines are believed to be in commission; new ones are being constructed at the rate of more than twenty a month — faster, that is, than we are sinking them. Unless we increase the rate of destruction, we shall not be able to send overseas all our present or future strength.

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III

In the last analysis the security of our transoceanic supply routes depended in the year just ended upon the security of the bases we had established and our maintenance of naval superiority in those areas of the ocean which our supply lines traversed. This was particularly true in the Pacific, where we were fighting a great sea Power. That is why the Battle of Midway was so important. Had we lost it, the entire Pacific campaign would have been jeopardized.

The Battle of Midway was prefaced by a series of actions which sprawled across the great distances of the South Pacific and culminated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. During April, Japanese concentrations of men-of-war and transports at Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea and at Rabaul had been reported. Early in May the enemy started to push to the south. One group of considerable strength steamed to Tulagi, the best harbor of the southern Solomons; another moved down into the Louisiade Archipelago. On May 4 a task force of the *Lexington* and *Yorktown*, escorted by cruisers and destroyers and commanded by Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, steamed to within bombing distance of Tulagi, and planes from the two carriers attacked the Japanese ships. Some were sunk, others were damaged and the Solomons wing of the Japanese southern offensive was stalled.

After the Tulagi raid, Admiral Fletcher moved into the Coral Sea to intercept the other wing of the enemy push. On May 6, planes from the *Lexington* caught a Japanese carrier, believed to be the new carrier *Ryukaku*, just as she was launching planes and after a heavy and well-delivered attack sent back the jubilant report, "Scratch one flat-top." The following day, in a continuation of the action, the *Lexington* and *Yorktown* squadrons smashed at two more Japanese carriers, and severely damaged vessels believed to be the *Shokaku* and *Zuikaku*. But this was not accomplished without loss. The *Lexington* took at least two torpedoes and several bombs and the *Yorktown* received some light bomb damage. The Japanese were turned back and the action broken off — an engagement unique in naval history in that there was no contact between opposing surface units. The bomb and the torpedo, carried by planes, took the place of the shell as the principal naval weapon. The damaged *Lexington*, burning furiously, pulled many miles away from the battle area. In the end,

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the heroic fight to save her was vain; internal explosions caused by gasoline vapors made her abandonment necessary and she received the *coup de grâce* from American torpedoes.

There was no interlude. The actions in the Coral Sea may well have been intended by the Japanese as a deliberate strategic feint; in any case, long before the battle of the Coral Sea was fought there was evidence that the enemy was building up a large striking force in the central Pacific. Hastily, all possible American forces were mobilized to meet it. The sea-weary and damaged *Yorktown* steamed swiftly north to Pearl Harbor and after a hasty dry-docking steamed westward toward Midway with the largest carrier striking force we had yet assembled to meet the foe.

The situation was tense. Japan still had naval superiority in the Pacific. A week before the battle, the people of Hawaii knew it was coming; part of Honolulu was evacuated.

Ensign Jack Reid in a PBY "opened the ball" on June 3 when he sighted a great armada of enemy ships headed eastward for Midway. There followed three days of sporadic action — a battle of planes against planes, of carriers against carriers. Flying Fortresses of the Army, flown from Hawaii to Midway, pounded at the enemy; B-26 medium bombers were used for the first time as torpedo planes; and even the lumbering PBY's of the Navy carried torpedoes. But at Midway the Japs were turned back by our carrier squadrons; dive bombers and torpedo planes from the carriers blasted at a threat which plainly was directed not only against Midway but also against the Hawaiian Islands. It was, in fact, the most serious threat of the war.

The Japanese made one air attack on Midway; they never got close enough to attempt surface bombardment or troop landings. Their air attack was heavy and accurate, and Marine fighters — mostly obsolescent Brewsters — suffered heavy losses, though not without exacting a major toll from the enemy. In the meantime our carrier-based planes had hit the enemy. The two biggest carriers of the Japanese, the *Kaga* and *Akagi*, were knocked out, and a third, the *Soryu*, was damaged. Our own air losses were heavy, and a Japanese air striking force hit the *Yorktown* with two torpedoes and a number of bombs. But the *Hiryu*, another Japanese carrier, was then knocked out, and later one of our submarines got the crippled *Soryu*. The *Yorktown* was taken in tow for Pearl Harbor; but a Japanese submarine got her and the destroyer *Hammann* two days later.

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The fact was, however, that the Japanese Fleet had been shattered. Four carriers — *Kaga* and *Akagi*, *Soryu* and *Hiryu* — had been sunk, as evidenced by the fact that prisoners were taken; at least two battleships had been damaged; the cruiser *Mikuma* (an eight-inch-gunned ship, not a light six-inch gun cruiser, as reported) had been sunk; her sister the *Mogami* had been badly damaged; and transports, destroyers or other vessels had been sunk or damaged.

It was a defensive victory and an incomplete victory but a great victory. Had we been able to follow it up and wipe out the remnants of the Japanese Fleet by surface ship action it might have been one of the decisive victories in the history of the world. As it was, it saved Hawaii and tended more nearly to equalize the strengths of the two fleets in the Pacific.

As the Japanese Fleet advanced toward Midway a northern wing attacked Dutch Harbor and landed troops in the Rat Islands, the outermost of the Aleutians. Early in June, while the Midway battle was being fought, the enemy established bases on Kiska, Attu and Agattu, but this move was plainly made to secure flank protection for the Japanese main effort in the central Pacific. Had the Japanese won Midway and established themselves in the Hawaiian chain, their operations in the Aleutians would unquestionably have become dangerous; Alaska might have been invaded and eventually the West Coast. As it was, the Aleutian operations were never more than a secondary front, and an annoyance. But our moves to counter the enemy there were prompt and vigorous. Alaska and the Aleutians were heavily reenforced, and in late summer the forces of the United States began an amphibious move westward. We occupied the Andreanoff group of the Aleutians, and established an airfield within some 125 to 175 miles of Kiska. This enabled us to send fighter planes over the Japanese bases, and a summer-long campaign of long-range bombardment was succeeded by an intensive program of short-range bombardment. Our submarines also commenced to harry the Japanese line of supplies, and before autumn the enemy had apparently abandoned Attu and Agattu and had concentrated his forces on Kiska.[2] We had not conquered Kiska — nothing short of an outright assault is likely to do that — but we had effectively neutralized it as an offensive or defensive base by air bombardment and by our submarine operations.

[2] Early in the winter the Japanese apparently reëstablished small forces on Attu.

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After Midway the Japanese reorganized, and later in the summer they again began to threaten in the South Pacific. Their jungle troops broke over the serrated crest of the Owen Stanley Mountains in New Guinea and began a push toward Port Moresby. They also sent forces to occupy some of the Gilbert Islands, reconnoitered some of the Ellice Islands, and commenced to build an airfield on Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons.

Suddenly, on August 7, the whole complexion of the Pacific warfare changed. American task forces covering a large group of transports steamed northward from New Caledonia towards the Solomons and a Marine division, supported by attached battalions of "shock troops," seized the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanombogo, commanding Tulagi harbor, as well as a beachhead which included the almost-completed Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal. This operation was first described as a limited offensive, intended to protect our supply lines to Australia, toward which the Japs had been slowly inching. But it quickly developed into more than that.

The general expectation had been that the Japanese would cross the Amur River and attack Vladivostok in August. Apparently the Solomons offensive was intended to relieve Russian Siberia of the threat of this Japanese attack. But in many respects it actually is the first step in a strategic offensive which eventually should carry to the doorstep of Tokyo.

The offensive against the Solomons was hastily planned and in many ways was hung "on a shoestring." Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, who commanded in the South Pacific, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, was under constant pressure to hasten the initial landings, and the forces under his command were inferior to those which the Japanese might muster and were inadequate to the task of starting a major strategic offensive. We appear to have underestimated the strength of the Japanese reaction.

However, the Japanese were taken by surprise and the initial landings were made successfully with relatively small casualties. But on the night of August 8–9, while the American transports and cargo vessels were still being unloaded, a Japanese cruiser division, accompanied by destroyers, made a night raid upon our northern cruiser screen which was patrolling in the channel between Guadalcanal and Tulagi islands. This Japanese squadron caught our ships by surprise and sank the heavy cruisers *Astoria*, *Quincy* and *Vincennes* and the Australian cruiser *Canberra*. The

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Japanese escaped with little damage. This was one of the worst defeats in our history. But there were more to come.

The supply problem for the Marines who had been landed in the southern Solomons rapidly became acute. The Japanese, operating from Rabaul and bases in the northern Solomons, bombed them by day and shelled them from surface ships and submarines by night. On August 24 there was a clash between task forces of the two fleets, and a Japanese carrier, probably the small *Ryuzo*, was damaged or perhaps sunk. In this action the antiaircraft defenses and fighter interception of American ships proved exceedingly strong. The defense at sea was catching up with the offense.

The Japanese now undertook a campaign of attrition against our footholds in the southern Solomons, landing men at night on Guadalcanal, outside the Marine lines, and attempting to harry and wear down our forces. The carrier *Wasp*, which in earlier months of the war had ferried British fighter planes to indomitable Malta in the Mediterranean, was sunk by a concentration of Japanese submarines lurking in the southern Solomons; and other important vessels were damaged in a continuing campaign in which American task forces were too often handled in a defensive fashion. The position of the Marines became serious in September when the Japanese launched a large attack by land, sea and air, and this crisis passed only to be followed by another and more severe one in October. The October fighting resulted, however, in losses for the Japanese. Two of their carriers were damaged at the cost of one of our own, and Japanese cruisers and destroyers, engaged in landing men at night on Guadalcanal, were intercepted and sunk or damaged by an American cruiser task force led by the cruiser *Boise*.

In November the Solomons experienced still a third and major crisis. But meanwhile many of our damaged ships had been repaired, the strength of our fleet had been increased by additions from the shipyards, the supply problem, if not solved, had at least been simplified, Army and Marine reënforcements and replacements had landed, the beachhead on Guadalcanal had been extended, and large air reënforcements were on their way.

Between November 12 and 15 one of the largest naval actions of the war — probably the largest between surface ships, if we except the battle of Cape Matapan — was fought off the Solomons. It was precipitated by a strong Japanese attempt to re-

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conquer our beachhead on Guadalcanal. A large Japanese fleet of transports, preceded and protected by several battleships and a screen of cruisers and destroyers, steamed southward from the Shortland area. Strong reënforcements for our land troops on Guadalcanal had just been landed, and the American cruiser and destroyer screen that covered the landing was manœuvred to intercept the Japanese battleship-cruiser spearhead which was moving into position to bombard our Guadalcanal beachhead. The resulting action took place at night off Savo Island, between Guadalcanal and Florida. Gallantly and with great intrepidity the American force, led by Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan and Rear Admiral Norman Scott (who the previous month had intercepted the Japanese cruisers off Guadalcanal), moved between two enemy formations. Our cruisers and destroyers attacked the Japanese battleships of the *Kongo* class at point blank range. Admirals Callaghan and Scott were killed, but the Japanese formation was disrupted and much damage was done.

The following night, after a day in which American planes based on Guadalcanal, Australia and New Guinea hammered the Japanese armada, another clash took place between surface ships. Two American battleships, apparently of the new *North Carolina* and *South Dakota* classes, participated either in this action or a later one. Sporadic but fierce fighting, with surface and air clashes, occurred for some days. When the smoke of battle cleared away the Japanese had received a decisive repulse. One or two battleships were sunk — the first the enemy has lost in the Pacific War — together with numerous cruisers, destroyers and many fully-loaded transports. Our losses were two light cruisers and seven destroyers. The enemy had been turned back in his greatest bid to retake the southern Solomons; our foothold there seemed to be assured; the Solomons campaign had become one of attrition which could turn only to our advantage; and it seemed probable that we would soon be ready to take another step northward.

Our losses in August and September in the Solomons had resulted in considerable public criticism. Admiral Ghormley was relieved by Vice Admiral William Halsey, who was in command in the South Pacific during the October and November victories. Several task force commanders who had served under Admiral Ghormley and who were in direct command of some of the ships which had been lost or damaged came ashore, but their names

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were not released by the Navy Department. Some public dissatisfaction was also expressed with the division of the Pacific into two strategic areas. The limits of Admiral Nimitz's command at first followed the 160th degree of east longitude to the Equator, and thus passed squarely through Guadalcanal. For the purpose of the campaign, and to permit the Navy to have full control, this boundary was moved westward. It still, however, passes through the northern Solomons. Another complication is that Rabaul, the important Japanese base in New Britain and the logical objective of the Navy's Solomon push, is in General Douglas MacArthur's command, which also includes New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. Despite this division of authority, General MacArthur's bombers based on Australia and New Guinea strongly supported the Solomons offensive; and in September the Allied troops in New Guinea undertook a counterattack of their own.

The Japanese advance across the Owen Stanley ridge had surged southward through the jungle to within 31 miles of Port Moresby, the Allied foothold on the south Papuan coast. Here the enemy advance was dramatically turned into a precipitate retreat. Fighting through some of the worst country in the world — country unknown to white men, and so thickly jungled that great areas of earth have never seen the light of the sun — the "Aussies" drove back against the enemy. A full explanation of the Japanese reversal of fortunes has never been made public, but the Allied bombing of Japanese supply lines, particularly effective under the new leadership of Lieutenant-General George C. Kenney, was one factor, and perhaps the Japanese reversals in the Solomons were another. Also, some American ground troops were hastily flown to New Guinea, and apparently these played an important outflanking rôle. No announcement that American ground troops were in action in New Guinea was made until November, however, when the Japanese had been driven back to the northern down-slope of the Owen Stanley range and were fighting desperately to hold their foothold near Buna on the north coast.

IV

During these dramatic developments in the Pacific, American troopships were steadily plying to the British Isles and American cargo ships were steaming eastward to Murmansk and the Middle

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East. All during the summer the striking power of the United Nations in the Middle East was increasing. New British divisions, trained in Britain's "battle school," were sent there, as well as hundreds of American tanks and self-propelled guns.

The Ninth U. S. Air Force, under Major-General Lewis H. Brereton, who was transferred from India, was organized in the desert, and a great stream of American bombers was sent eastward across the Atlantic and Africa to Egypt. Air power, both British and American, was an important factor in stopping Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's spring and early summer drive toward the Valley of the Nile. And in the late summer and fall, British and American air power, greatly strengthened, dried up Rommel's sources and lines of supply and prepared the way for one of the greatest land defeats the Nazis have yet suffered in this war.

During the summer it became evident that a dramatic change in strategic emphasis had occurred. Until July, Britain obviously was to be the main base and Germany was to be attacked by air, and possibly by land, in a cross-Channel invasion. But suddenly the emphasis shifted. By September and October our new plans had become more or less of an open secret.

Early on November 8, American troops began landing from a mighty fleet of transports at selected points in North and West Africa. More than 500 vessels were employed, protected by 350 men-of-war. Following hard upon Rommel's defeat in Egypt, the landings in Algiers and Morocco were plainly designed to catch the North African forces of the Axis in a pincer and to bring the entire south shore of the Mediterranean under our control. The American spearheads were followed by British troops, but the entire expedition was under command of Lieutenant-General Dwight Eisenhower, formerly commander of our forces in Britain. The British troops, and many of the American ones, came from Britain; other American troops were transported directly to the scene from the United States. They were well equipped, had heavy American and R.A.F. air support, and were protected by British and American naval units.

The way had been thoroughly prepared, and the "conquest" of North Africa represented a political and psychological Blitzkrieg, not a military one. There was some naval and coastal battery opposition, particularly around Casablanca, but on the whole there was relatively very little fighting. The other landings were at Fedhala and Port Lyautey, on the Atlantic, and on the

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Mediterranean at Oran and Algiers and later at Bône and Philippeville. Our total initial casualties were under 2,000. The Navy's first announcement of ship losses admitted the destruction of five transports. First, General Henri Honoré Giraud, and then Admiral François Darlan, rallied with many French troops to our banner, and soon all of North Africa was under our control. As these lines are written Dakar too has "come over," and the campaign for Tunis is under way. The campaign for Libya remains to be completed, but the defeat of Rommel in Egypt and the Anglo-American landings in the Western Mediterranean have provided a tremendous psychological and moral "lift" to the United Nations and have given a material advantage to Russia by forcing the diversion of German planes from the eastern front.

We must remember that the North African expedition, a preface to the eventual establishment of a land front in Europe, has necessitated a dispersion of our forces. Britain was stripped of many American troops and many British and American planes were withdrawn to support the landings. The bombing raids on Germany, which incidentally never reached the four-figure frequency predicted last spring, are bound to decline for a time in magnitude. This will also be true of our bombing efforts against German-occupied Europe. The American raids, patterned on a carefully planned program of *day* bombing, commenced to take form and weight in early August. American Flying Fortresses and Consolidated B-24's undertook daylight raids against European ports and objectives in German-occupied France situated within range of British fighter bases. The big bombers suffered light losses. But it must be remembered that they have not yet bombed the interior of Germany in daylight and have nearly always operated with fighter protection. Moreover, the fact that Germany's submarine production and synthetic oil production are both rising shows that any vital impairment of German productive capacity by bombing alone is a long way off indeed.

The fact remains that the United Nations still are attacking in the air in Western Europe; Germany has been hammered and hurt; above all, we are on the move in North Africa and the Pacific. These are prefatory moves. Victory is a long way off. Yet the summer and fall of 1942 have seen a profound change in the complexion of the war. "The end of the beginning" is in sight.

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POSTWAR PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES

By Sir Herbert Emerson

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT predicted in October 1939 that "when this ghastly war ends there may be not one million but ten million or twenty million men, women and children, belonging to many races and many religions, living in many countries and possibly on several continents, who will enter into the wide picture — the problem of the human refugee." [1] If we regard as refugees all those who have had to leave their homes because of military operations or persecution, through fear or under compulsion, then even the higher figure mentioned by the President has already been exceeded.

The most numerous refugee group consists of those who have had to flee before advancing armies. In China alone there are said to be fifty million of these. There must be almost as many Russians who have been evacuated or have escaped from German-occupied territory. Two million Indians who had long been settled in Burma have found their way to India. No reliable figures are available on the Poles who fled to Soviet Russia or on those who fled from Russian Poland into German Poland and the Vilna territory, but the number must run into the millions. When the Low Countries and France were invaded, the stream of refugees blocked the roads, and although most have now returned, thirty thousand civilians and many more soldiers — Belgians, Dutch, Poles, Czechs and other nationalities — escaped to Great Britain alone. So it has gone all over the world — in Greece, Jugoslavia, Malaya and the East Indies. In most of the cases mentioned the number of refugees has been limited only by the means of escape.

The movement of labor from occupied territories into Germany, or within those territories, is of a somewhat different character. Some of it, no doubt, has been voluntary but many have had to move under coercion. Then there are the transfers of populations as a result of cessions of territory. Rumania, perhaps, has suffered most in this way; two hundred thousand persons are said to have moved from Transylvania alone to the remaining parts of Rumania. Most revolting of all in its deliberate brutality has been the mass expulsion or deportation by the Nazis of whole classes of

[1] Address to members of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee dealing with refugee problems, Washington, October 17, 1939.

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people, especially the Jews. Four hundred thousand persons were expelled from Greater Germany before the war, and the same policy and methods have been extended to countries that have come under the German heel. The Vichy Government also adopted the same practices. Since the war began, not only have there been mass deportations of Jews into Poland and western Russia, but Jews have been collected locally and segregated in central ghettos.

These examples by no means exhaust the list of population movements, but they will suffice to show that when the war ends millions of persons will be scattered over the face of the globe, separated from their homes, many of them with no homes to return to and some with no government willing to protect them. This is a bare statement of the problem in its most simple form. As for a solution, all that can be attempted here is to break down the problem into its main elements and to suggest two or three basic principles which should be followed in trying to deal with them.

II

First let us distinguish between the short-term and the long-term problem. "Short-term" must for the time being remain undefined. But we can say that though it is not likely to be less than five years from the cessation of hostilities, beyond that it will approach what we can call long-term. The immediate problem will be that of relief, using the word in a wide sense; and the objective should be not merely to relieve privation and want but to get as many persons as possible back to their own countries, and, where feasible, to their own homes. Relief will include many activities beside the feeding of the needy, although this in itself will be a colossal task, involving the production, collection, financing, transportation (often overseas) and distribution of supplies so that they are in the right quantity in the right place at the right time. Relief will also include supplying medical needs, coördination of private efforts in such matters as the special care of children, and the organization and control of transport so that masses of people will move in accordance with the ability of the countries of destination to absorb and maintain them.

The difficulties are sure to be greatly increased by the sudden closing down or contraction of war industries, which will throw many out of employment. They will be further complicated by the problems presented by two large groups of persons of which as yet

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no mention has been made — men and women under arms, and prisoners of war. The military forces of the defeated enemy will break up. Those of the United Nations will have to be demobilized. Prisoners of war must be cared for and repatriated. It will be natural and necessary to give some measure of priority to the needs of men who have fought. Furthermore, cessation of the main hostilities may not bring an end to strife. Secondary wars may follow, as they did in 1918 and 1919, and in some countries internal revolution may precede the formation of stable governments. Some time must elapse, also, before the civil administrations can be expected to be in smooth operation. For this reason, as well as because of military requirements, the work of relief will at first have to be carried out by the armies of occupation.

The picture is a somber one. There is, however, one factor which will help solve a problem which would otherwise be almost insoluble. This is the homing instinct. The great mass of displaced persons will turn instinctively to their own countries. Moreover, where stable governments exist or as they come into existence, they will normally wish to have their own nationals back and they may be expected not only to coöperate fully with international or Allied agencies in accomplishing the tasks involved, but to utilize their own resources to as great an extent as possible. The difficulty in most cases will not be to persuade people to return to their own countries, but to regulate the movement.

But although the vast majority of exiles will wish to return home, and will be welcomed by their governments, there will be a residuum of whom this will not be true. Some will be unable to return for reasons other than physical — either because their governments will not be prepared to receive them or because they themselves will refuse, in view of past events, to incur the fresh risks that might be involved. We cannot estimate today how large this residuum may be, but since the total of displaced persons is already many millions even a small percentage will present a formidable problem. These persons will be true refugees in the sense in which the word has hitherto been used in international authority and practice. In this sense a refugee may be said to be a person who, for other than physical reasons, is unable to return to his own country and to enjoy there the protection of the government. The obstacles in his way are usually found either in the system or policy of a government which practices some form of political, racial or religious persecution, or in changes in state bound-

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aries, usually as a result of military conquest. Often the refugee has been deprived of his nationality and is stateless. The common use of the word "refugee" to denote not only persons of the class just described, but also those who, for temporary reasons, are unable to get back to their own countries or to their own homes, is confusing, since the two classes will present different problems which will have to be dealt with by different agencies. It is necessary to distinguish between them, and for convenience I will refer to the temporary exiles as short-term refugees and to the others as long-term refugees.

Some of the postwar problems will be common to both groups. Both, for example, will need relief of their physical distress in the period immediately following the end of hostilities. The United Nations are understood to have this problem already in hand and it may be assumed that there will be an allied organization which will undertake the relief measures mentioned. It may also be assumed that, so far as the relief of privation is concerned, this body will make no distinction between nationals and strangers or between short-term and long-term refugees, and that the sole test will be the necessity for relief. The same standards should be applied to all, and this requires that the responsibility for relief, so far as it is of an international character, should be vested in a single agency. To attempt to set up one international authority to relieve the physical distress of nationals and another for non-nationals would lead to confusion, conflict and variation in standards, and would cause a great deal of unnecessary suffering. Still more confusion would result if attempts were made at that stage to distinguish between short-term and long-term refugees. Indeed, it will not be possible for some time to make a final classification of non-nationals as short-term or long-term refugees. Some groups will at once come within the long-term category. In other cases it will be necessary to wait to classify them until future conditions in their countries of origin become clear and until their own attitudes have been determined. Much will depend on whether or not former state boundaries are restored. Here again the facts will not be evident at once, and premature assumptions regarding the long-term status of particular groups are therefore to be deprecated. The initial object should be to return as many willing persons as possible to their own countries as soon as possible. We know that there will be at once some groups which cannot be returned, however, and it is probable that similar groups

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will emerge later. They will constitute the problem of the long-term refugee, and it is with this that I am primarily concerned.

III

Experience in the 20 years since the last war, and particularly the expulsion by the Nazis of whole classes of Germans, has left no doubt that the refugee question is of international concern. On the humanitarian side, it has outstripped the resources of private benevolence; politically and economically it affects so many states that it calls for concerted action; while the causes that create the refugee can only be prevented by international sanctions. If, therefore, a solution is to be found, there must be an international organization competent to deal with the problem's many aspects. I will call this organization the International Refugee Authority.

At present two international organizations are concerned with refugees. The older is the League of Nations, acting through a Commission. Since Dr. Nansen became High Commissioner in 1921 there has been no time when the League has not had definite responsibilities for particular groups of refugees. The responsibilities and the groups have varied, but the League's record of experience and service is a continuous one. The League has consistently given special attention to the political and legal protection of those groups which from time to time have been brought within its mandate.

The Intergovernmental Committee — the other international organization concerned with refugees — came into being at the conference held at Evian in July 1938 on the initiative of President Roosevelt. Its specific object was to find a solution of the involuntary emigration of nationals from Greater Germany. The hope was that a long-term program might be arranged in collaboration with the German Government and within the framework of the existing immigration laws and practices of the various governments concerned. The coöperation of the German Government would have made possible an orderly system of emigration which might have been financed largely from the assets of the emigrants themselves. Some prospects of this hope being achieved still existed when the outbreak of war created an entirely new situation. The Intergovernmental Committee has devoted itself particularly to examining and encouraging schemes of permanent settlement.

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Each of these two bodies has limited functions, has a mandate restricted to particular groups of refugees, and has strictly defined the financial responsibilities. Neither would be able, then, in its present form, to deal effectively with the postwar problem. Either one could, however, be adapted and developed for the purpose. I do not wish to make any suggestion along this line, but prefer to outline what I conceive to be the functions of a single International Refugee Authority, capable of dealing with the main questions that will arise.

IV

The Authority's mandate should extend to each group of long-term refugees as soon as it is satisfied that the group as a whole is of this character. Thus immediately after the war it might thus be concerned with only a few groups — for example, refugees from Greater Germany and the so-called Nansen refugees (who now include the Russian and Armenian refugees from the last war) and perhaps the Spanish refugees. It would enlarge its mandate as the long-term character of other groups became evident. It would, therefore, have to be fully informed of the facts of the changing political and economic situation. It would be concerned with all matters affecting the interests of refugee groups which required international action or assistance and which were not the responsibility of some other international agency. Thus, if the immediate relief of physical distress after the war were the function of an Allied relief organization, the Refugee Authority would not have to participate in that task except in areas where the relief organization was not operating or where, by agreement with that body, there was reason for it to do so.

But physical distress is only one question. The Refugee Authority would deal with all questions affecting the long-term refugee which are outside the scope of a relief organization — always keeping in mind its essential purpose of discovering a final solution for the groups within its care. This purpose cannot be emphasized too strongly. The world has become so accustomed to refugees that there is a tendency to regard them, if not as a permanent incubus, at least as an unavoidable incident of modern society. As a result, even the refugees themselves sometimes attach more importance to the palliatives than to the cure. The legal and political protection of the stateless person, for instance, is a matter of great importance which will continue to demand in-

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ternational action, but it is only a stage toward the real goal, which is to furnish the stateless person with a home and a nationality so that he ceases to be stateless — a counsel of perfection perhaps, but one which has to be borne constantly in mind.

In the discharge of this primary duty the Authority will have to undertake many auxiliary functions, among them the following: to influence governments to adopt humanitarian principles in their attitude toward refugees, and to secure so far as possible a common code of rights in such matters as criminal and civil justice, education, health and state relief; to encourage the acceptance of appropriate forms of travel documents and passports of stateless persons; to develop and coördinate humanitarian assistance from international, state and private funds; to advise on, and, if necessary, to assist schemes of training and re-training to fit refugees for available employment and increase their economic value to the countries of reception; and to carry out or assist surveys of areas for settlement, and of particular industries for development by refugees. In general, the Authority will seek to convert refugees into citizens, either by their return to their own countries, or by their absorption within the country of refuge, by their normal emigration to other countries, or by large-scale settlement. These duties would relate primarily to long-term refugees, but, as after the last war, long-term problems may also arise in connection with persons who have returned to their own country and are technically no longer refugees but who nevertheless have to be resettled on a scale so large as to require international assistance. The International Refugee Authority might be a suitable agency to carry out such schemes.

It would be incumbent on the Authority to work in the closest coöperation with all states concerned, especially with the countries of temporary asylum, and to encourage each to take its full share in developing the final solution. It should work through and with the state authorities so far as possible, and where assistance was necessary it should give it freely. Similarly, it should coöperate with and encourage voluntary organizations working in the same or related fields. In the past, these have taken the foremost part in refugee work, and no praise is too high for their devotion and achievements. Both during the period immediately after the war and later, the voluntary workers can make a valuable contribution toward the relief of distress and the solution of refugee problems. They bring to their work a human element sometimes

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absent from official agencies; they are not fettered to the same extent by rules and regulations; and they establish individual contacts which a busy official has not the time to make. They are usually economical in their methods, and the reputation they have established enables them to tap private sources of revenue which can supplement state or international funds.

At the same time, it may be desirable, especially during the early period, to coördinate the efforts of the private agencies and the work of the International Refugee Authority so as to avoid overlapping, confusion and waste. The volunteer bodies could relieve both the Authority and the foreign offices of the countries concerned of a large part of the great mass of case work, that is to say, the hundred and one questions of detail which arise regarding individuals. Otherwise the Authority and the governments concerned would have to maintain large staffs for that purpose. Before the war, almost all the organizations were entirely dependent on private finance. They could not sustain the burden and in some countries they are now aided by the government. While private charity will no doubt continue to flow freely, it can provide only a part of the necessary funds. The voluntary bodies will have to be assisted from international or state funds; but any aid given will be more than repaid in the form of work done which would otherwise fall on public authorities.

V

Many of the issues that will have been suggested to the reader in the course of the preceding summary of a vast and complicated problem cannot be dealt with here; but there is one about which something must be said. How are new homes to be found for the refugees? I have mentioned four methods — return to their own countries; absorption in the countries of temporary asylum; normal emigration; and large-scale settlements. In the past, emigration was by far the most successful way of handling refugee movements. It was the normal remedy before countries of immigration found it necessary to impose restrictions. Even so, it took care by infiltration of at least 85 percent of the 250,000 refugees from Greater Germany who were permanently settled before the war. It will, no doubt, continue to play an important part; but we would be foolish to shut our eyes to certain facts.

After the war some time is likely to pass before the ebb and flow of migration reverts even to prewar conditions (in which it

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will be recalled, many restrictions were in operation). In ordinary circumstances, emigration provides outlets for the overflow of populations by spreading it over countries where it can be put to use economically, with benefit to all. This presupposes a reasonable degree of stability in the countries of reception, a factor likely to be absent or uncertain immediately after the war. Employment may be difficult; the absorption of demobilized men and women into civil work will take time; the change-over from war to peace industry will not be easy; and the prospects in the various primary industries, such as agriculture, will not at once be clear. Some countries may be reluctant to open their doors until the future — particularly of their own people — can be forecast with some accuracy. These factors may be offset by others more favorable. The ravages of war may convert a previous excess of population in some European areas into a shortage; repair of the ravages of war may dispel the specter of unemployment; new financial and economic policies may produce rapid results.

However this may be, we would be unwise to assume that either the capacity or the will of countries to receive immigrants will be unlimited in the years immediately following the end of the war. To find homes for the refugees we shall certainly have to resort to all the four methods mentioned. Every effort will have to be made, too, to keep the number down to manageable proportions. This can be done in two ways. First, as many as possible of the persecuted should be enabled to return to the countries from which they were expelled; second, causes which might otherwise lead to an immediate exodus of a new host of refugees should be removed.

As regards the first, compulsory repatriation is out of the question. The persecuted must go back of their own free will. At the best, they will not do so unless they are reasonably certain that they can live the lives of citizens with the rights of citizens, and with full protection of life and property. As for the second, there are now countries in Europe where whole classes of the population, and especially the Jews, are suffering every form of persecution that a diabolical ingenuity can devise. There are millions who would escape tomorrow if they were able to do so. No wonder that many regard these countries as places in which they cannot live in the future. There is grave danger of a new rush outward as soon as the opportunity occurs — a centrifugal movement which would go far to cancel the homing instinct of others, and which would superimpose on the long-term problem a new refugee prob-

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lem which would make the whole intractable and insoluble.

It must be the business of the United Nations to see that this does not happen. In imposing terms of peace they must at once annul all discriminatory legislation and end all administrative measures of discrimination. They must restore to the affected classes the rights of citizens and guarantee them safety and protection of life and property. These measures must have the sanction of military force. True, this alone will not wipe out the legacy of hatred and prejudice which Nazism will leave behind. Time is the only real solvent. But conditions must meanwhile be made at least tolerable, and the principle enforced that it is the first duty of a government to protect its own nationals. It is not only the fate of the millions of persons now directly affected that is at issue. If the flagrant breach of this principle by the Nazis is condoned, then sooner or later other countries will inevitably adopt the same evil methods. The refugee problem, which will otherwise yield to treatment, would then have to be designated as beyond solution.

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GERMANY'S VULNERABLE SPOT: TRANSPORTATION

By Karl Brandt

LONG before this war began, military and economic strategists were trying to calculate just where, when it did begin, the pressure of blockade and counter-blockade would first precipitate a crisis. Today, in the fourth winter of the conflict, it has become apparent that transportation is one of the critically weak spots in the modern industrialized economy.

There is no secret about the fact that all the belligerents are in the midst of a transportation crisis. Roosevelt and Churchill have dealt repeatedly with the dangerous shipping situation; on November 6, 1942, Stalin spoke of Russia's serious transportation problems; and for two years Hitler has been emphasizing his achievements in staving off a transportation tie-up. Which of the belligerents will find its military position affected most seriously by this bottleneck? The war economy of which will deteriorate first? The answers depend, first, upon the reserve capacities available to each, and, second, upon the ability of its opponents to interfere with or to paralyze the flow of its traffic.

None of the belligerents could have had more foreknowledge of the crucial importance of transportation in modern warfare than Germany. In the First World War she staked her hope of victory largely on her plans to cripple the seaborne transportation of the Allies, while keeping her own continental rail and waterway system in good order. On May 4, 1917, Count Bernstorff warned General Ludendorff of the import of America's entry into the war with "resources of a really serious nature within a year's time." Ludendorff answered: "We do not need a year; we shall have finished, by means of the U-boat war, before that time."[1] But by the fall of 1918, Germany had not only lost the submarine war; her own transportation system was in a pitiful condition, despite most impressive performances by engineering troops and the state railroads. The exhaustion of the means of transport contributed both to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and then to the defeat of Germany herself.[2]

[1] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, "Official German Documents Relating to the World War." 1923, v. 1, p. 312.

[2] *Cf.* A. Sarter, "Die deutschen Eisenbahnen im Kriege." Stuttgart and New Haven, 1930.

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Entering a Second World War, the German General Staff was certain to have all the transportation aces up its sleeve. Indeed, the new strategy of a lightning war of motion was built around transportation. The German staff felt that if it was mobile on, above, and around the entire continent, and if it were equipped to attack the enemy's railroads, bridges, highways, docks and shipping from the air and from under the sea, the possibility that the 1914–18 experience could be repeated was excluded.

Evidence is accumulating, however, that the pattern of the First World War is being followed in the Second. By the spring of 1917 the German submarine warfare had created a real transportation crisis for England. But by the winter of 1917–18, the crisis had plainly shifted to the traffic system in Germany. In this war, the submarine warfare has created a most serious crisis in ocean shipping for the United Nations, but it is far from disrupting their communications. For several months past, American and British shipbuilding has been gaining in tonnage over sinkings, and the shipping situation can be said to be gradually improving, although it will probably continue to be tense as long as the war lasts. Of the greatest significance is the fact that the United Nations have not yet called fully into play their great dormant reserve capacity to produce ships.

In the same period the German transportation system has begun to show more and more symptoms of gradual but steadily increasing strain, which in turn taxes the country's industrial capacity and its management and manpower resources. As in 1914–18, the Germans have miscalculated the length of the war. In the course of three years the colossus of the mechanized *Blitzkrieg* has consumed so much territory that its momentum is now confined to limited segments on the outer rim of the continent. Three days before he struck against Poland, Hitler reminded his officers that the aim was not to conquer territory but "to destroy the enemy physically." The achievement so far has been, in general, the opposite: the Nazi armies have absorbed a stupendous expanse of territory, but they have not destroyed the enemy. As a result, transportation is the sector of the Nazi economic and military realm which suffers the greatest wear and tear and which generates the most exasperating friction. It follows that transportation is the sector which offers the Allies the greatest opportunities for softening and finally cracking Germany's economic and military resistance.

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II

One of the outstanding characteristics of modern industrialized economy is the high velocity and volume of its traffic. This is a result of the concentration of heavy industries, the decentralization of forest and agricultural resources, the division of labor between heavy and manufacturing industries, and specialization. The circulatory system, which moves goods as well as people, is composed of sea routes, coastal and inland waterways, railroads, highways, subways, tramways and pipelines. It represents the greatest accumulated investment of the industrial age and it does not lend itself to quick expansion. In the totalitarian economy of Nazi Europe, this whole arterial system is centrally controlled from Berlin. The subordination of economic considerations to strategic necessities puts a premium on the capacity of the system to shift the volume of traffic to alternative branches during emergencies and to stretch its service far beyond normal limits. Difficulties developed in the German transportation system in the final period while war was being prepared, and others have appeared since the conflict began; but the German General Staff, assisted by resourceful technical staffs, is constantly on the alert to stave off any real crisis in any branch.

One of the important branches is seaborne traffic. Before the war, the ports of Europe received annually between 350 and 400 million tons of goods, 45 to 48 percent of it coming from other continents. The British-American blockade has cut off Europe from all overseas imports, with the exception of very restricted navicert shipments to Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Spain. In this way, from 130 to 180 million tons of goods per annum formerly imported from overseas are blocked. Some of them, such as foreign oilseeds, fats and oils and feed grains, can be spared. Most of them, however, are still needed and must be obtained from continental sources. This throws the burden on European coastal and inland shipping, on the railroads and on trucking.

Despite Nazi Europe's loss of ocean traffic with the other continents, it still does a sizeable maritime shipping business. The Baltic, the eastern and southern parts of the North Sea, the Channel and French Atlantic coasts, parts of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea lie within the orbit of the German Navy and the German merchant marine. Ores, timber and wood pulp from

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Finland, Sweden, Russia, the Baltic states and Poland, and some Polish potatoes and grain, move to German ports in the Baltic and to some extent into the North Sea ports of Hamburg, Bremen and Emden, through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which in recent years has surpassed the Panama Canal in volume of traffic. The Baltic is a German lake, subject to only occasional hazards from mines and Russian submarines. The North Sea, however, is a fiercely contested area; here German traffic requires strong naval


German-controlled territory, as of about Nov. 20, 1942
German-controlled shipping routes, ocean and inland
Area of most important inland waterway traffic
Scale of miles
0 200 400 600
400 mi.
200 mi.

and air protection. Up to July 15, 1942, the British sank 223 merchant vessels and damaged many more in the English Channel, the North Sea and the entrance to the Baltic. Shipping along the Norwegian, Danish, German, Dutch, Belgian and French coasts is a vital link in the German transportation system, and it is open to attack, especially by submarine and daylight bombing raids. The loss of every single ship is serious, since a full cargo vessel of 6,000 tons carries the load of ten long freight trains and since in any case a great deal of the North Sea traffic simply cannot be transferred to railroads.

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The following table indicates the size of the merchant marine which Germany might have hoped to get under her control at the beginning of the present war.

I. THE MERCHANT MARINE (STEAM AND MOTOR) OF NAZI-CONTROLLED EUROPE [1]

(in thousands of gross tons)

Country 1939		*Available to United Nations 1941* [2]	*Unaccounted for*	*Available to Germany 1941*
Germany	4,483	960 [3]	...	7,908
Italy	3,425			
Denmark	1,175	311	94	770
Norway	4,834	3,800	34	1,000
Holland	2,969	2,250	359	360
Belgium	408	200	178	30 [5]
France	2,934	400	34	2,000 [5] 500 [6]
Finland	590	30	60	500 [5]
Sweden	1,577	800 [4]	377	400 [5]
Latvia Estonia	505	100	405	...
Poland Rumania Jugoslavia	522	180	342	...
Greece	1,780	1,000	780	...
Others	98	...	98	...
Total	25,300	10,031	2,761	12,508

[1] Column one, Lloyd's data for 1939; column two, "Available to United Nations," based on fragments of information from *Fairplay*, *The Economist*, and *Foreign Commerce Weekly*; column four, "Available to Germany" mainly as estimated by *The Economist*, December 13, 1941, p. 716–17.
[2] Up to June 30, 1941, these fleets suffered a loss of 1,500,000 gross tons.
[3] Continental shipping tied up in ports of North and South America.
[4] *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, March 21, 1942, p. 17, reports about one-half of Sweden's prewar tonnage outside blockade (not free to supply Sweden, however, with the exception of five ships per month).
[5] Germany probably using for its own ends a large part of tonnage indicated.
[6] Captured.

To the above total of 25.3 million tons of shipping which Germany might have hoped to control at the end of 1939 should be added about 3 million tons more of ships built since that time, making a total of 28.3 million tons. In actual fact, however, it seems that some 19.3 million tons should be deducted from this sum. According to the British Admiralty, about 6 million tons of German shipping had been sunk by August 1942. About 2.8 million tons, listed in column three of the table as "unaccounted for," probably did not fall into German hands.[3] Another 10 mil-

[3] Out of the 2.8 million tons "unaccounted for," the Germans may have gained control of over a million tons, while probably more than a million tons of Greek, Jugoslav, Polish and Latvian vessels included in that figure were sunk. However, other losses not considered here probably counterbalance that possible gain. Some German ships fled to Japan, others were lost by accidents.

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lion tons, as shown in the fourth column of the table, became available to the United Nations, including 960,000 tons, chiefly German and Italian ships, tied up in North and South America. The occupation of Morocco and Algeria by the United Nations has made perhaps 500,000 tons (possibly much more) of the French merchant marine inaccessible to the Axis. All these losses combined amount to 19.3 million tons. If we deduct this figure from the potential total of 28.3 million tons we find that at the end of 1942 about 9 million tons of shipping may be estimated to be under Axis control.

In the Mediterranean, Germany depends on the Italian merchant marine, plus some French vessels and a few surviving Greek ones. If she had succeeded in acquiring the entire Italian and Greek merchant marines intact, she would have gained more than 5 million tons. There may be between 2 and 3 million tons at Germany's disposal today in the entire Mediterranean. So long as the Luftwaffe was entrenched in Tripoli, as well as in Sardinia, Sicily, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese Islands, Germany controlled the main shipping lanes. The establishment of United Nations air forces in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya will change this picture. The most crippling blow that can be struck against the entire transportation system of Nazi Europe is to batter down the Luftwaffe over the Mediterranean and sink Nazi merchant ships. Destruction of the main part of the Axis merchant fleet in the Mediterranean would lead to a collapse of industrial production in Italy and would expose the flank of the Nazi land transportation system to direct attack. At the same time it would improve communications for the United Nations.

III

While seaborne traffic and coastal shipping are of vital importance to Europe, a much greater volume of goods, armaments, munitions and men moves within the continent, chiefly by inland waterways and railroads.

Germany's rivers and canals are better developed for navigation than those of any other country, with the exception of the Lowlands. In many ways they provide the supplement to sea and rail transport which in the United States is represented by trucking. Canals connect the heart of the German heavy-industry region in the lower Rhineland and Westphalia with the North Sea, the Channel, the Baltic, and all the major rivers; also with

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central Germany, Czechoslovakia, Silesia and Poland; and via the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal with the Black Sea. In 1938 the last link of the west-east Mittelland-Kanal, which cost 1.4 billion marks, was opened, and since then another canal has connected it with the Hermann Göring Works at Salzgitter. Some 14 million tons of freight were transported from this plant alone in 1941. Also located on the Mittelland-Kanal is the big automotive factory at Fallersleben, which was supposed to produce the "people's car" but now turns out "jeeps" for the army.

In normal times traffic on the inland waterways of Germany represents a quarter of the aggregate ton mileage moved on rails, rivers and canals. The inland port of Duisburg-Ruhrort has a greater volume of traffic than the ports of New York, Liverpool or Buenos Aires.

Traffic by inland waterways, of course, is slow at any season, and in winter canals as well as some rivers are frozen for several months (though this is less true in the Rhineland). Nevertheless, inland waterways are particularly valuable in wartime because they relieve the railroads and are suited to moving bulk goods, which often can be transferred directly to barges from seagoing vessels. In peacetime about 35 to 37 percent of the total traffic by inland waterways consisted of coal, 15 to 17 percent of ores, 20 percent of building materials, 4 to 5 percent of metals and 2 to 3 of fertilizer. The rest was composed of miscellaneous agricultural products. In 1939 Germany owned nearly 6,000 inland vessels, one million tons of which were steam or Diesel powered, also 13,000 unpowered barges with 6 million tons capacity. These vessels moved 26 billion ton-kilometers compared to about 80 for the railroads. Several thousand more barges were seized by Germany in the Lowlands, Belgium and France. In September 1940, when Hitler was preparing to cross the Channel, he assembled 3,000 self-propelled barges with a capacity of a million tons in ports from Amsterdam to Cherbourg. A great many of these were lost to the vigilant R.A.F., but on the whole the German inland marine suffered only slightly.

During the war, the Germans have made strenuous efforts to shift a greater burden to the waterways, especially as the railroads began to feel the wartime strain and as trucking came under handicaps of tire, fuel and vehicle shortages. The ice-bound period has been reduced by the use of icebreakers, and the greatest possible economy of time is enforced in loading and unloading.

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In 1941, as a result, the canal and river traffic increased by one-fifth over the 1940 volume. Fully 60 percent of the tonnage that moves by Germany's inland waterway transportation system is handled in the Rhineland, with the heaviest traffic flowing from Belgium and Holland to Hanover and Berlin. Acquisition of control over the Danube has also opened up important new possibilities for traffic in Rumanian oil, Russian manganese and Turkish chrome ores, as well as in grain from the Ukraine and Rumania, all, of course, up-river, and in coal and munitions down-river.

The most vital part of Germany's inland waterways system lies within a 450-mile radius of the English coast, within easy range, as the accompanying map shows, of British and American air attack. The R.A.F. bombed the port of Duisburg-Ruhrort 22 times in four months in 1940 alone. It also succeeded in bombing the aqueduct of the Dortmund-Ems Canal north of Münster so severely that traffic was interrupted for weeks. Traffic on this canal, the only water link between the Ruhr Valley and northern, western and central Germany, is the equivalent of several hundred trainloads a day. But on the whole, Germany's inland waterways have suffered less from bombing than have the German railroads.

IV

But in spite of the importance of seaborne traffic and inland waterways, railroads are the core of Nazi Europe's transportation system. In prewar years, the railroads of Europe (excluding Russia) moved about a billion metric tons of cargo annually, compared with from 350 to 400 million tons of seaborne traffic. Of that railroad traffic, Germany's railroads carried about 45 percent. It is in railroad transportation that the bottleneck is most serious.

The German railroads reached the limits of their capacity in 1937 and by fall were short 100,000 box cars.[4] The deficit is estimated to be 15 to 20 percent of the existing loading capacity.[5]

In 1938 the steep rise in industrial production, topped by the hasty construction of the Westwall and the express automobile roads, and by traffic reorganization projects in the larger cities, began to overtax the capacity of the national railroads. In that year the Reichsbahn moved almost 80 billion ton kilometers with

[4] *Cf.* Reichs-Kredit Gesellschaft AG, "Deutschlands Wirtschafts Entwickelung Im Ersten Halbjahr 1938."

[5] *Wochenbericht*, February 15, 1939, p. 36.

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only 593,000 freight cars, compared with 69 billion in the previous peak year (1929) when 660,000 cars were used. By October and November, a shortage of cars for the coal mines of the Ruhr led to the piling up of stocks. Unloading on Sundays was introduced as a remedy. Financially, the Reichsbahn was handicapped with heavy taxes and reduced rates for members of the Nazi Party and the Army, and thus was unable to finance from its own proceeds the large-scale investment needed. Indeed, the critical condition of the German railroads, and the loud complaints which Germans made about it and a multitude of other economic difficulties, led many foreign observers to the erroneous conclusion that the Nazis would be unable to fight a war.

However, the necessary work of adjustment was undertaken without delay. In 1939 the Reichsbahn made three times as great an investment in rolling stock as it had the year previous, placing large orders in German, Austrian and Czech railroad shops. Only a part of the order was received, however, probably because of inadequate priorities on steel.

Since the war began, Germany has added to the transport services at her disposal the railroads of most of continental Europe, with the exception of those in Switzerland, the Iberian Peninsula and Sweden. Their trackage and capacity (as of 1937) are shown in the following table:

II. THE RAILROADS OF NAZI-CONTROLLED EUROPE

Areas	*Trackage (kilometers)*	*Locomotives (number)*	*Passenger cars (number)*	*Freight cars (number)*	*Freight traffic (in billion ton kilometers)*
Germany	68,000	21,600	67,000	575,000	80.5
Western Europe [1]	51,000	23,600	40,500	627,000	41.7
Northern Europe [2]	12,000	1,900	6,000	48,000	3.6
Eastern Europe [3]	24,000	6,000	14,000	75,000	18.9
Italy	17,000	5,800	7,000	127,000	11.2
Southeastern Europe [4]	53,000	14,900	29,000	295,000	25.1
Occupied Russia (1942)	34,000	?	?	?	?
Total	259,000	73,800	163,500	1,747,000	

[1] Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France. [2] Denmark, Norway, Finland. [3] Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland. [4] Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Greece.

As the table shows, the mileage of railroads under German control has expanded almost four times. The new figure is 63 percent of the mileage in the United States, while probably 50 to 60 percent of the United States tonnage is shipped. It would appear that the figures of nearly 75,000 locomotives and more than 1.7 mil-

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lion freight cars are ample compared with 44,000 engines and 1.7 million freight cars in the United States. However, a comparison of the ton kilometers moved per engine in different countries shows how much more limited is the use of engines in those which are mountainous.[6] For example, the average million ton kilometers of freight per year per locomotive is only 3.8 in Germany and 11.8 in the United States. Furthermore, some five or six thousand German locomotives are useful only as switch engines or for local passenger traffic. A considerable number of the heavier engines are always under repair. Also, some four or five thousand heavy engines had to be sent into Poland and Russia where many of them were damaged by frost and by war action.

The Germans have also faced many problems in connection with the railroads coming under their control outside the borders of the Reich. One rail on the roadbeds in conquered Russia had to be moved to conform with the western European gauge, which is 3½ inches narrower. In Poland, the Baltic states and Russia, literally hundreds of bridges and thousands of switches had to be rebuilt. The Russians probably succeeded in withdrawing or destroying the major part of their rolling stock, except perhaps in the Donetz Basin and the northern Caucasus. During the earlier part of the war, however, the Germans proved very efficient in railroad reconstruction. In his address of October 3, 1941, Hitler stated that of 25,000 kilometers seized, 15,000 had already been changed over to German gauge. And on September 30, 1942, he declared that "in a few more weeks" all the bridges and tracks would be finished. As of November 1942, Germany operates about 34,000 kilometers of the Russian railroad system.

For many years the French railroads have been in notoriously bad shape. Today their condition is paralyzing to the French economy. Only 7,000 locomotives out of 18,900 are reported to have been in running condition on the eve of the war. About half of that number are said to be left in use, due to German requisitions, scarcity of lubricants and wear on matériel.[7] In Jugoslavia and Greece most of the bridges and viaducts were blasted during the fighting. The heavy traffic in the Reich, and in Holland, Belgium, northern France, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the

[6] Many other factors than topography affect the ton mileage per engine, among them the size and power of the engines, the type of cargo, the length of average haul, the interference of passenger traffic with freight schedules and the general capacity of the trackage. It is not easy to increase the efficiency with which engines are utilized.

[7] *Cf. New York Times*, August 5, 1942, p. 4.

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long-distance shipping to the Russian front, have combined to create serious shortages of rolling stock, the results of which have been felt throughout Nazi Europe.

Italy is another serious liability so far as railroad transport goes. She must get all her coal from Germany, and today it must be shipped by rail instead of by sea. Some 27,000 cars and 700 heavy locomotives are assigned to the constant task of hauling coal to Italy. Because of congestion in the Ruhr and on the Brenner Pass, shipments frequently have been from the Silesian mines via Vienna and Klagenfurt instead of from the Ruhr. Time and again Germany has defaulted on her coal commitments to Italy, as well as on those to her small customer, Denmark.

The rolling stock of Nazi-controlled Europe is so overtaxed that many expedients have to be adopted. Since June 30, 1942, German freight cars with a normal capacity of 10 to 15 tons may be loaded two tons above that limit. Belgian and French cars may be loaded one ton above the normal limit. A "coke boundary" prohibits cross-hauling of Ruhr and Silesian coal. Moreover, Germany has been drawing more and more rolling stock out of France. Originally about 60,000 cars and an unknown number of locomotives were transferred from the occupied territory. Recent reports indicate a deal whereby Vichy would deliver 1,000 locomotives, 40,000 box cars and 35,000 trucks, plus several thousand miles of rail ripped up in France.[8] But perhaps the occupation of southern France will now compel Germany to bring back some rolling stock and reorganize the whole dilapidated French system.

In Germany itself, transport offices were instituted for the building trades and in 1941 began to draw up biweekly plans for shipping building materials to all essential construction projects. Builders were forced to depend more heavily on local sources and to divert freight from the railroads to the waterways. As a result, the mileage used for building materials was said to have been reduced by one-half.

Other expedients had to be resorted to in order to cope with the increase in potato consumption from 13 to 23 million tons. This called for the shipment by rail of an additional 4 or 5 million tons from the eastern surplus areas to the western consumption centers in a very short period in September and October 1941. This is precisely the peak load season in any case. Coal for households, sugar beets, grain and fertilizer must all be moved then, as well as

[8] *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, October 10, 1942, p. 17.

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winter supplies for the front. The late frost last spring, when seed potatoes had to be shipped westward and fertilizer and seed grain had to be distributed, also caused most serious congestion. The result was serious discussion in Germany of a plan to shift a large part of the potato acreage to the west, which would be contrary to all sound farming principles. In any event, shipments of potatoes were assigned to waterways and put under the direction of special transport offices under regional peasant leaders.[9] Some potatoes were shipped by truck. In 1941 over one million truckloads were moved, using 18 percent more trucks than in preceding years.

Many other steps have been taken to avert the threat of a partial collapse of the German transportation services. Shifts of officials are constantly being made, with more and more powers being conferred on the Inspector General of Transportation, Jakob Werlin. Passenger traffic is cut to the bone. Very strict priority schemes are enforced. New construction of buildings is being even more sharply curtailed. Greater efficiency is demanded in the utilization of freight cars. Yet in 1941, with the output of coal and steel at a high rate and all industrial production being speeded up to the limit, the ton mileage covered on rails increased by 32 percent over the 1940 level.

As another partial remedy for this precarious situation, Germany has launched a program for the construction of new rolling stock which if carried through will constitute a record. The railroad shops and locomotive factories throughout Europe have received huge orders. The limitation of engines to a few standardized models will reduce the time and materials needed. In 1941 the output of freight cars in the Greater Reich is said to have been double that of the preceding year, and engine output 65 percent higher. Since wood is available in Poland and northwestern Russia, the construction of box cars is probably being shifted largely to railroad shops in those regions. Whether steel will be available will depend on military requirements. The real bottleneck in rolling stock, however, is skilled labor rather than materials. In locomotive plants, boilermakers are the key mechanics. Moreover, engine building competes with shipbuilding (fireboxes and boilers), with heavy ordnance and airplane and tank engines (forgings), and with general steel construction and mechanical engineering. If engine construction is greatly accelerated, the labor

[9] H. W. Singer, "The German War Economy," Part VI, *The Economic Journal*, June–September 1942, p. 186–205.

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and material requirements will create new bottlenecks in other heavy industries.

The present critical strain to which German transportation is being subjected is explicable mainly in terms of the vast expansion of German industrial activity, Germany's territorial expansion, and enormous exertions put forth by Germany in the Russian campaign. This strain the Royal Air Force has been trying to accentuate wherever possible. Fully one-third of its night bombing attacks have been directed against railroad installations, for the most part in the vital Rhineland-Westphalian region. In addition to the material damage inflicted on tracks, switches, bridges and cars, it has caused endless delays, interruptions and dislocations which in turn have been felt through the whole system.

In 1942 the R.A.F. developed a new, very effective form of attack when it began sending fast, light planes to make low-level daylight attacks on individual railroad engines. By exploding the boilers with shells many train wrecks have been caused in France, Belgium and Holland. In Germany, a new heavy railroad engine represents the equivalent of from 8,000 to 12,000 workdays.[10] Thus its value is much higher than that of a light bomber. While it does not pay to risk airplanes or to spend bombs on freight cars, engines are as worthy prey as ships at sea. Since the boiler is under 200 to 300 pounds pressure per square inch, it carries its own explosive charge of steam with it. A single small shell which bursts anywhere near the boiler or firebox will wreck an engine. Even a partial wreck is worthwhile, for the repair of it costs half the labor and materials of a new one. If the engine is derailed in addition, it will come close to being a total loss, and in addition damage will be done to freight cars, tracks and traffic in general. It is reported that in 1942 the R.A.F. shot to pieces more locomotives than the German and French locomotive shops had built in two years. The Germans may try to armor plate their engines for defense and to put anti-aircraft cannon on a tender. Armor uses much steel, however, while anti-aircraft protection uses up material and man power; an anti-aircraft gun is, in any case, no match for a plane travelling 300 miles per hour at a low level.

The most vital part of the European railroad system lies within a radius of 450 miles from the British Isles, that is to say, within

[10] The much heavier American freight engines cost $240,000 each and it takes from seven to eight months to build one. German engines represent probably the equivalent of half an American heavy engine.

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easy reach of the American and British air forces based there. The Rhineland-Westphalian district, for example, shipped no less than 45 percent of Germany's total railroad freight in 1937. Geographically, this district is the same as the most vital part of the inland waterway system.[11]

V

Contrary to most expectations, the worst friction in the German transport system has developed in the old-time part of it which is coal-fed and steam-driven. Until recently, British and American analysts have held stubbornly (with a few notable exceptions) to the view that automotive and air transport and mechanical farm traction power were the parts of the circulatory system which were most prone to break down. They forgot that Hitler devoted just as much attention to this kind of transportation as did they, but much earlier; and the precautionary measures which he ordered prevented the otherwise inevitable collapse.

While the experts were calculating the day when Germany's air force and tank fleet would be stalled by lack of motor fuel and high-grade lubricants, Germany was solving her oil problem. She all but eliminated civilian automobile traffic, utilized the Polish and Rumanian oil wells,[12] greatly expanded her production of synthetic high-octane fuel from coal, and equipped more and more tractor and truck engines to consume solid fuels (anthracite and bituminous coal, peat, wood and charcoal). The Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Herr Speer, has set up a department for the purpose of adapting motor cars to gas generators.[13] It obviously escaped the attention of most foreign observers that by the time Germany launched her aggression, she already had succeeded in making all of her existing central nitrogen plants, as well as all the new ones, adaptable to the production from coal of either high-octane fuel or lubricants, only two weeks being required for the shift from either product to the other. At the same time a bold stockpiling policy was adopted. In combination, these remarkable technological achievements probably have staved off any serious shortage of liquid fuel. In addition, the

[11] The railroads of Italy and the Danubian basin are also of crucial importance. Functionally speaking, they are the weakest part of the whole continental system and have the least recuperative power.

[12] The British failed to seal their Rumanian oil wells with concrete before it was too late, and so far the United Nations air forces have not destroyed a single one of the 11 refineries there.

[13] *The Economist*, August 22, 1942, p. 241.

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Maikop oilfield is now in German hands, one newly-assembled Belgian refinery is in operation, and others which had been dismantled in France are being reconstructed.[14] The Germans have also learned to build pipelines. They operate pipes from Ploesti to Port Giurgu, from Constanza to Bucharest, and from Constanza to Cernavoda on the Danube. It seems, then, that the German supply of motor fuels and lubricants is secure, whether the Grozny and Baku fields are in Russian hands or not, so long as Hitler can hold on to what he has.

Germany has solved the rubber problem in the same way that the United States has at last chosen to solve its similar problem, in accordance with a plan which worked in Russia before the present war began. Methanol, an intermediate product, is produced synthetically in close connection with the nitrogen and coal cracking plants. Moreover, draft power on farms all over Europe except in Russia is still supplied, by and large, by horses, oxen, mules and even cows. Hence the gasoline shortage never did seriously affect European agriculture. Germany today probably has more than 500,000 motor trucks of her own on hand, plus what she confiscated in France, Belgium and Holland. As early as 1938, annual production of trucks had already passed the 65,000 mark. French, Austrian, Czechoslovak and Italian truck factories, as well as the big German auto trust, produce military, mail and commercial trucks of high quality (some steam-powered) probably at the peak prewar rate. Since, with few exceptions, civilians are deprived of the use of automobiles, they walk, ride on bicycles or commute by streetcar, suburban railroad, subway or elevated train. In 1941 the train services accommodated 35 percent more passengers than they did in 1939.

VI

Taking all the available evidence together, we are able to arrive at certain conclusions. Unquestionably the German railroad transport system is suffering a most serious strain on its rolling stock, in the Reich proper as well as in the conquered territories. Inland waterways and coastal shipping also gradually disclose a shortage of capacity. Every effort is being made to relieve the situation, partly by rationalization and thrift in transportation, partly through shifting traffic from rail to rivers, canals and highways, partly by an energetic building program.

[14] *Cf.* cable report by Ray Brock from Istanbul, *New York Times*, October 24, 1942, p. 5.

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The writer feels that in the field of transport, as in her food economy, Germany is beginning to move in circles. Every bottleneck she breaks creates several others. In no single branch of the German economy — in raw material supplies, in food or in man power — is collapse imminent or inevitable. But in every sector the reserves are becoming smaller, inaccessible or difficult to mobilize. While nothing could be more disastrous to the cause of the United Nations than for them to exaggerate the economic difficulties of their highly resourceful enemy, it seems justifiable to state that the German transport system not only is laboring hard, but that it is putting additional burdens on the already overstrained German industrial system. Whether this will lead to a more serious crisis, or whether as in the past the Nazis will pull through by concentrating their efforts on vital points regardless of cost, will depend in the last analysis on the action taken by the United Nations. The question boils down to a consideration of what they can do to exploit the German weakness in transportation, while at the same time protecting their own transportation.

Before discussing specific lines of attack, one should stress that of course the surest way to weaken the German transport system is to engage Germany's military might in battle at the seven corners of the Continent. So far, notwithstanding the incessant bombing of the R.A.F., the chief credit for the damage done to the German means of communication goes to the Russians, who have fed more and more space to the Nazi juggernaut, forcing the German industrial system to extend itself by tremendous shipments of men and freight, and leaving behind for its use little but the rails and, for eight months of the year, an expanse of snow and mire. However, the keeping alive of the Russian front will not, by itself, cause the German transport system to break down. Much more is required.

The growth of American and British naval and air strength offers an opportunity of intensifying the war on German coastal shipping in the North Sea. Every supply ship sunk is a clear gain. Submarines and bombers seem the most effective weapons for reducing the still considerable tonnage in German hands. In this field, the construction of more submarines would seem one of the best investments the United Nations could make.

Secondly, there can be an intensification of air attacks from England against barges, docks and railroads in the vital industrial Rhineland-Westphalian region, in Belgium and in the Longwy-

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Briey coal basin. It is a common misconception that Germany has shifted the center of her heavy industries to the southeast. New industries such as the Linz branch of the Hermann Göring Works have been located in Austria, and others are now established in central and eastern Germany. Yet the industrial heart of Germany still lies, as before, in the zone of from 250 to 400 miles from London, within easy reach of medium and heavy bombers. The question is how to achieve the maximum effect there with a minimum of cost in men and matériel. So far, bombing attacks have been directed against certain strategic points in the industrial area. But the scarcity of bombers, the strength of the German flak and fighter defense, the weather and the desirability of achieving an element of surprise have given these attacks a sporadic and desultory pattern.

If we view the problem simply from the standpoint of how to do most damage to the German transport system, leaving considerations of military feasibility aside, another procedure seems to promise much greater effect. More of Germany's industrial capacity would be immobilized by strangling the traffic system of her vital industrial area for a considerable length of time, particularly during the peak-load period of September and October, than could be effected by the direct destruction of the industrial plants themselves. In his attempt to vindicate himself and Hindenburg of having lost the last war, Ludendorff stated in his memoirs that the railroads broke down so that powder and explosive factories had to close for days at a time. "Personnel and material were overworked," he wrote, "particularly locomotives." There are fair prospects that by 1943 or 1944 the same situation may occur.

Paralysis of Germany's circulatory system, rather than destruction of her vital organs, should be the aim of the United Nations. They should concentrate on blocking off traffic in a designated area over a period of one or more weeks at a time. In time of peace, the worst hazard facing the German railroads was a heavy blizzard and accompanying severe frost, for this struck all tracks and switches simultaneously. Congestion in one area caused congestion throughout the entire system. The effect of a blizzard should be imitated. This calls for low-level daylight bombing over long stretches of tracks and highways leading to the chosen industrial zone. There would have to be a special pattern of attack, planned and executed by air force experts. We

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know that the destruction of communications during the heavy German assaults on Plymouth, London and other cities reached a point at which, in most cases, further bombing might have precipitated a collapse. Similarly, systematic and continued bombing beyond that point would strangle the life lines in the vital industrial area of western Germany.

As already suggested, the shelling of industrial engines by single planes is probably the most effective way of depleting Germany's precious fleet of locomotives. This new technique, already used most successfully in northern France and the Low Countries, should be extended to the Rhineland-Westphalia area. Moreover, it would seem adaptable to conditions behind the Russian front, where its effects would be even more crippling.

The industrial area of the Reich offers an open flank for an attack upon her transportation, but it is only a secondary one. It is on the Mediterranean coast that the Nazi-controlled transport system is most vulnerable to air and seaborne assault, as well as to invasion. Moreover, this coast is without fortifications such as the Germans have put up along the Channel.

The occupation of French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and the elimination of the last Axis forces in Libya, will give the United Nations command of invaluable sea and air bases from Gibraltar all the way to Port Saïd and Haifa. They will be in a position then to reopen the southern part of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping, gradually to dispose of the Italian Navy, to occupy Sardinia and thereafter to invade the continent. In meeting this attack Hitler will be forced to rely on most inadequate railroad communications, which in the mountain terrain especially are open to bombing attack and demolition by parachute troops. If, on the other hand, he should decide to lop off Italy like a dead limb and defend the Alpine passes, the whole Adriatic coast and the other coasts of the Balkan Peninsula would lend themselves ideally to invasion.

If the United Nations can really make their blockade airtight, they may even succeed in breaking the European end of the Axis economically without having to storm the central fortress. At the least, they may hope — and should try — to disorganize the economic life behind the fighting ring of the blockade to such an extent that the remaining military resistance can be overcome at a cost figured largely in machines rather than in millions of lives.

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TOWARD PEACE IN PALESTINE

By Judah L. Magnes

MANY of the basic problems of life defy complete solution. The Jewish problem is one of these. It is made up of so many complex elements — religious, moral, political, economic, social, racial, historical — that it is a difficult task even to formulate it, let alone speak of "solving" it. Most of the solutions which are put forward are over-simplifications. But Jews and non-Jews can attempt to understand the problem and labor together for a free and just society. And in the measure society is just and free, in that measure Jews and Judaism will find their appropriate places and functions.

Palestine must occupy an important place in any consideration of the Jewish problem. It is unique among the lands of the earth — the Holy Land of three great monotheistic faiths. It is also the Land of Israel, with which the People Israel have been associated from Bible times to this day. Would that it were large and empty enough to absorb millions of persecuted, wandering Jews and to be constituted into a Jewish state! Some object to this conception on the ground that politics and religion have nothing to do with one another. But politics is one of the most profound of mankind's spiritual concerns. How men are to live together and be governed is a spiritual question with far-reaching implications. The fact remains that Palestine is small and is not empty. Another people has been in possession for centuries, and the concept of Palestine as a Jewish state is regarded by many Arabs as equivalent to a declaration of war against them. To those who contend that Palestine is the Promised Land of the Jews, I would say that it is necessary to distinguish between Messianic expectations and hard reality. When the late Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Kuk, was asked by the Shaw Commission in 1930 what his attitude was toward restoration to the Jews of the site of Solomon's Temple, where the Mosque of Omar now stands, he replied that he believed with a perfect faith that this would come about in God's own time, but that meanwhile violence in achieving Messianic ends could not be countenanced by Judaism.

Some important Zionist leaders [1] contend now — they did not

[1] *Cf.* Chaim Weizmann, "Palestine's Rôle in the Solution of the Jewish Problem," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1942.

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always do so — that room can be created in Palestine "for something like 400,000 families, or nearly two million souls" in addition to those already there, and that "this is likely to be approximately the number of people whom Palestine will in fact have to take care of very rapidly after the war." The only way this can be achieved, they maintain, is "by establishing a state of their own," that is, by constituting Palestine into a Jewish state or commonwealth.

But to make sure that there will be room in this small country for these additional two millions, some influential Zionists have adopted the idea put forward by the Palestine Royal Commission in its report of 1937,[2] that the Arabs of Palestine, now numbering about a million, should be exchanged or transferred in the event of a partition of the country.[3] The Royal Commission spoke (p. 392) of an arrangement "for the transfer, voluntary or otherwise, of land and population;" and in a book of essays published in Palestine last year, B. Kaznelson, one of the foremost leaders of the Labor Party in Palestine, which constitutes the dominant group in the Jewish Agency, welcomed this initiative of the Commission.

Mr. Kaznelson, addressing the Arabs, says: "We shall be ready not to be your foes and even to support your aspirations for independence and unification, provided you cease disturbing us and provided you recognize Palestine as a Jewish state. Upon this presupposition there can be mutual understanding." As to the transfer of Arabs, he adds: "The question of the exchange of populations is likely to become pressing in our days. I believe this question to be *essential* [italics by the author] for us and also for them." [4]

On the other hand, the late George Antonius says: "There seems to be no valid reason why Palestine should not be constituted into an independent Arab state. . . . No other solution seems practicable, except possibly at the cost of an unpredictable holocaust of Arab, Jewish and British lives. . . . No code of morals can justify the persecution of one people in an attempt to relieve the persecution of another. The cure for the eviction of

[2] Palestine Royal Commission, "Report," 1937 (Cmd. 5479).

[3] *Editor's Note:* For comment on the Report, see "Alternatives to Partition," by Viscount Samuel, and "The Arabs and the Future of Palestine," by H. St. J. Philby, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1937. For a general treatment, see "The Palestine Situation Restated," by Felix Frankfurter, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1931.

[4] B. Kaznelson, "In the Furnace," p. 168–9.

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Jews from Germany is not to be sought in the eviction of the Arabs from their homeland; and the relief of Jewish distress may not be accomplished at the cost of inflicting a corresponding distress upon an innocent and peaceful population."[5]

The antithesis is complete. These extreme aspirations are clearly incompatible.

This is not to say that there is a lack of reassurances from one side to the other. In his article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Dr. Weizmann says that in the Jewish state of Palestine there will be "complete civil and political equality of rights for all citizens without distinction of race or religion, and, in addition, the Arabs will enjoy full autonomy in their own internal affairs." Mr. Antonius says that in an independent Arab state Jews "would live in peace, security and dignity, and enjoy full rights of citizenship . . . and the widest freedom in the pursuit of their spiritual and cultural ideals. . . . Jewish values could flourish and the Jewish genius have the freest play to seek inspiration in the land of its ancient connection."

These assurances of tolerance are sincerely meant. Yet the basic contrast persists, in that the one assumes the Jews are to rule and the other is predicated upon Arab hegemony.

II

The purpose of this article is to warn of the danger of war between Jews and Arabs, and to offer an alternative based upon a reasonable compromise. The uncompromising who believe that this collision is inevitable are supposedly making their preparations. Those who believe in the necessity and the possibility of compromise should also be preparing. Nothing is more dangerous and enervating than the advice to postpone all thinking and planning until the end of the war. The war will not end and the peace will not come unless in every field the utmost exertions are made to think things through and to work things out now.

The indispensable prerequisite for a reasonable compromise is, I am convinced, that America's moral and political authority be thrown into the balance. In view of the intransigeance of many responsible leaders on both sides the adjustment may have to be imposed over their opposition. Only organized world democracy, convinced of the truth and the necessity of the Atlantic Charter, can have enough authority to do this; and it is America, I submit,

[5] George Antonius, "The Arab Awakening." Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939, p. 410.

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which must be chiefly responsible for the practical fulfilment of the principles of this great pronouncement.

Great Britain's authority, unhappily, has been impaired for the time being in Palestine and in the Middle East. The association of the United States with Britain in the Holy Land can help re-establish the authority necessary to keep Palestine from becoming a menace to the world's peace. America is greatly trusted. She has no territorial or imperialist ambitions here. She has served the Middle East generously and unselfishly on numerous occasions, and she should continue to do so. She must not leave it to perfidious Japan sanctimoniously to hold up ideals of freedom and union before the peoples of the East. She should join Britain in helping find and, if necessary, impose a reasonable compromise. But if the American people are to be drawn into this task in Palestine they must know beforehand that it is not simple or one to be undertaken lightly. They may become involved in the controversies and even in the hatreds which, unfortunately, seem to be almost inseparable from the Palestine problem.

Palestine as a Jewish state: Palestine as an Arab state. The two conceptions leave little room for compromise. But a search for one should be begun. The first step — and the sooner it is taken the better — should be an announcement that the adjustment will not include either of these alternatives. Such an announcement might help dissipate the increasingly bellicose atmosphere and might, perhaps, turn both Jewish and Arab propaganda in the direction of peace and understanding. The ordinary Jew and the ordinary Arab have no hatred for one another. They will rejoice over the prospect of a reasonable settlement which might enable them to live together and to develop their common country in peace. The search for a compromise might well be furthered, too, by the selection of a few Englishmen and Americans to coöperate with Jews and Arabs in canvassing the possibilities. There is much material that could be studied usefully.

III

I shall try now to give the general outlines of the kind of compromise which I think might be imposed upon the Jews and the Arabs by a sufficiently high moral and political authority without giving reasonable cause for rebellion. It is the outcome of many years of study, for the past 20 years in Palestine itself. It is not,

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I must admit, the official program of any political party.[6] I am putting it forward now in the hope that it may serve as material for anyone who is convinced that the search for a compromise is essential. The suggestion of other ideas would be advantageous.

The proposals which I bring forward are based on the great idea of union. Union must be the guiding political ideal of the United Nations if they are to achieve victory. The unbridled greed of those who have ruled the world hitherto, and the narrow chauvinism of so many nations, can be overcome only if a really free and really united world is created. The Palestine situation must be raised to the high plane where the gigantic struggle to build a mighty union of free nations is going on. Union for Palestine may be said to have three aspects:

1. Union between the Jews and the Arabs within a bi-national Palestine.

2. Union of Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon in an economic and political federation. These lands form a geographic unit and constituted a political and economic union at several times between ancient Semitic days and the First World War.

3. Union of this federation with an Anglo-American union which is assumed to be part of that greater union of the free nations now laboring to be born out of the ruins of the decaying world.

I should like to consider each of these aspects in some detail.

IV

Experience in the new states set up by the Treaty of Versailles has shown that a successful bi-national arrangement is hardly possible unless the majority and the minority nations or peoples constituting the state have equal political rights. The conception of minority rights has broken down in practice. It has to give way to equal rights for nations and peoples within the state as well as for individual citizens. Palestine as a Jewish state would mean Jewish rule over the Arabs; Palestine as an Arab state would mean Arab rule over the Jews. Palestine as a bi-national state must provide constitutionally for equal political rights and duties for both the Jewish and the Arab nations, regardless of which is the majority and which the minority. In this way neither people

[6] I may be permitted to say, however, that there are Jews and Arabs of some consequence who are in accord with its general purport.

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will dominate the other. But a constitutional provision alone is not sufficient. There must be effective guarantees that this political equality will be carried out in practice. The nature of these guarantees will be determined by the nature of the federation of which Palestine is to be a member, and also by the nature of the union of the free nations of which this federation is to be a part. I shall return to this point later.

If the political equality of the two peoples in Palestine is accepted as a part of the compromise we are seeking, there seems to be no good reason why a beginning should not be made now with a bi-national administration, so that officials may be trained as soon as possible for the great tasks which confront them. On more than one occasion Britain has held out hopes that the people of Palestine would receive an increasing share in the government of the country. These hopes have not been realized. If it be objected that the Palestinians are politically immature, the democratic way to attain maturity would be to place political responsibility upon them. The time has come to put Palestinians, both Jews and Arabs, in charge of non-controversial government departments and to make them members of the Executive Council of the Government. That would be a step forward of the highest educational and political value.

A modest way of associating the population of Palestine with the war effort has also been suggested. It has been proposed that a consultative body of representative citizens be appointed under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner. He would call the group together at intervals to make statements on the war and to consult on such matters as supplies and rationing, recruiting, the cost of living, agricultural and industrial production, profiteering and social welfare. But nothing has come of this suggestion.

It is a mistake to think that new arrangements will come into being automatically after the war. The time to begin to prepare the Jews and the Arabs for responsible duties in the bi-national Palestinian body politic is now.

V

Immigration is in many ways the crux of the problem and it is on this issue that agreement will be most difficult. There are 17 million Jews in the world. Understandably, the Jews want to admit hundreds of thousands of the homeless and persecuted to Palestine. But a long time would be required to settle even the

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two million whom some think the country could absorb. The astounding advances which the scientific knowledge and the devotion of the Jews have brought about in the agriculture and industry of Palestine might conceivably shorten this period. But today the country does not grow enough food to support its present population; and in order to import food, particularly from neighboring countries, peace between Jews and Arabs is necessary. If the capacity to absorb immigrants is to be increased by making Palestine largely industrial rather than agricultural, this will increase its dependence upon the Middle East for its markets; and in this case also there must be peace between the two peoples.

The problem is dual. Taking into account both the country's economic absorptive capacity and the political situation, how can as large a Jewish population as possible be settled in Palestine? How is this to be accomplished within the framework of the suggested compromise?

We begin again with a negative aspect of the proposed adjustment in order to reach a positive conclusion. No Jews can agree to a fiat which would arbitrarily stop immigration into Palestine, the Land of Israel. This is the main reason why Jews have been unanimous in opposing the British Government's White Paper of 1939.[7] Of the many arbitrary decrees included in that unhappy document, the one to permit no further Jewish immigration after five years from 1939 unless the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it was the most unfortunate. The Arabs will not agree to unrestricted Jewish immigration. It would build up a Jewish majority and might mean Jewish dominance in Palestine. We must recognize that this is a genuine impasse and that a way out must be found.

The establishment of a federation would help resolve the problem. If and when the federation came into being, the whole question of numbers in Palestine would lose its present primary significance for the Arabs. For a federation of the four states in question, whatever its form, would include an Arab population of several million. The Arabs would be relieved of their present fear of being swamped and dominated by a majority of Jews. A Jewish majority in the federation is hardly conceivable.

It should also be borne in mind that since the outbreak of war Jewish immigration into Palestine has been practically at a standstill. This means that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in Palestine

[7] "Palestine Statement of Policy," 1939 (Cmd. 6019).

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is growing progressively smaller, for the annual rate of natural increase of the Arabs is much higher (2.7 percent) than that of the Jews (1.3 percent). The present Arab population is estimated at about a million; in five years' time it might number rather more than 1,200,000.[8] The Jewish population is estimated to be about 500,000; if there is no important Jewish immigration in the next five years the rate of natural increase will bring this to only about 540,000. In other words, the Arab population in 1947 would be larger than the Jewish population by more than 600,000. If, therefore, the political controversy between the Jews and the Arabs were composed, as it might be through the establishment of a federation, several hundred thousand Jewish refugees could be admitted to Palestine with advantage to the country and without disturbing the political balance. The establishment of a federation might also be advantageous to the Jews, as well as to the federation itself, by making possible agreements under which the Governments of Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon would permit a given number of refugee Jews to settle in those countries without extending the Jewish National Home beyond the borders of Palestine.

Thus it seems clear that a federation would make it possible for many thousands of Jewish refugees to find room in Palestine and other parts of the federation, and this with Arab agreement instead of Arab animosity.

As to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, it should be pointed out that the Jews have given definite proof that it is greater than had been supposed. The Jews have shown that there is more water in the country, more arable land, better land, the possibility of raising more diversified crops, more raw materials for industry, more chances of establishing industries both for home consumption and for export, than had been imagined. Whereas formerly the maximum population of present-day Palestine had been estimated at about three million, with agriculture as its chief economic activity, today responsible authorities admit that this maximum can be raised to four million.

The economic absorptive capacity both of Palestine and of the federation ought to be determined from time to time. This would be useful not only in selecting immigrants and determining their numbers, but also in drawing up any large-scale plan for the country's development. One of the first constructive tasks of the fed-

[8] Report of the Palestine Royal Commission (Cmd. 5479), p. 281.

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eration, under the aegis of the free nations and with their financial and scientific help, should be to work out such a plan of development for all the constituent parts of the federation, and to put it into execution. An Anglo-American undertaking of this sort in the name of the union of the free nations would go a long way toward bringing the compromise to fruitful success.

If for some unfortunate reason the federation should not come into being, the immigration question in Palestine alone would be made — as I think I have shown — that much more baffling. Even so, we should have to try to face that difficult eventuality as well as possible. For example, a proposal might be offered somewhat similar to that made in 1936, after the Arab rebellion had begun. At that time it was suggested that the number of Jewish immigrants be so calculated that at the end of a ten-year period the Jews would constitute no more than 40 percent of the total population. The Jewish population then numbered 400,000. It was estimated that under the plan, which was sponsored by a number of responsible Jews and Arabs, this figure would be doubled by 1946.

A similar procedure could be used now. It would have two basic provisions. First, whatever percentages and periods might be fixed, the Jewish population would never be permitted to become more than one half of the total population; and second, instead of dividing Jewish immigration into equal yearly quotas, as large a number as was economically possible should be admitted in the years immediately following the close of the war to mitigate the fate of thousands of homeless Jews. This is a method which should be adopted, however, only after all hope of finding a better way has been abandoned. It has the fault that it again raises the majority-minority complex to primary political importance, as at present; whereas federation would reduce it to a secondary place.

In the preceding paragraphs I have attempted to show that a reasonable compromise is possible on the two chief points at issue — a bi-national government and Jewish immigration. Obviously, other matters of great importance remain to be settled also, such as land, employment and agricultural settlement.

VI

The Jews are able to help as no other people can or will to build up the proposed federation as an integral part of a union of the

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free peoples. Their help can be scientific, financial, social, industrial and agricultural. But even before the start of the delicate and complicated process of establishing a political federation there can be an economic union of Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon, and these countries can join with their neighbors in economic agreements.

These developments are possible because of the war. The four small states in question will be less and less able to stand the rigors of the war unless they form themselves into an economic bloc for the production of food and the manufacture of other goods and to arrange to receive supplies in common. One way of forming this very desirable economic union might be to develop the Middle East Supply Center to its full capacity for usefulness. This wartime organ is based on two ideas: its make-up is Anglo-American, which means that it pools Anglo-American resources for conducting the joint war effort in the Middle East; and it is giving blood and bone to the conception that the Middle East is a unit formed of contiguous countries with economic needs so vital in time of war that differences over their political borders and other matters become of secondary importance. This conception ought to be carried over into the peace, and I believe it is possible if the basic ideas of the Middle East Supply Center are worked out with efficiency and vision.

Another factor in the suggested compromise is Jerusalem, Holy City of three religions, which might become the federal headquarters or capital. Geography and history alike fit it for this great destiny. Should it once again become a center of spiritual and intellectual exchange, it will restore contact between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. So far these three faiths have failed in their efforts to create a society based upon ideals of righteousness and mercy. Yet despite the afflictions visited upon Israel in the Christian West, we may not despair of the West. And Israel, which once achieved great things for mankind in the Middle East, can acquire renewed youth and deeper wisdom if it is re-invigorated and rooted once more in the ancestral soil. The new Jerusalem, then, would symbolize a new relationship between Judaism, Christianity and Islam in the cradle of their origin; and in the new Jerusalem they would work out together part of their common problems with that old-new East which contains among its other elements the vast, vibrating, spiritual powers of Russia, India and China.

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VII

A compromise settlement of the Palestine problem such as I have outlined above would be doubly guaranteed: by the federation and by the union of the free nations. But will this latter union be created? And how can we be sure that it will be any more effective or that its members will do their duty toward peace through it any more truly than they did through the League of Nations? Millions of men and women are asking these questions. When Vice-President Wallace and Mr. Sumner Welles speak eloquently and sincerely of the free world that is to be made, millions take courage. But afterwards they begin to ask themselves if, after all, it is only words. No answer can be found for this historic question except in the heart and the determination of each one of us individually. By now we should have learned that peace is indivisible and that there is no chance of political understanding in the world unless organized world democracy assumes responsibility for it by assuming responsibility for the security and the economic well-being of every nation, regardless of race, creed or color.

In making our Palestine compromise work we can learn much from the mistakes of the mandatory system. The principle of trusteeship which was implicit in that system is sound. But let the mandatories ask themselves if they have always acted like true trustees. Whatever the nature of the guarantee or trusteeship which is adopted after this war, experience has taught us that it should not assume the form of mandates granted to single countries or to groups of countries which have imperialistic, military or other selfish interests in the region involved.

Israel is an imperfect instrument through which universal religious and moral principles have been communicated to mankind. These principles call for the creation of a visible, tangible society founded upon justice and mercy. The utterances of the Prophets of Israel contain as powerful revolutionary ferment as mankind has ever known. Until Israel and the nations of mankind succeed in establishing a universal society based upon those ideals there will continue to be a Jewish problem. That is Israel's destiny.

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BRITAIN AND AMERICA: ALLIES FOR PEACE?

By Barbara Ward

THIS is not the first time that the British and American peoples have come together in a fighting partnership. Two decades back they were fighting side by side for very much the same reasons. Now they are doing the job all over again. From this experience at least one lesson should be plain. It may be difficult to say precisely what the two nations should do to coöperate effectively in the postwar world, but it ought not to be difficult to say what they should not do. They should not do what they did last time.

Their first main error is so obvious that it hardly needs underlining. They did not maintain their partnership. The second error is more fundamental but less obvious. They had a basic misconception of the nature of war and peace. If war is thought of as a sudden, inexplicable, arbitrary act, then it is possible to mistake victory for peace. In that conception, victory puts an end to war as a policeman removes an unwelcome intruder from the peaceful home of a respectable householder. The burglar has gone. The home resumes its normal preoccupations. The incident is closed. This is the basic assumption of the "normalcy" of peace. But war is not a sudden intrusion from without on an otherwise peaceful world society. War is simply a consequence of the way in which that society behaves. It is the violent crisis of deep-rooted social disease. A more exact if unpleasant analogy for war is that of an abscess on the body politic. It may gather in this place or that, but it draws its poison from the whole of the unhealthy bloodstream. Lancing the abscess is not enough. Until the bloodstream is cleansed, the sores will break out again.

Take the example of Germany between the wars. From 1925 to 1929, in the period when German society was fairly stable and the German nation was recovering some position in Europe, the Nazi vote was never above 100,000. Then came the Great Depression. The German unemployment figures rose to nearly 10 millions. During the same period, the Nazi vote soared to nearly 15 millions. If there had not been the human despair, the loss of self-respect, the shattering of hope caused by this mass dislocation of the German economy, would the Nazis have come to power?

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If the victors had accepted it as their positive responsibility to build a Europe in which social dislocation on the 1929 scale was impossible, would the military crisis have recurred at all, or at least, so soon? In 1918, the abscess was only lanced. The poisons were left in the body. Within three decades, they had again worked themselves to the point of eruption. Today the task of lancing is being done again. The problem after victory will be to undertake the necessary cleansing of the bloodstream and to do it in time. Peace is not the process of cleansing. Peace is the result if the cleansing is successful.

One of the errors of the last Anglo-American partnership has been remedied. The two nations are together again. Again they are fighting to prevent the triumph of militarism and aggression. Again they are pledged to carry on until victory is secured. The new partnership is a better one than the old. The pooling of resources and the coördination of every phase of the war effort from the allocation of raw materials to the conduct of strategy has gone much further than ever before in the history of two allied nations. Between the two economies and the two war efforts, certain principles have been adopted which are not only essential to victory, but have a possibly revolutionary significance for the postwar world. The system of priorities and the allocation and supply of materials all pivot on the fact of need. The Americans and the British know that to beat Germany and Japan they need the maximum number of the right weapons in the right place at the right time. These concepts do not have anything to do with industrial purchasing power or the national origin of the arms produced or the ability or inability of the various belligerents to pay in dollars or sterling.

Within each national economy, tanks, shells and aircraft and all the other necessities of war have the highest priority. Though a man can afford three grand pianos, five cars and ten iceboxes, they are "out" for the duration. Need, not purchasing power, determines production. Between the two national economies, similarly, completed weapons, raw materials and manpower are sent where the need is greatest. About 80 percent of all Britain's war production goes overseas, a large proportion of it to Russia. American distribution follows the same pattern. To direct and regulate this vast network of coöperation, the two nations have created institutions which, without much publicity or recognition, are carrying on a revolutionary experiment in international

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control. The combined Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Production and Resources Board, the Combined Food Board — these with their respective staffs represent a concrete institutional embodiment of the will to coöperate. They are the nuclei round which more permanent and more fully articulated institutions can be built. The pressure of war has thus overcome the most difficult obstacle to the creation of international government — the lack of a concrete starting point.

The danger now lies not in the lack of a framework of coöperation but of the will to coöperate. This is a factor of more than Anglo-American significance. The paths of international coöperation are largely untried. If those nations which are best suited and best equipped to coöperate with each other fail, how much hope is there for others? There can be little doubt that the United States and the British Commonwealth have a better chance of achieving coöperation than any other group of nations. They speak the same language. They have been nurtured in the same traditions. They are the only present heirs and custodians of Western civilization's great experiment in human freedom. They have a wide variety of uniform social habits. They all love peace. Both the American federal union and the British Commonwealth are remarkable experiments in interstate coöperation. Together they spread a network of freedom around the world.

All this is so familiar that it seems unnecessary to repeat it. The curious thing is how completely it appears to have slipped from the consciousness of the United States. One of the most disturbing phenomena of 1942 was the deterioration of good will between the United States and the British Commonwealth. An argument can be made that it was a passing phase, that better military results are already putting it right. This is true; common victory is the best cement of good relations. But it is not enough. The will to coöperate does not depend upon logical, rational premises. Just as a marriage of true minds may break up on trivial irritations about false teeth or tricks of speech, so constant ill-humored comment between the two nations, a sense of frustration or a nagging sense of annoyance on the part of one as a result of the shortcomings of the other, may leave severe enough psychological strains in their relations to undermine the precondition of effective coöperation — the will to hold together. And if the parts of the English-speaking world cannot coöperate, who can?

One or two aspects of this changed mood have been particu-

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larly damaging to understanding and mutual respect. An English visitor is bound to notice, for example, the tendency to underestimate Britain's military performance. The most usual explanations for the series of disasters that has befallen the British land arm are that British military leaders come from an effete class-conscious clique, or that native peoples do not think the British Empire worth fighting for, or, more simply, that "the British cannot fight." Yet the clique which is criticized has produced naval leaders of the superb quality of a Vian, a Harwood or a Mountbatten, and air leaders of the skill and originality of a Tedder or a Harris. Again, the behavior of the native peoples in Britain's colonies in Africa and the West Indies has proved that they *resented* any suggestion that they should not be asked to fight for the Empire. The explanation that is rarely taken into account is that democracies do not put their best brains and resources into preparations for war in time of peace and therefore have a very painful time-lag to make up when war catches them — as it always does — unawares. Lack of equipment — not lack of generalship — was Britain's greatest handicap in 1940. For courage and risk-taking, few military decisions surpass Churchill's dispatch of Britain's only armored division to Africa on the morrow of Dunkirk. On that decision the whole of the later Allied successes in Africa is based. But these arguments are not brought up here in order to attack or defend them. They are mentioned simply to illustrate the apparent disposition, when there are several possible explanations of British conduct or policy, to prefer that which is unfavorable, and thereby to set up one more obstacle to that wartime movement of spontaneous friendship and confidence, which, operating almost at the level of the subconscious, is the precondition to coöperation *after* the war. After the exertion and heat of any war the subconscious trends of opinion are all bound to be toward passivity and isolationism. The trend can only be countered if now, during the war, the store of good will and active understanding is being steadily built up. It cannot be created out-of-hand in the moment of victory.

The remedy for misunderstanding and ill-temper on either side lies partly in the hands of the governments, partly with the press, but chiefly in the hands of the citizens themselves. In a free community, there cannot be controlled opinion. There is only individual responsibility. Each citizen is his own propaganda agent. His thoughts and reactions and sayings are part of the great surge

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of opinion that determines in broad outline all major matters of policy. An encouraging feature of the idea of the United Nations is that if one takes the official utterances of China, Russia, Britain and the United States *at their best*, the principles as stated largely coincide. It is true that Britain has colonial dependencies; it is true that China has an absolute dictatorship; it is true that Russia has no political liberty; it is true that the United States has a Negro problem. But the soundest way to foster good relations between them all is to insist on the good aspects of the achievements of each, and, as for the bad, where possible to give the benefit of the doubt. If that is true for the United Nations as a whole, it is especially true of the relations between Britain and the United States.

Take another case where American criticism of Britain is very free — that of India. The tremendous complexities of the Indian problem make categorical pronouncements on it risky. Why has it been singled out as the chief obstacle to the establishment of a genuine "front for freedom"? We see a situation developing in which the desirability of Anglo-American collaboration is being dismissed as a veiled attempt to continue the system of "imperialism." In its stead there is being propagated the concept of American coöperation in the first place with Russia and China, the two great "fighting allies" pledged to the freedom of all peoples everywhere. In this picture the British Empire tags along as something of a slur on the genuineness of the Four Freedoms and as an entity to be liquidated in the general interest of putting an end to imperialism. This situation contains obvious elements of danger. One very practical one might be mentioned. Though the coöperation of the United Nations is highly desirable, no structure which would permit it to become the nucleus of world organization has so far been created. Anglo-American collaboration already exists. It would be tragic to throw the reality away for the possibility, to sidetrack concrete instruments of coöperation in the vast English-speaking world in favor of verbal endorsements of "the United Nations" and verbal condemnations of "imperialism," terms which need much more careful definition before they can be used as freely and easily as they are today. Given the good will of *all* the parties, the United Nations can still become a concrete institutional fact; but emptying Anglo-American collaboration of its significance will not hasten the day.

One of the reasons, of course, why jarring notes are heard in

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Anglo-American relations is the very fact that they are coöperating in a concrete way and therefore have to face specific difficulties which can cause disagreement between them. The United Nations approach seems a great deal easier at the present juncture because China and the United States have few immediate military, economic and strategic decisions to make in common, and because Russia is fighting its own war as far as direction, control and propaganda are concerned. Naturally it is easier for the three nations to be friendly; there are so many fewer concrete things for them to be unfriendly about. But this is all the more reason to make a good job of friendship and understanding between Britain and the United States now, for it can be an important part of the preparation for the more difficult and ticklish job of establishing an effective alliance with China and Soviet Russia.

It is especially true because the British and the Americans will face a unique and inescapable responsibility at the end of this struggle. Their political and the moral responsibility they will share with other nations. Their economic responsibility is going to be, for the first year or so at any rate, almost entirely theirs alone. The war is not making it more likely that there will be freedom from want after victory. Year by year, the process of devastation has been covering wider and wider areas. Europe's resources are draining away. The harrow of the war has been driven over the richest agricultural and industrial lands in Russia. China has been bled white by years of exploitation. Of the four great allies, two only are in any condition to give concrete material assistance to the victims of war — the United States and Britain. Two of the principal victims are Russia and China. They cannot shoulder added responsibilities when their own people will be crying out for help.

Unhappily it is also true that the economic sphere is where Britain and America face some of the greatest risks of friction. The United States now occupies the position of Britain in the nineteenth century, that of being able to out-produce and undersell any other industrial nation in any free market. If it now swings the full weight of its industrial machine into unrestricted competition with its less powerful neighbors, the result will inevitably be to develop defensive and obstructionist policies on their part — quotas, bilateral barter agreements, exchange control and similar methods, all equally anathema to the free trading spirit in which the United States basically believes. Britain may even find itself

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in the paradoxical position of being able to maintain free trade relations with every nation save only the United States, whose political support and coöperation it needs the most. Anyone who has read the reports of some of the manufacturers' associations in Britain will see the danger of such a development; it would mean the disappearance of any hope of economic coöperation for a more prosperous and stable world.

Is such a head-on collision between rival economic interests inevitable? Only if a certain conception of the world market is the only one which is possible. Moreover, however true that conception may have been in the past, it is not rooted in the nature of things and can be changed if Britain and the United States possess the necessary political will and wisdom. In a restricted world market, conditioned by low purchasing power and recurrent crises of unemployment, there is not enough room for the vastly expanded industrial capacity of the English-speaking world — quite apart from that of the other great industrial nations. Suppose, however, that the problem were approached the other way around, from the end not of existing purchasing power but of existing needs (the angle of approach, incidentally, of any successful war effort). Suppose an inventory of basic human needs — food, clothing, medicine, building, irrigation, communications, fuel and power, just to name the simplest — were drawn up and against it were set the inventory of the world's economic capacity. The result would not show that Britain and America had industrial and agricultural capacity in excess. It would show that all the existing capacity the world over is insufficient to satisfy some of the simplest basic needs of mankind. The old tag that if each Chinaman added an inch to his shirt, American textile factories would work overtime is a simplified but substantially correct example. If the problem of world markets is approached from the standpoint of the consumer as a problem of world *needs*, there is little danger of economic collision. It is quite possible for Britain and the United States and the other industrial units to work out a world economic policy, provided they accept the necessity of an expanding market.

Here are merged the problem of securing a framework for economic coöperation and the more fundamental problem — so misunderstood in 1918 — of dragging up the roots of war. Many of the chief causes of war — poverty, chronic unemployment, disease, ignorance, autarky, exploitation — could be abolished

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if a policy of maximum national and world consumption were adopted as the conscious goal, first for Anglo-American economic collaboration, later for a world economy. The prospect is not as utopian as it sounds, for it is simply applying to the conditions of peace certain of the expedients which have proved satisfactory in time of war. In this war, need *has* been substituted for purchasing power as the criterion of production. The instruments of Anglo-American economic policy, lend-lease, the Combined Boards, W.P.B., the Ministry of Production, the Raw Material Controls are all working on the principle of securing adequate materials and manpower for the vast program dictated by the *need* of defeating the Axis Powers. Every official engaged in these organizations is gaining some experience of controlling output in the interests of expansion, according to a given program of need, not, as with the controls of the past, in the interests of restriction to maintain a certain price level. Some of this mechanism and much of this experience can be carried over to meet a vast program based on the needs of peace.

Priorities for the needs of war will be familiar by the end of the struggle. Why not priorities for the needs of peace? Why not accept the principle that the first charge on any community are the basic human necessities of its citizens, that they are as vital to successful peace as tanks and shells and aircraft to successful war? This is not overstressing their importance. If war is the product of deep social evils, if the Nazis and the Japanese militarists are in one sense merely the product of the diseased social conditions which threw them to power, it would be folly to fight them only. Food, housing, schools, medical services, better roads, better communications, better irrigation are weapons of peace, some of the weapons we must use if we are to succeed in the postwar effort to root out the deep causes of war.

There will be no coöperation after victory if there are no concrete objectives to be secured by coöperation. Britain and the United States do not coöperate today *in vacuo*. They are coöperating because they have a common enemy to defeat. If the social evils and dislocations of our age can be seen as permanently dangerous adversaries, the concept of a common front, of a crusade even, can be carried beyond the strenuous and exhilarating days of war into the period of reconstruction. It does not always happen that self-interest — the need for expanding markets — coincides with a noble cause — the rooting up of some of the

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deep causes of war. Anglo-American relations can be based on just this coincidence.

The techniques of a policy of expanding consumption have yet to be worked out. Many people will shun the methods used in the war on the grounds that they are bureaucratic and would involve the world in a winding-sheet of red tape. But to say that many of the contemporary methods of planning in Britain and America are unsatisfactory does not invalidate the principle of planning. Moreover, the concept of priorities for peace does not entail a totally planned economy. In all highly developed economies, consumer wants are infinitely varied and depend more and more upon changes in whim and fashion. For these, the free price system and the profit motive are probably the most sensitive mechanisms available for recording and satisfying variable human needs. But basic human needs are not so variable and are more predictable. There is no inherent reason why economies, both national and international, should not be part planned and part free. The democratic nations have here a new possibility of escape from the unattractive "either-or" of total planning or entire laissez-faire, a chance to develop a new type of economy in keeping with their own genius and traditions. The British desire to guarantee a Citizens Economic Charter based on existing and expected social services — a plan foreshadowed in the Beveridge Report — is one example of the half-planned, half-free approach within a national economy. Several possibilities in the planned sector of a future world economy are already discernible — the Pan-American Highway, for example, or a continuation of the Alaska Road to Moscow and Narvik. From the R.F.C. it is not a very long step to an I.F.C., an International Finance Corporation, through which the United Nations might jointly undertake great public works of electrification, irrigation and communications which would help maintain world employment, raise living standards and give the peoples of different lands interests in common which transcend their national frontiers. Why not a T.V.A. for the Danube Valley?

Many will object to envisaging Anglo-American or United Nations collaboration on a scale at once so vast and so concrete for the reason that it is too utopian and too difficult. To them there is only one reply, that everybody everywhere is passionately desiring something most difficult and utopian — a lasting peace. Two world wars in one generation should have dispelled the idea

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that peace can be had for the asking, can be enjoyed by a comfortable relapse into all the old easy ways. Peace is not easy to win. It is much harder to win than victory. The world has known thousands of victories. It has known very little lasting peace.

To those who object that policies and programs conceived at such a level and on such a scale are beyond the grasp or responsibility of the average citizen, the answer is to point out that it is only where a majority of citizens understand and accept the need for international coöperation on this scale that there is any hope of a democratic government accepting it. An analogy from Britain may explain this point. Between 1932 and 1935, Britain must have spent some $86,000,000 on unemployment. At the end of that period, the unemployed were still there and citizens were complaining bitterly of the ruinous cost. In 1942, Britain spends about $86,000,000 *a day* on the war effort and no one complains of ruin. Is the difference economic? No, the difference lies simply in the will of the people; nobody felt as strongly about conquering unemployment as they feel about conquering Hitler. In Britain as in America, people ultimately get the policies and the government they desire. If by needless carping and distrust now they are using up their "reservoirs of good will" they are preparing for international anarchy after the war. If they are still blind to the real nature of war and are still unready to undertake the positive and aggressive policies necessary to create peace, then they are already heading for a state of complacent "normalcy" that will inevitably produce another war.

"With charity for all" . . . how far have Britain and America fallen short of this ideal? "A new birth of freedom" . . . how far have they accepted this vision as their common goal?

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THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES IN EUROPE

By Karl Barth

WHAT have the Protestant Churches of Europe learned, suffered and achieved in the world crisis? What may be expected — for them, and from them — in the days to come?

In trying to answer these questions I ask the reader to remember that church affairs, like everything else in Europe, are in such a state of flux that historical opinions must be ventured with diffidence and accepted with caution. In the end, things can turn out altogether differently from what even the most painstaking analysis would lead one to expect now. Moreover, the reader must realize that the various Protestant Churches in Europe, like the European nations themselves, are isolated from each other and that contacts and exchanges of views between them are relatively rare and casual. Even within individual countries, as for instance in the different sections of Germany, or until recently between the occupied and unoccupied zones of France, churchmen know comparatively little about one another. A comprehensive picture of the life of the Protestant communities in Europe can therefore be presented only in broad, general outlines, and with the reservation that even these change from time to time. Finally, I should like to emphasize that personally I have no official function or responsibility either in the Swiss Church or in the Geneva center of the ecumenical church organizations, and so write only as a private individual and express opinions determined merely by my own insight.

II

The present world crisis began when the National Socialists came to power in Germany in the year 1933. It found most of the Protestant Churches of Europe in the initial stages of a process of internal and external rebuilding and consolidation on the basis of a renewed consciousness of their peculiar nature and mission.

The catastrophe of the World War of 1914–1918 was widely felt to have been a serious indictment of the Church and of the Christianity of that day, still strongly under the influence of the intellectual and political developments of the eighteenth

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and nineteenth centuries. Not only shallow detractors held this conviction, but also many enlightened exponents of the Protestant tradition and mission. The effect, however, had not been to produce discouragement but rather to lead many to ask themselves, with new emphasis, the question: What is the basic principle and function of the Church in a human society which obviously is sick almost to death? As was the case during the Renaissance, the return to the Church's historic origins played a decisive rôle in the posing and answering of this question. It did not produce either a new religious philosophy and orientation or a new program of religious activity, but it did lead to a rediscovery of the unique content of the Bible and of the significance of the Reformation era and the still older Church — a rediscovery which all of us would have thought most unlikely before the present catastrophe.

The diluted bourgeois religion and ethics of the early twentieth century became "the dead past," while the message of the Old and New Testament, as we found it for the most part rightly interpreted by Luther and Calvin, became "the living present." We did not become orthodox ("fundamentalist") in the sense of the repetition of some historical dogmas, but we tried, freely and in our own present-day way, to think again biblically and evangelically and to give back to the preaching and life of our Churches their biblical and evangelical Protestant conformation. This conformation they had pretty well lost at the time of the First World War, so that actually they were no longer that "salt of the earth" which they should and could be. We felt obliged to restore to its rightful position the elements of objective truth which must ever be the secret of a living Church and which must be given recognition if the Church is to be differentiated from an inspirational conventicle and if its message is to have meaning for the life and living of human beings.

I say "we," for I am thinking of a whole generation of responsible persons in all the Protestant Churches of Europe. Partly in agreement with each other, partly without such agreement or even in opposition to one another, without organization of any kind but nevertheless in an unmistakable objective solidarity, we entered upon this way. I note explicitly that the so-called "dialectic theology" often associated with my name was only one phenomenon among others. There were, and are, many and various ways to walk on this road.

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Protest and reaction of all sorts made themselves felt, and, of course, unintelligent and undesirable henchmen were not lacking. Above all, indifference was for a time invincible. It is nevertheless true to say that, by and large, this beginning of an inward renewal springing from the living foundations of the Church of Jesus Christ was the answer given by European Protestantism to the question posed by the First World War. The majority of our theological students and of young men interested in things Christian began to seek progress along these lines.

Theology necessarily had to give recognition, favorable or critical, to this transformation. Roman Catholicism and contemporary philosophy took notice of it as they had never previously noticed developments within Protestantism. A Berlin churchman who tried to claim that the twentieth century was the "century of the Church" was, of course, going too far. But it remains a fact that interest in and understanding of Protestant ecclesiastical doctrine and order increased in comparison to what they had been in the second half of the nineteenth century, often in unexpected ways and places. For example, the prestige of the Protestant Churches, and to a certain extent their popularity also, grew in government circles in a number of countries. And a certain wholesome Christian self-consciousness again became a fact in Europe.

True enough, it was only a beginning. Many of the new positions were (and still remain) unclarified, vulnerable and even self-contradictory. There were too many problems to be mastered or even surveyed in the course of a few years. It was too much to hope that the Protestant peoples would be permeated by the new conception at once, that prejudices and misunderstandings firmly rooted for centuries among both the educated and the uneducated could be removed immediately. We must be under no self-deception concerning the tentative character of the preliminary gains, especially in those countries where the transformation appeared most spontaneously and vigorously — Germany, Holland and Switzerland. In France, in Scandinavia, among the Hungarian and Italian Protestants, only relatively small groups had begun to work. Fifteen years after the First World War, all those who were seriously participating in the movement and were well-informed about it were aware that the time had come to start really intensive and extensive work.

The Protestant Churches in Europe, then, were not wholly un-

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prepared when the first shocks of the earthquake came in 1933, heralding the world catastrophe of today. In so far as the churches had participated in the renewal of which I have spoken, they had, after all, at least a slight headstart on the Nazis. It is hard to say what would have become of them if it had not been for this, if the sudden assault of 1933 had found them as they were, for example, in 1910.

III

It must not be forgotten that opposition to the anti-Semitic, aggressive, totalitarian, national state was not at first so general as it has become since the outbreak of the present war. At the outset, the attitude of "Western Civilization" to that state was not certain. It is not fair to accuse the German intellectuals and the German Democrats and Social Democrats of weakness and disloyalty without mentioning the many Frenchmen, Englishmen and Americans who allowed themselves to be deceived at a distance just as those nearer by were deceived. As late as 1938, some of these foreigners permitted themselves to be received as honored guests in Berlin, and recorded a reverential and even somewhat envious admiration of what they saw there.

For a time it was uncertain whether one might not see in Hitler's spirit, method and enterprise something like an apotheosis of the movement of emancipation which began with the Renaissance. Was not this the true face of the absolutely self-sufficient man, who had long since become not only the ideal of Germans but of all modern culture as it is related to economic and technical progress? If human affairs could develop as logically as they do in theory, it might easily have happened that not only Germany and Europe, but the entire modern world, apparently long detached from its Christian roots, would have welcomed the Hitlerian system as the kingdom of the superman toward which it had always secretly aspired.

After all, even in his utterly insane reconstruction of history, Hitler is not entirely wrong when he keeps referring to the Jew as the obstacle which has thus far prevented this logical development of events. The existence of the Jew probably is the symbol of the objective metaphysical fact, independent of all intellectual counter-movements, that the Christian root of Western culture is still alive. Without credit to him, and even against his will, the Jew is witness to the continuing vitality of the Old and New Tes-

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tament revelation, by virtue of which Western culture, despite the degree of its present and possible future apostasy, is separated as by an abyss from the inherent Godlessness of National Socialism. This revelation can be misconstrued, but never wholly overlooked or forgotten. Hitler knows what he wants better than he may be aware when he selects the Jew as the world's Public Enemy No. 1. Wherever the Christian revelation, whose actual witness is the Jew, is recognized and understood, the struggle against National Socialism ceases to be accidental and superficial and becomes fundamental and essential.

Western civilization failed to confront National Socialism firmly because the realization of the Christian revelation among the civilized people of the West (not only among the Germans!) had become dim. Men did not see the inherent atheism of the Hitlerian system. Hence, they could not be sure whether the antithesis between a legitimate state and a robber state, between democracy and absolute dictatorship, might not simply be a difference in taste, evaluation or political technique. Thinking in that way, how could people have been capable of a serene faith in Western culture and of firm resistance to that which threatened it? How could they think otherwise than they did, blind and deaf as they had become to the revelation of the Old and New Testament?

There was resistance to Hitler from the very first on the part of those who were on their way back to a conscious realization of the Christian presupposition of Western culture. In these circles it was not easy to mistake a human authority, however powerful, for that of God; a community of "race, blood, and soil" for the Communion of Saints; the might of brutality for the power of truth. This group could not accept or treat the Jewish problem as a "racial question." The first serious protest against Hitlerism necessarily had to come, and did in fact come, from the ranks of the Protestant Churches that had been touched by the "renewal." They were the first to grasp the essential impossibility of the totalitarian state, the negation of life inherent in the Hitlerian doctrine of un-freedom, the impudent denial of the intellect by the National Socialist cult of physical force. They saw through the intolerable implication of the neo-German anti-Semitism. Inevitably, it was in this quarter that alert and resolute wardens were found for Western culture, for freedom of conscience and speech, for the democratic state.

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IV

It was inevitable that the Christian "substance" of the Churches should prove intolerable to National Socialism. Rauschning was right when he defined the actual content of National Socialism as pure, logical and therefore wholly destructive and anti-spiritual nihilism. In no other way is it possible to explain either the peculiar character of its leading personalities, the inherently inhuman nature of all its modes of behavior or the daemonically fascinating influence which emanates from it. It is easy to see where such a system might expect to find its most dangerous enemy. From the outset, its religious policy could only be directed toward the extirpation of the Christian faith and creed.

This goal, however, like other goals of National Socialism, could be approached only step by step, indirectly and under all sorts of disguises. In its naked form, National Socialism is a secret cult which is probably proclaimed openly only in the cloister-like training camps of the *élite*. Outside of this group were those educated or half-educated persons who were estranged from the Church but who still required a certain religiosity and religious ideology. They were offered a "German Faith," based on the old German paganism. In this cult the mystical personage "Germany" took the place of the Godhead, Führer Adolf Hitler became the prophet, and the church services were replaced by more or less appropriate rites exalting the German national character. There was never any seriously intended religious movement back of this neo-paganism which attracted so much attention in other countries. Like many other things in the Third Reich, it was "window-dressing" for overgrown children; but as such it has been by no means ineffective.

This is even more true of the artificial structure of a "German Christianity" which was presented to those parts of the population which were more or less actively interested in the Church. According to this concept, National Socialism was to be the real "positive Christianity," in contrast to Judaism and Bolshevism, which were regarded as the embodiments of everything heathen. It was to be a new revelation from God, but one that was identical with that in Jesus Christ, or at least closely related to it! After all, it had been possible in the past to bring into a similar "positive" relationship to Christianity the bourgeois moralism of rationalism, later the idealistic philosophy of Goethe, then the monarchi-

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cal nationalism of Bismarck's day, and still later Marxian Socialism. Why should not the same attempt be made with the Hitler system, which the nation believed was its hope of salvation? It was this fantastic but at the same time cogent proposition with which the Protestant Churches had to deal.

The basic question was: Had comprehension of the unique character and independence of the Christian Gospel completely died out, or had it reawakened, and, if so, what would be the reaction to the particular new temptation of 1933? The answer to this question is found in the fact that while the German political parties, German jurisprudence, science, art and philosophy capitulated, the Churches formed the first opposition to the current which was sweeping all before it.

Out of the conflict against the National Socialist version of Christianity there arose, under the leadership of Martin Niemöller, first the "Pastors' *Notbund*" (Emergency Union), and then on a wider base the "Confessional Church" (*Bekennende Kirche*). They attempted quite simply to defend the basic essentials of Christianity, the preaching of the word and the order of the Church, against the strange new faith which was being imposed on them but which they could not accept as Christian. This gave their movement an essentially conservative character. That, we see now, was their limitation: they concentrated solely on one specific phase of Nazi religious and church policy.

The pagan "German Faith" barely touched the edges of their field of vision, and the political problem of National Socialism did not come into it at all. This may be hard to understand, but it is necessary to realize that the fight of the Confessional Church was not directed against National Socialism as such. The latter's innate hostility to all things spiritual, as well as its anti-Christian tendency, were at that time only too successfully camouflaged. Most of the adherents of the Confessional Church, in fact, thought they could agree to, or at least sympathize with, the political and social aims of National Socialism. Their struggle was confined to the specific question whether the Church could remain the Church, *i.e.*, could preach the Gospel according to the Old and New Testaments, or should be coördinated with the new political doctrine and combine its mission with it. Up to the year 1934, while I was in Germany, I myself thought that I could relegate my political opposition to the background and work only along that line.

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Those who refuse to give the Confessional Church credit for its achievement in this narrow sector fail to realize how necessary it was to answer clearly the fundamental question just posed, how difficult it was at that time in Germany to venture to contradict the official answer to that question, and how loyally and energetically the battle has been fought to this day by thousands of known and unknown men and women. If an indictment were to be brought against them, it would not be that they began on this line, but that they did not go on from there. They took their stand on behalf of the Jewish Christians, for the freedom and purity of the Christian creed and worship, for suitable theological training and for a parish life built around a sincere study of the Bible. But they were not able (alas, in many cases they did not even really want!) to prevent the rise of National Socialism in Germany and its malignant development into a menace to all the rest of the world. Nonetheless, they helped to cross Hitler's purpose at a very decisive point by making it possible for free Protestant Christianity, despite all the cunning assaults against it, to survive in Germany and retain its power of germination.

Not merely did the German Christians not "conquer" the Churches, as they had made up their minds to do in 1933, but they were ignominiously dropped by the National Socialists when they failed to accomplish their purpose. In this one field the National Socialist system met a force which it was able to suppress but not to break. To that extent the Confessional Church was the vanguard of the more comprehensive resistance which is being offered to Hitlerism today. Do not forget that this Church took its stand — within its limitations — when the tragedy of Munich and the subsequent slow awakening of most of the world to resistance still lay far in the future. The fate prepared for Martin Niemöller — he is still in the concentration camp of Dachau — by the personal order of the Führer, shows that the basic importance of the Confessional Church's resistance was fully recognized by the other side. Numerous other equally determined individuals are in concentration camps or have had to pay for their devotion to the cause with long prison sentences or even with their lives. Whatever one may think about their limitations of vision and aspiration, it is only right to remember them with special reverence among the many victims of the present crisis.

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V

The significance of the German Church's struggle was understood well enough by the other Protestant Churches of Europe. It was more than the drama of what was unfolding nearby, a drama in which a church was acting and suffering according to its best knowledge and conscience, that awakened sympathy in Holland, Switzerland, Scandinavia, France (and for a time, also, among the Protestant Hungarians and Italians). There was also a realization that the common cause of the Gospel, now facing an obvious threat, was at stake in the stand taken by the Confessional Church. Communication between the Churches was kept up as long as possible; Switzerland, especially, gave the Confessional Church in Germany a considerable amount of aid. A certain misunderstanding played a useful part in this from the beginning, the action of the German Confessional Church being interpreted in other countries as more broadly based and more radical than it really was.

The moment came soon enough when a number of these other Churches were compelled by the German occupation of their respective countries to take their own stand on the problem which had first been presented in Germany. The conflicts which broke out in Holland and Norway should be recalled especially.

Clearly there was a difference between the situation of the Churches in those two countries and that of the Confessional Church in Germany. It is only fair to note three things: 1. The Churches in Holland and Norway have the immeasurable advantage of defending not only the freedom of the Gospel, but the freedom of their own people and fatherland against foreign oppressors and traitors within their gates; the men of the German Confessional Church, on the other hand, have to stand up against their own government and are constantly faced by the problem (which the war has made still more insistent) of reconciling their opposition to National Socialism with their duty and love for their own land and people. 2. The Churches of Holland and Norway, before they themselves became part of the conflict, were able to learn much from their long observation of events in Germany; they could carry on their struggle in the light of the German experience. 3. The German occupation authorities, after the experience in Germany, did not meddle with the inner life of the Churches in Holland and Norway or try to impose on them a

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pagan or heretical doctrine and order; as a result, these Churches were able from the start to orient themselves more freely.

For these reasons the church struggle in Holland and Norway is a far more animated picture than in Germany. It takes for granted the answer to the question concerning the preservation of the Christian substance and is able to concentrate on the practical accomplishment of that aim. The fight is carried on and supported not merely by a minority but by an overwhelming majority of theologians and church members. It has a direct relationship to the struggle in which the nations as such are engaged. It is being waged not only on the defensive, but on the offensive as well. The issue is not merely the rights of the church, but also the restoration of the general state of civil law destroyed by the German invasion; not faith alone is at stake, but the belief in the validity of God's commandments; it is not just a question of the Jewish Christians, but of the Jews in general. Even in the eyes of the individual who is only superficially, if at all, interested in Christian affairs, this struggle is now an important part of the general battle against National Socialism.

If the scope and significance of the church struggles in Holland and Norway are greater than those of the one in Germany, we must not overlook the fact that their Christian purity and depth and their relation to the religious "renewal" are perhaps more problematical. Motives and principles other than those which are purely Christian may play no small part here, and all sorts of naïve confusions may result — confusion between the cause of God and the national cause, between hope in God and hope in the British, between a holy, prophetic wrath and the comprehensible but less holy rage of the oppressed and betrayed. The problem of the Prophet Jeremiah should be food for thought to the more serious Christian in Holland and Norway. It is undeniable that the church struggle in Germany is closely linked with the "renewal;" but it is at least uncertain whether the "renewal" is so much in the foreground of the vigorous action in which the Dutch and Norwegian Christians are at present engaged. Later we shall see which Church will emerge with the greatest spiritual gain from the developments of these days.

This reservation, however, does not alter the fact that the logical conclusion of the struggle begun in Germany itself would be the decisive political witness and devotion to God now apparent in these other countries. It is precisely because of the

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Christian belief in the resurrection of Christ from the dead, the faith that to Him is given all power in heaven and earth, that one cannot say to German National Socialism either "Yes" or "Yes and No," but only wholeheartedly and with complete decisiveness: "No!" Those who do otherwise have either failed to understand National Socialism, despite all its self-revelations; or they have not thought through the message of the Bible; or they have developed a kind of schizophrenia in which totally divergent yardsticks are adopted for the inner and the external life. One wonders uneasily whether even the sincere Christians in Germany have not become victims of that sort of intellectual disintegration. But no matter how far they may have progressed in other directions, they will have to learn from the other Churches that there are a Christian center and a Christian periphery, that the Christian substance and its political application are indeed two different things, but that there is only one truth and one righteousness — and no man can serve two masters.

I know little or nothing about the present ecclesiastical situation in Denmark or among Protestants in Hungary, Italy and the part of France which has been under German occupation since the Armistice. In the light of their antecedents, and also from certain direct indications, it is to be feared that the Hungarians, of whom we formerly had good hopes, have rather lost their heads as a result of their alliance with Germany and the war with Russia and now expect to find their Christian happiness in unrestrained anti-Bolshevism. The situation in occupied France appears to be similar to that in Germany, in that the French church leaders, inwardly in passionate opposition to the German occupation, have been concentrating their attention on the inward life of the Church and on education of the community for a better future.

On the other hand what has been said about Holland and Norway is applicable also to Switzerland, Sweden and the part of France until recently not directly under the Germans.

Reformed Switzerland, of course, has not yet been put to the test of actual war. But their country's isolated position in the midst of the Axis Powers had forced the Swiss urgently (though tentatively) to decide for or against the "New Order" in Europe. It is safe to say that Switzerland in general has answered with a unanimous negative, not through the mouth of the Swiss Government, but by the voices of the preachers and the parishes (in-

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clusive of Catholic Switzerland). During the First World War there was a not insignificant amount of Swiss anti-militarism; today the overwhelming majority of the Christian Swiss realize clearly that "obedience to constituted authority" (according to the thirteenth chapter of Romans), in the form of armed neutrality, is both righteous and necessary. The interpretation of the concept of Swiss neutrality has, however, caused sharp differences of opinion in several instances between certain church spokesmen and the federal authorities. The Swiss Church cannot be accused of having been silent when the Government applied it in a manner which was highly questionable alike from the Christian, the traditional and the prevailing legal viewpoint of our country. Nor can it be said that the Church failed to act in a practical way in the matter of the foreign refugees, or that its general attitude has been wholly without impressiveness and effect. But, of course, our resistance can hardly be compared for the present with that of the Churches in Holland, Norway and (in a different manner) Germany.

News from Sweden indicates that, subject to similar conditions and reservations, the Swedish Church too belongs thus far not only to the Protestant but to the *protesting* churches.

Although the paralysis of the summer of 1940 at first led Protestantism in unoccupied France to withdraw into political quietism and the cultivation of piety and morals, a change seems to have occurred in 1941 and 1942. The principles and practices of the Vichy Government and its relations with the foreign Power which stood behind and over it were under constant debate. The vigorous action of the church leader, Pastor Marc Boegner, on behalf of the Christian education of youth, his courageous address to Marshal Pétain on the persecution of the Jews, and other news which has seeped out regarding the attitude and activity of the younger generation of pastors appear to indicate further developments along these lines whenever the occasion again offers.

What was said about the special danger inherent in the situation in Holland and Norway is to some extent true also of those Churches which have not yet been directly attacked. We shall have to keep watch over the attitude they have taken, and also guard against impairing the freedom of the gospel in our zeal for the good and our aversion to evil, which in a reverse sense is just what National Socialism demanded of the German Church in the name of "German Christianity." And, above all, we shall

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have to be vigilant lest our courage and our enthusiasm for resistance become subject to the alternating political and military successes and setbacks. It must be clear that our resistance can have meaning and even political significance only to the extent that it is able to nourish itself from its own roots.

The thing that the Church must tell the world in the present crisis is this: that there is an *absolutely* essential antithesis to National Socialism which is independent of success or failure. But the Church can and will say this rightly only if it continues to go its own way.

VI

Taking the situation as a whole, one may justly say that European Protestantism, with varying degrees of consistency, frankness and power, has recognized and assumed the position appropriate to its historic mission. It may be affirmed without presumption that it has sounded a clearer call than any which has as yet been heard from the Holy See in Rome, and that it need not be ashamed when measured against the other forces of resistance. We may be gratefully astonished that, hardly a hundred years after Kierkegaard's devastating criticism of Protestant Christianity, a vastly greater catastrophe than he visualized has not succeeded in overwhelming it.

But measured by the yardstick which has been in existence since the sixteenth century, and which we now take with new seriousness, the Protestant Churches can find no occasion for satisfaction with the results of their efforts thus far. In the sixteenth century, Protestantism assumed a great responsibility for shaping the destiny of Europe. It has reason to ask itself, therefore, how it could happen that, after 400 years, Europe could be brought to the uttermost edge of the abyss on which it stands today. And it is a monumental disgrace to all Protestantism that the monster of National Socialism could be born in the very cradle of the Reformation and could develop there into an object of dread and abomination to all the world.

It is part of the pattern of things that German theology, which up to the time of crisis gave guidance to the theologians of all the Protestant Churches, should not have retained its leadership but instead should have become instrumental in leading men's souls astray. However, it is likewise part of the pattern of things that those of us who felt called upon to take up the conflict either did

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so too late or did not know how to find the enkindling and potent word which would awaken the nations and prevent the approaching calamity — although it was clear enough that this word should be spoken and equally clear where it could be found. Furthermore, the Protestant Churches, in Germany as well as in all the other countries, with the possible exception of Norway, did not possess the "watchmen" and leaders who might have known how to rouse them. They showed themselves on the whole to be ill-prepared to meet the problems of this time. The steps actually taken thus far have had necessarily a spasmodic, personal, voluntary and therefore often arbitrary origin and character. Even the ecumenical movement, although it had increased in importance after the First World War, obviously had not yet developed far enough to furnish authoritative guidance to the Churches or to do more than provide a means for exchanging information.

Protestantism was altogether lacking in the intellectually consistent direction which it enjoyed in the days of Calvin. For this reason, in the last analysis, the individual Churches were left to themselves in their anxieties and problems and in their dangerous vacillation between quietism on the one side and a secularizing activism on the other. The result was that the voice of Protestantism became the voice of one crying in the wilderness, or, more accurately, a voice coming out of a corner. Thus it was deprived of the power and effectiveness which it should have had, considering the mission entrusted to the Churches of the Reformation. It is small consolation that the far better equipped Roman Catholic Church has done no better, in fact, not nearly so well. The fact is that probably we all had too much of the weak and confused spirit of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to be equal to this crisis.

One can speak only theologically, not historically, of the reasons why we nevertheless were not altogether like sheep without a shepherd, and why it is possible to say, though with the greatest caution, that there is still an enduring Protestant Church in Europe. The Churches might well be compared, in the words of the Prophet, to a "brand snatched from the burning." One would have to admit that they can thank the inward renewal, to which reference has been made, for the little they have been able to achieve. The question of their future, immediate as well as remote, may well be decided, therefore, by whether this renewal

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continues vigorously, comes to a standstill or becomes in some way perverted.

The present crisis has evidently not yet reached its peak. The severest trials and tests of endurance for European Protestantism probably still lie ahead. And beyond the problems of wartime lie those of peace. "The old world is dead!" a leading English statesman has just proclaimed. He is probably right. Europe undoubtedly has come to the end of an historic, political, economic and social era and confronts an unexampled re-beginning. Equally true is that its renewal must consist not in the destruction of Western culture, but in its unhindered efflorescence, rooted as it is in Christianity. The new life which is to follow the death of the old must be founded on this culture.

Will the confused and war-weary nations muster the courage, the insight and the will power to do this? Will they be able to comprehend that the world, for all its frailty and imperfection, after all the horror which it has known, still has a hope of better things? And will they comprehend further that without this hope no authentic quest for those better things will ever be attempted? It will be the function of the Christian Churches to proclaim this hope and to make it comprehensible. That is going to be much harder than the essentially critical task of today, when we are still at war.

This hope is the great affirmation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ; but the Churches will be able to proclaim and expound it to all peoples only if they themselves regain true knowledge of it and learn to live by it, only when they themselves are ready to move forward with simple, direct and complete faith in this Gospel. How shall they tell the world what they themselves no longer understand? Their whole weakness in the present crisis lies in the fact that they are only at the beginning of this return — or advance. They will be stronger in the future than they are in the present if their own process of renewal precedes the necessary and true renewal of Europe, if they do not stand still or deviate, but go forward.

There is no phase of European church life which does not stand in need of this renascence. The pastors must hear the call, but so must the congregations. Theology must listen to it, and also the church judicatories and the supporters of the ecumenical movement. There is no need to stress how much depends on whether or not they obey the call. If the old world is really dead, nothing

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less than the Gospel of the resurrection and the life must be preached and heard. This is the mission which will be entrusted to the Church tomorrow in a manner far different from that of yesterday.

But here again we are at the frontiers of a domain about which one can speak only theologically. The real renascence of the Church, as of Europe, does not lie ultimately in human hands. The Christian hope is the strongest hope of all the world, because it reaches immeasurably higher than the objectives which are attainable by political, economic, social or even ecclesiastical action. The Protestant Churches will themselves look confidently into the future, and will awaken confidence in others, to the precise degree that they keep that hope before their eyes and are willing to accept it as *grace* and make it fruitful accordingly. If a further quickening is granted to them, and with it the insight and the power to carry out their mission to the world, then a better future for Europe should be realized.

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FASHIONS IN SPACE

By Sigmund Neumann

THE signal that a new fashion had arrived — the fashion called geopolitics — was given by the flashy journalism which suddenly raised the Professor-General Haushofer to the rôle of the "man behind Hitler." Since then new books rolling off the press almost weekly make this "new science of power politics" the "inside story" of National Socialism's secret desires and drives. The Professor's presumed power and prestige appeal no less to some American geopoliticians. What Haushofer is supposed to have done, Professor Renner thinks can be tried as well over here. Let the geopoliticians dictate the future peace; let amateurish statesmen step aside. Like any fashion, geopolitics will pass. Even so, it will leave its mark and therefore should be taken seriously. The term has come to stand for a danger zone of muddy thinking and shady ambitions. It is imperative to delineate the chief features of the new science and to give it a critical airing.

Geopolitics has three aspects, three distinct dimensions — as a science, as a political weapon, and as a world outlook. First, it is a modern version of political geography, or anthropo-geography. As such, though neither new nor novel, it has accumulated a respectable body of scientific material. Second, it serves as a weapon of modern National Socialism, a rationalizing ideology of imperialist expansion. It is this side of geopolitics which has naturally aroused wide interest and many misunderstandings among the non-academicians. Finally, it is an all-embracing *Weltanschauung* which has filled the imagination and won the loyalty of a small yet significant group of ardent followers. This, the least discussed aspect of geopolitics, probably is the most crucial. Not only does it explain the appeal of this pseudo-science to so many young and susceptible minds, but it also brings out clearly its power and peril.

The difficulty of analyzing geopolitics lies not least in the fact that the three aspects are inextricably intermingled in the minds of friend and foe alike. With its enemies, this confusion often is simply the result of a lack of factual information or of clarity of thought. As far as its own representatives go, it may well represent a conscious realization that ambiguity can be a powerful weapon, screening political drives and ambitions behind terms of

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"inviolate and unfailing scientific findings." Science then becomes a "front" for politics.

II

As a study of "the dependence of political events on the character of the earth," following Haushofer's own definition, geopolitics is certainly not an invention of the general-geographer of Munich. It has a long and distinguished tradition; and much of what has recently been added by his Institut für Geopolitik to its scientific riches will probably not stand a critical review.

One does not have to go back (as one naturally can) to the Greeks, to Herodotus and Thucydides, in order to find an understanding of the fact that political geography is a key to human affairs. It was recognized as such by the first modern social scientists, philosophers and historians alike. Bodin and Montesquieu, Ranke and Ritter, gave elaborate proof of the great importance of climate and environment in the history of mankind. It would also be easy to present an impressive list of "forgotten men" who made special studies in a geopolitical vein more than a century ago. Baron Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow with his "Spirit of the New System of War," published in 1799, has recently received a new hearing, and there are many others.

Every new movement naturally reënforces itself with such testimonials, especially from respectable forerunners who carry weight in the intellectual history of their nation. Yet it is well to remember, if only for the scholarly assignment of priorities and influence, that the geographical approach to history and politics was already well-established long before the emergence of *Geopolitik*. One need only be reminded of H. T. Buckle, Hippolyte A. Taine, and Heinrich von Treitschke. Especially Treitschke, dynamic historian of the Bismarckian era, had all the makings, and the phraseology too, of the modern myth-makers of space and race. And there was Otto Hintze, master of Prussian history, who made continuingly valid statements concerning the relations of institutional structures and geographical environment. His analyses of the divergent political fate of the democratic island Britain, and of Prussia, the militant continental state surrounded by competing land Powers, have by now become accepted textbook knowledge. At the very same time, American historical science was no less deeply impressed by geographical influences,

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as the writings of Frederick Turner prove and as the analyses of Ratzel's faithful disciple, Ellen Churchill Semple, reaffirm.

In the meantime geography had acquired a new name for its human side, which had been constant in its interest, though not in its form, since Herodotus — anthropo-geography. Geopolitics came into its own with Friedrich Ratzel, who developed the first great scientific and systematic analysis of the environmental basis of society, and later on with Rudolf Kjellen, who popularized Ratzel's findings and gave geopolitics an exciting nomenclature. This is not the place even to enumerate the achievements of this young science in half a century. A vast amount of factual data was collected dealing with topography and configuration, with strategic location and population pressures, with climate and natural resources, together with a well-developed technique of cartography. All this material supplied a working basis for the extensive investigations of geopolitics in the period after the last war. While the Haushofer school is enormously indebted to these earlier findings, even on this elementary level it contributed to a vitalization of the collected raw material. Many a conservative laughed at the antics of the young geopoliticians when they started drawing their visual maps with arrows pointing at the heart of the enemy's country and circles defining kernels of strength or disturbance. They employed much verbiage, raised a great hullabaloo and called in great showmanship and advertising; yet they certainly succeeded in awakening a wider interest in geographical thinking. Maps became purposeful weapons. Mountains and rivers were moved right out of the textbooks and made into real dynamic forces, threatening or promising. The Haushofer school made a whole generation think spatially. It is on this first level of geopolitics that much can be learnt by an American world which still has not outgrown its grammar school days of scanty geographical instruction. One of the many failings of American higher education is that its curriculum has not lived up to the needs of a world which in war and peace has taken on literally global dimensions.

Since the days of Ratzel and his "Seven Laws of Expansionism," geopolitics has built up a most impressive armory of rules and concepts. Many of them merely contain half-truths or commonplaces, though embedded in a glittering vocabulary which makes geopolitical books and journals awe-inspiring and hard

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reading for the uninitiated. But in the voluminous and often cryptic utterances are hidden some substantial realities, and these should not be dismissed simply because they have been applied unscrupulously to suit preconceived political ends.

Three fundamental considerations of geopolitical thought may be singled out. They are not original with Haushofer, the eclecticist, but are borrowed from his three outstanding sources: Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder. Ratzel's basic law of the spatial growth of states had clearly indicated that there was an increasing discrepancy between nationalism as the organizing principle of political order and the natural movement toward greater empires. *Geopolitik* seized, after Versailles, upon this idea of "space-conquering forces" and claimed to be the liberator from provincial nationalism and the spokesman of a rising though still inarticulate longing for a new and wider World Order. The myth of nationalism, strained by the bitter experiences of that period, was ripe to be superseded by a new ideology. Geopolitics entered the void. Its ambitious scheming was in harmony with the economic realities of a shrinking planet and the military considerations of mechanized warfare. It predicted the doom of small nations, especially the succession states created at Paris out of the former Hapsburg Empire. Geopoliticians labelled these bits of states "the witches' cauldron" of Europe. Ratzel *redivivus* made the whole trend towards the building of new empires look scientific and irresistible.

Geopolitics fed on the ineffectualness of the system of nationalism, and it also capitalized on the inner unrest of individual nations. Here again Haushofer could simply take up where his predecessors had left off. Kjellen's whole theory of "the state as a form of life" was an attempt at emancipation from the predominantly legal concept of the state, at filling "the legal skeleton with social flesh and blood." True, his new system of *Realpolitik* was only another scheme. Complex though it was, and impressive in its verbiage, it did not correspond to the reality of the body politic. Yet Haushofer learned from his pathfinder that a multiplicity of forces must be included in a coherent thought pattern if geopolitics was to be made the guiding star of a synthetic science. When the Institut für Geopolitik extended its interests into practically all fields of human activity, this was not merely the natural expansion of a young science but a sincere and necessary attempt at integration because, as

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Haushofer said, only "about one-quarter of the questions posed by human evolution can be explained from earth-determinant causes."

The third great influence on the pattern of geopolitical thought came from Sir Halford J. Mackinder and his doctrine of land power, which represented a corrective of Admiral Mahan's thesis of the predominance of sea power in history, so uncritically hailed as a dogma of universal validity both in the Anglo-Saxon world and in the Germany of William II.

Ten years before the First World War, Mackinder's classic lecture on "The Geographical Pivot of History" conceived world politics as basically a conflict between oceanic and continental powers. He did not reject the importance of sea power outright, but emphasized its changing prerequisites. To maintain its supremacy in the twentieth century, it needed broader land bases than in the nineteenth century. The development of railways, submarines and airpower dictated a new orientation. Each century has its own geographical perspective, he said coolly, and this carried a warning to Britain. "So impressive have been the results of British sea-power that there has perhaps been a tendency to neglect the warnings of history and to regard sea-power in general as having, because of the unity of the ocean, the last word in the rivalry with land-power." This warning was reiterated at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference, but his "Democratic Ideals and Reality," recognized twenty years later as a prophetic book, warned in vain against the emergence of a land bloc that would find its center in the Heartland stretching from the Arctic to the Himalaya Mountains and from the Volga to the Yangtze River. The great world island of Europe-Asia-Africa would be invulnerable to sea power.

The Versailles system dictated by the great sea Powers neglected the potentialities of such compact land masses. Haushofer accepted and exploited the great Englishman's theory, yet abandoned its circumspection and neglected its underlying human elements. Haushofer offered the doctrine of land-power pure and simple. It was Mackinder in a strait jacket. Taken with Haushofer's belief in the doom of the British Empire, this doctrine seemed to give scientific promise for an early recovery of Germany, strategically situated as the key to the wide-open spaces of Eurasia. Mackinder had proclaimed: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the

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World." Now the hour of German world dominance had come. Haushofer felt sure that he was its prophet — Germany's Mahan, or better. *Geopolitik* was ready to dictate its "global scheme of political strategy" and to give orders for the march on the world.

III

Geopolitik's hour of birth was the period between the wars. "*Geopolitik* aims to furnish the armature for political action, and the principles for guidance in political life. . . ." Thus the official definition continues, stepping far beyond the sound basis of political geography. "*Geopolitik* must become the geographical conscience of the state." Description and analysis do not suffice: norms and blueprints for action are required.

It is on this second layer of geopolitics as a political weapon that Haushofer made his "contribution" and that his school of fanatic disciples won historical significance. "Military understanding passes from the victor to the defeated," Haushofer had confidently stated. Born of German defeat, the new science was meant to be no mere academic discipline but a workshop for tools of revenge. In Haushofer's forge all the raw materials of generations of great scholarship were melted together and bent towards one purpose: Germany's quest for world power. Thus we come one step closer to an understanding of the true character of geopolitics. It is not only political science clarifying the issues, specifying the techniques, and preparing the decisions; it is politics itself — action and combat.

By no mere accident, the founder of the geopolitical school started his career not as a professional academician but on staff service for the army. In this capacity he had been sent on a military mission to Japan. His years in the Far East awakened in him a lasting sentiment for Japan and the greatest interest in the Indo-Pacific area. His observations and experiences there developed all the leitmotifs of his dynamic political theory, which in 1924 found full expression in his "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean." [1] Yet long before the First World War he had conceived the idea that "whoever could make an alliance with that part of the globe [the Indo-Pacific area] with its rich resources and superabundant population could rule the rest of the world." His conclusion that Germany should coöperate with the rising

[1] *Editor's Note.* For an analysis of "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean" see "Haushofer and the Pacific," by Hans W. Weigert, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1942.

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"giant of the monsoon lands" had not been shared, however, by the Imperial Government. William II had made himself the protagonist of the White Race against the "Yellow Peril." Then followed the war, in which Haushofer saw active service, leading his division in combat. After the German defeat he retired from military service. When in 1921 he was appointed to the Chair of Geography and Military Science at Munich he remained basically the general, only changing his assigned post from the field quarters to the study in preparation for a renewed and better-planned drive toward world conquest. He at once revived his prewar credo regarding an alliance with Japan.

Germany's desperate plight after the White Man's Great Civil War put sharper weapons in Haushofer's hands to argue for a German-Japanese alliance. In his opinion it had been a fatal mistake of the Allied Powers to dispossess Germany of her Far Eastern colonies. The Reich could turn defeat into a great victory by awakening to its geopolitical opportunities. Free from commitments and conflicts in the Far East, it now could and should return to that area as the champion of "the oppressed people of India and Japan." With the satisfaction of a fatalistic Spengler, he foretold the pending doom of the White Man in Asia, and linked to it Germany's opportunity to make a comeback in world politics. There was grandeur in the conception, and utter cynicism. When it became the basis of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis, the General won the greatest victory of the campaign he was conducting from his study.

What was true of Haushofer was no less true of his disciples. They were soldiers first and students only second, and even in their classrooms they were fighting the battles of the coming Reich. Indeed, many among them had been officers in the Imperial Army, and, still stunned by the unexpected defeat, were restlessly looking for a new hold on life and a new rôle in it. The electrifying effect of the soldier-teacher on his audience derived from the fact that he did not offer them a mere academic discipline but a promise and direction for their empty life. It was a natural climate for dynamic geopolitics. How different was this excited atmosphere from the one in which a Karl Ritter had said: "The still power which nature exerts demands a like peaceful soul to watch its workings."

Orientation in international affairs, Haushofer taught, should be directed not by political ideologies but only by the iron laws

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of the great spaces. A transcontinental bloc including Germany, Russia and Japan would represent a natural alliance that could not be defeated. And, in fact, long before Haushofer's star rose, the German Republic had accepted his maxim that a German-Russian understanding offered a way out from Versailles. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had early proclaimed the idea, and Walter Rathenau had put it into practice in 1922 in his master stroke: the Treaty of Rapallo. The Reichswehr tried to keep friendly relations with the Red Army even after the rise of National Socialism.

When the geopolitical school was officially launched in 1924 — the very year Germany overcame the inflation — it signaled the rise of a new imperialism. Friedrich Naumann of Mittel-Europa fame and Paul Rohrbach's Berlin-Baghdad Railway scheme reappeared, reënforced by new slogans. First among them was the dubious formula of the "have" and "have-not" nations. Well-meaning American publicists like Frank Simonds were the godfathers of this glittering phrase, which became most welcome ammunition in the arsenal of the "young nations" fighting for a place in the sun and their share in the world's resources. To be a "have-not" nation gave your quest for the redistribution of worldly goods a moral blessing. Germany, according to Haushofer, was in such a case. Squeezed between colony-possessing Powers in the West and space-possessing Powers in the East, the Germans were "a people without space." But population pressure, which was declared to be a major incentive for an expansive foreign policy, could be made to order by the dictators, who simply started intensive drives to increase their people's birth rate. Thus was demographic imperialism justified.

Though victorious National Socialism was able to make good use of the well-forged weapons of geopolitics, it nevertheless is an erroneous simplification to make Haushofer the ghost-writer of "Mein Kampf" and the guiding hand of Nazi foreign policy. True, Hess had been a disciple of Haushofer and had brought Hitler and Haushofer together. Report even has it that at the time Hitler was a prisoner in the fortress of Landsberg the Professor visited him every Wednesday to teach him the fundamentals of geopolitics. For years, however, the policies of National Socialism were dictated by other forces. There was Rosenberg with his "ideological" crusade against Bolshevism and there was Hitler's own wishful thinking about an alliance with England — both

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in stark contradiction to geopolitical teaching. In fact, up to September 1938, Hitler's only declared aim was the German *Volksstaat*, *e.g.*, the inclusion in Greater Germany of all compact groups of German nationality within reach. At the height of the Sudeten crisis, Hitler had proudly proclaimed: "We want no Czechs."

The day after Munich, however, the whole concept of Nazi foreign policy was completely reversed. This was Haushofer's hour. Greater Germany having been practically achieved, new dynamic concepts were needed for further expansion; and the school of *Geopolitik* took the reins for the time being. Theirs was the timely formula of the "natural right of the capable peoples to living space as against that of the possessors of territory who were unable to develop it."

The advantage of this concept of living space (*Lebensraum*) consisted in the fact that it gave practically unlimited possibilities to an ambitious people. One had a right to as much living space as one could control; one's ambition was the only limit to further expansion. People who live happily in two rooms will soon feel crowded and will gladly move into a three-room apartment if they can afford it. Their drive toward more spacious living quarters will be limited only by their budget. But while such an ambition may be the principle underlying many human actions, it is not the organizing principle of human society. Actual need and social status are continuously adjusted to and limited by the social whole. The same principle must be and is prevalent in international affairs under normal conditions. The nations represent the political units in a world structure which must guarantee their mutual right to existence and equality. The concept of living space, however, not only carries in itself the seed of unlimited dynamics, but fails to recognize the neighbor's equal right to living space. The complete absence of any sense or feeling of reciprocity is a characteristic of National Socialist thinking.

Lebensraum was granted or denied to nations in the court of the geopolitical potentates. If the British Empire would play the game with the "renovating Powers," she might keep a sphere of interest of her own. If not, then the "declining empire" would have to abdicate, and the spoils would be redistributed among the rising World Powers. The final outcome was obvious: a world empire for one supreme Power dominating the entire globe. This

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dangerous trend was carried further in the substitution for *Lebensraum* of the even more flexible *Befehlsraum* — the area in which Germany was "to give orders." Obviously, so long as another *Befehlsraum* exists, the New Order is endangered. In consequence, the concept of *Befehlsraum* not only is a glorification of the well-known idea that "might is right" but it also carries in itself an unlimited dynamism. From the concept of Greater Germany to that of *Lebensraum*, and thence to that of *Befehlsraum*, a direct way leads the modern dictatorship towards world control.

The marriage between National Socialism and *Geopolitik* reveals the nature of both. By its very definition, National Socialism is ready to make use of any elements of unrest that will feed the fire of permanent revolution, and then to abandon them after they have served their purpose. It may have done so by now with Haushofer. *Geopolitik*, for its part, proved by its acceptance of Nazi tutelage that it utterly lacked scruple, for various basic concepts of National Socialism — the idea of the master race, for one — contradicted well-established ideas of the geopolitical school. This shows that the geopoliticians are as unprincipled and cynical as the Nazi leaders. Here we reach the essential aspect of their school: *Geopolitik* as *Weltanschauung*.

IV

Geopolitik is not only a pseudo-science and a political expedient; it is, above all, a pseudo-philosophy. In the first phase of its triple attack it embraces the world in its general concept of a dynamic political geography. It then turns to the nation with promises of power and prestige. It finally reaches man — and fails him completely. It is in this third incarnation, as a world outlook, that it stands fully revealed and demonstrates its utter failure. Yet here it is part and parcel of a much deeper crisis. It is another signpost of man's fatal "retreat from reason."

Geopolitik's basic appeal is its simultaneous promise of stability and dynamic action. Man, having lost confidence in himself and in his ability to choose between good and evil, is ready to surrender his freedom for security; for in a world which seems to have lost all the basic values, his primary concern is to find again stable concepts, indisputable tenets, absolute standards.

This is exactly what the new theories of space and race claim to offer. Their attractiveness resides above all in their "scientific" absoluteness and their presumed concreteness. They merge the

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disturbing complexities of life into one single and seemingly objective factor. And with the return to the primitive mind, space becomes the most tangible and concrete manifestation of life. In the unending flood of continuous change, space is the invariable, independent of man and events. Rootless man seeks a new hold outside of himself. His loud call for action — speedy, glamorous, continuous — in the big world is a desperate move to make him forget the emptiness of his small inner life. The "powerful" dynamics of the modern world conqueror is only his escape from his despair of real values and of himself. He is at war with the world, because he is not at peace with himself. Yet man cannot escape his responsibility as man. Nor can a science of society and social order establish itself as a "natural science" without missing its challenge completely. In this most important respect *Geopolitik* fails.

Needless to say, the crucial study of the relation of man to earth does not need to exclude man altogether. There are geopoliticians (Albert Demangeon and other Frenchmen significantly in front) who have even emphasized the primacy of man in the interplay of human and geographic factors. Geopolitics is divided into as many schools as there are divergent geographical conditions, political constellations and cultural landscapes. German geopolitics is *sui generis*, reflecting many German traits: rigid systematization and passionate flight into the clouds, pedantry strangely mixed with romanticism. Though the Haushofer school has become influential far beyond its own boundaries, it is only one geopolitical school, the school of German *Geopolitik*.

By no mere accident, the great forerunners of German geopolitics started out as students of the natural sciences. This was true of Alexander von Humboldt as well as of Friedrich Ratzel, the young apothecary. Their approach to geography was that of a natural scientist. Kjellen, no doubt, sensed the weakness of the embryonic political science of his day. Yet it was this very preponderance of the natural scientist in him which petrified his endeavor to instill social reality into a stillborn concept of the state as a "social organism." Ratzel and Kjellen were children of the age of natural science. They became the prototype of a social science which, since it lacked confidence in its own way of thinking, simply translated the techniques and experiences of the older sciences into the new field. While their findings seemed to result in the creation of a very impressive

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scientific edifice, they never reached the center of the social sciences, which is man. In the "struggle for areas" corresponding to the "struggle for existence" in the biological evolution, man did not count and continuous war was inevitable.

Their world was mechanistic, and, translated into politics, the best they could do was the theory of the "balance of power." It is worth noting today that believers in the "balance of power" and the efficiency men of "managerial revolutions" all over the world easily surrender to the glittering concepts of *Geopolitik* without fully realizing how much they capitulate, at the same time, to its *Weltanschauung*.

It is true that "space" had been a neglected factor in the dynamics of politics. During the period of awakening social and economic forces, Marxian ideology had penetrated the minds of both its friends and foes. Geopolitics must be considered as reaction against Marxism or, better, as its counterpart, bourgeois Marxism. As such it was greeted by its followers; but its new and ardent adherents made the same mistakes as their opponents. Now instead of economics it was space that became the absolute and exclusive yardstick.

It should not be difficult to prove the basic fallacy of a political system which raises "space" to such an illustrious position. Geography can be the most permanent factor in the foreign policy of states, without being the most fundamental one. Technology changes, if not the face of the earth, most certainly the meaning of its never-ceasing influence on human affairs. Human ingenuity can blast out an Alaska highway and can tunnel the Swiss Alps, it can control rivers, and with modern airplanes it can penetrate even the "Heartland." In the final analysis, it is up to man to decide what he will do with nature and its barriers. It is not space that makes history or even defines frontiers. Such a warning is pertinent and necessary at a time when everyone carries his own blueprint of a postwar Utopia in his pocket. The drawing of a new world map will be a thorny undertaking, and those who undertake the task will have to respect historical traditions, national peculiarities and human values. A good order can evolve only gradually. Blueprints are dangerous. Especially deadly are those of the geopoliticians.

Nazi Germany's New Order teaches the world a bitter and needed lesson. Professor George T. Renner's "Maps for a New World" offers an American version of that New Order, a weaker

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edition to be sure, yet permeated with the same basic fallacies. One cannot dismember Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal and Hungary simply in order to set up nine large European blocs (and incidentally create a Greater Germany, a Greater Italy and a Greater Spain!). To do that may satisfy a technician's view of a well-balanced Europe, but it shows an utter disregard of Europe as a living body.

The self-appointed demiurges of the natural forces of the great spaces consider man and society mere marionettes. They have no respect for human dignity and freedom, for man's yearnings and sufferings. They see no limit to their wilful play but their power to enforce the "natural laws," whose sole interpreters they are. Geopolitical materialism is devoid of any moral evaluation and restraint; it is driven only by "political expediency;" it is an ideal weapon in the hands of those who are striving for unlimited power and dynamic nihilism, and in such hands only.

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QUEZON OF THE PHILIPPINES

By Sergio Osmeña

MANUEL LUIS QUEZON, President of the Philippine Islands, was a soldier of the Revolution of 1898 against Spain. As a youth he joined the ranks of the Philippine Revolutionary Army, serving under the immediate command of General Mascardo. It is an irony of history that 44 years ago he engaged in military operations in the same jungle-clad Bataan where last spring the Philippine-American Army fought its desperate battle with the Japanese invaders. He rose from the ranks to become a major. He knew how to suffer and he did suffer. In the front line he fought with reckless abandon. He learned about military discipline and its importance. These qualities, so evident in Quezon the revolutionist of 1898, are no less apparent in Quezon the statesman of today.

In the spring of 1941, when the clouds of war gathered over the Pacific, President Quezon, like a sentry in his watchtower, sounded this warning:

> In these tragic days when the very future of civilization is in the balance, the defense of our nation should be uppermost in our mind. We have been spared so far the horrors of war, but no one can foretell if and when we shall be involved in this armed conflict. We should be prepared for any eventuality, and every man and woman should be ready to answer the call when the bugle is sounded.

When the situation became even more serious, he saw that it required a categorical definition of the Filipino stand and showed his people the path of duty in the following words:

> In this grave national emergency, the stand of the Filipino people is clear and unmistakable. We owe loyalty to America and are bound to her by bonds of everlasting gratitude. Should the United States enter the war, the Philippines would follow her and fight by her side, placing at her disposal all our man power and all our natural resources, however limited these might be. We stand with the United States in life and in death.

The momentous decision having been made, the next step was to carry it to realization. Prior to the summer of 1941, the Quezon Administration had been occupied primarily with the reorganization of a working government, the revision of the tax system, preparation for national defense, the expansion of public education, the planning of a new national economy, the vigorous

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prosecution of programs of social justice and public health, the development of agriculture, trade and industry, and the construction of such public works as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, flood controls, radio and telegraph stations, and airports. All these things had been undertaken with a view to preparing the country for the responsibilities of independence.

But from the moment the decision was made to stand firm with the United States in the event of war, the Administration proceeded to vital readjustments needed to harness every ounce of the country's energy for a supreme war effort. A Civilian Emergency Administration was organized, and considerable sums were appropriated for supplies, transportation, communication and air-raid protection. Under the direction of the Civilian Emergency Administration, a comprehensive plan was adopted to buy and store food, fuel and other civilian necessities; rice and corn were imported from Java, while canned meat, fish and milk were purchased in great quantities from the United States. Crop production was fostered and air-raid shelters were constructed in many parts of the islands. Civilians living in congested districts of Manila were taken to evacuation centers outside the city and provided with food and medicine. Many schools were converted into relief centers and emergency hospitals.

What happened on and after December 7, 1941, is well known. Following their treacherous attack upon Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Our small air force was destroyed on the ground during the first days of the war and the United States Asiatic Fleet was soon forced to leave Philippine waters. The enemy was able to make simultaneous landings in the north, south, east and west. Japanese propaganda, too, was very active.

But in their hurried advance, the Japanese encountered one thing they probably did not expect — the determined opposition and tenacious resistance of the Filipinos. Under the superb military command of General MacArthur, American and Filipino forces held at bay for many anxious months an overwhelmingly superior Japanese Army.

Let me give you a picture of the situation in the Philippines on December 7. President Quezon was recovering from a long illness and was so weak he could not even walk. Nevertheless, he summoned his associates in the legislative and executive

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departments and took counsel with them. The Cabinet met frequently in his country home in Marikina and took its fateful decisions. On December 11, the National Assembly, which had been called into extraordinary session, voted to place all the resources of the country at the disposal of the United States Government. All available government funds were appropriated for national defense and civilian protection.

When the question of evacuating Manila presented itself, the members of the Philippine Government would have preferred to stay with their people, to suffer, and, if necessary, to perish with them. Such a course, however, would not have aided the war effort; in fact, Filipino morale would have received a fatal blow had President Quezon fallen prisoner to the Japanese. We prevailed upon him finally to leave Manila. Availing himself of the authority granted him by the Emergency Power Law of December 15, 1941, President Quezon reorganized his Cabinet, reducing its membership, and, upon the advice of General MacArthur, left for Corregidor on Christmas Eve. The four-and-a-half month odyssey that led us finally to Washington had begun.

President Quezon and his Cabinet unknowingly chose to leave Manila at an hour when Japanese planes appeared and began raining destruction on the port. But the Presidential party, which included Mrs. Quezon and her children, escaped injury and embarked on the steamer *Mayon*, with life-belts fastened and ready. On the same ship were High Commissioner Sayre, his wife, son and staff. We reached Corregidor before dark. Upon our arrival we were informed that Japanese airplanes had just paid the island a visit. From the entrance of our tunnel we could see a great fire off Mariveles. It was the blazing hulk of a French liner, bombed while lying at anchor there.

In Corregidor we had to adjust ourselves to the regulated life of an army post. We were given accommodations in Malinta tunnel. In one of the laterals were the President, his War Cabinet and staff, the United States High Commissioner and his personnel, and some of General MacArthur's staff. In another lateral were Mrs. Quezon, Mrs. Sayre, the daughters of the President and other ladies. Our beds stood side by side, as in a soldiers' barrack, and each group had a common bathroom. Our dining room was the mess hall of the Malinta Hospital, where we ate with doctors, nurses and patients who were strong enough to

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walk. Our meals — we got only breakfast and an early supper — were the same as those given the soldiers.

Life in the tunnels of Corregidor was trying. The bombings were continuous and deafening. In the heavy atmosphere it was no wonder that President Quezon's health deteriorated rapidly. He coughed frequently and soon contracted a fever. I succeeded in having a platform constructed on the slope near the entrance of the tunnel, where an army tent was placed for his use. Thus he was able to get fresher air; and in case of an air-raid alarm it was easy to take him to safety in his wheel chair.

Notwithstanding his delicate health, President Quezon never ceased to exercise his duties as Chief Executive. His main preoccupation was with the condition of the soldiers in the fighting lines, but he attended regularly to important cases of the civil administration and also gave deep thought to the general course which the war was taking. He held two conferences daily: one with General MacArthur and the other with his War Cabinet. In a manifesto issued from Corregidor late in January he exhorted our soldiers to fight to the bitter end.

The spirit of our soldiers at the front could not have been better. Perfect comradeship prevailed between them and the Americans. Frontal attacks of the enemy were vigorously repulsed; flanking movements, well-planned and daringly executed by selected Japanese soldiers, failed before the quick and determined action of our forces. Such enemy contingents as succeeded under cover of darkness in disembarking and establishing themselves in the woods behind our lines were promptly located and annihilated.

As the war progressed, however, the precariousness of our situation became more evident. Food and medical supplies became scarce and munitions began to run low. Hunger and fatigue reduced the efficiency of our soldiers. No reënforcements arrived at Bataan, and the Japanese were steadily augmenting their numerical superiority. Worse, we began to realize that the promised reënforcements never would arrive. Discomfiting news also kept coming in. Mounting casualties, including many cases of malaria, were reported from the front. Telegrams brought complaints from the provinces, which were awaiting action on matters that had long been pending in Manila. Finally the necessity of leaving Corregidor and going to the provinces became plain, in order to show the people that our Government was still

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functioning. On February 20, therefore, the President evacuated Corregidor with a party of about twenty. We traveled in two groups. Half went by surface ship; the rest of us, including President and Mrs. Quezon, their two daughters and their son, boarded a submarine.

After two days we emerged from the depths and landed on the island of Panay. While we were on that island, and subsequently at Negros and Cebu, we of course were always exposed to enemy attacks from sea and air. Disregarding these dangers, President Quezon together with his Cabinet toured those islands to confer with the civil and military officials on war needs. Rice, corn, coffee, sugar, dried fish, pineapple juice, medicine, military uniforms, fiber sandals and bolos — everything that could be used in the battle was gathered up and sent to Corregidor. Some of these supplies reached their destination; others went to the bottom with their carriers.

At the conferences with the provincial officials of Iloilo, Negros, Cebu, Bohol, Leyte and Samar, serious problems arose for settlement. One was the lack of currency. This was solved by the circulation of emergency notes. The morale of the troops and civilians alike in these provinces was admirable. Their loyalty to the United States appeared to be complete and unbreakable. This was despite the fact that they had no planes or cannon, and that at many places there was only a handful of soldiers to assume the defense. The situation in the rich, populous Visayan Islands was also daily becoming more difficult. By the time we shifted our headquarters to Mindanao, all the steamships in the vicinity had been either captured or sunk by the enemy. The *Princess of Negros* which carried us from Iloilo to Negros and Cebu was subsequently captured by the enemy. To get from the Visayan Islands to Mindanao, en route to Australia upon the urgent request of General MacArthur, President Quezon and his colleagues had to take a motor torpedo boat, and thence a Flying Fortress. The decision to make this trip was taken on the night of March 18.

We arrived in northern Australia on March 27, and, proceeding southward through Alice Springs and Adelaide, reached Melbourne three days later. It was pleasant to be able in that beautiful and well-planned city to enjoy quiet for a moment from the nerve-racking roar of enemy planes and the boom of heavy siege guns. But it was plain that President Quezon could serve

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our country best if he were in Washington, so a few days later we continued with our odyssey from Melbourne to San Francisco aboard a United States Army transport. The presence of a convoying cruiser, the continuous zigzagging of our boat and the blackouts at night made us feel that we were never far from danger.

Every moment of the trip from Manila had required unwavering determination, and President Quezon showed throughout that he possessed it. He disregarded every consideration except the main one that he, Chief Executive of the Philippine Government, must remain free to fight for his country's liberation. He left his country only when he was convinced that nothing more could be done by him there and that he could serve his people better by continuing to lead them from abroad. His presence in the United States is a living symbol not only of our continued resistance against the invaders but also proof that ultimately our freedom will be redeemed. Already world recognition of the Filipino people as a nation has been won by our admission as a full member of the United Nations.

Looking back, we think that we can justly claim to have made rapid progress in preparation for this. In the twelve months preceding the outbreak of war the development which had characterized the first five years of the Commonwealth continued. Sure steps were made toward establishing a progressive democracy in which the common man should have an opportunity to improve his lot and in which he might enjoy not only the form but also the substance of his inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

In emphasizing the services which President Quezon has rendered since the outbreak of war I do not wish to seem to minimize the importance of our highly competent military leadership, much less to underestimate the valor of our men in Bataan. The American soldiers fought well and nobly, living up to the highest traditions of the United States Army; and the Filipinos were no less courageous. The Filipinos are by nature quiet, but they know how to fight and they will fight, with firm determination and bravery, when the occasion demands. In Bataan, they displayed the same qualities that steeled Lapu-lapu, the sixteenth century chieftain of Cebu, to resist Spain. They matched the heroic exploits of Andres Bonifacio and his followers who, armed only with bolos, raised that memorable cry at Balintawak and began

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their final drive to wrest the freedom of the Philippines from Spain. But, while admitting the fighting qualities of our soldiers and admiring their magnificent stand in Bataan, I must say I expect that future historians who evaluate our determined resistance as a nation will find at the root of that resistance two vital factors: the faith of the Filipino people in the United States, and the leadership of President Quezon.

President Quezon and I became friends in our boyhood, and we have remained friends ever since. We shared a common room in the University of Santo Tomas when we were studying law. We began public life together. We were elected governors of our respective home provinces in the same year, and later were elected members of the first Philippine Assembly. We served together in the Philippine Senate. Finally, when the Commonwealth was established in 1935, we were elected to the executive branch of the government, he as President and I as Vice-President. Last November we were reëlected to the same positions. The year 1907, a year of momentous decision, found both of us in the first representative assembly in the Philippines. Together, we formulated a policy of coöperation with the United States. That policy, which met with the approval of the representatives, has served as the basis of the relations of the two peoples during the last 35 years. It has resulted in true friendship between them, I believe, and mutual understanding. But no satisfaction which I have had in working with President Quezon during all these years has been greater than my pride in being able to take part in the formulation of our national policy of complete coöperation with the United States in this war. I believe that it will win our country its freedom and independence, and under conditions which will make those blessings endure.

Shortly after we arrived in the United States, two events occurred which must have been of the utmost satisfaction to all liberty-loving people and which were of especial importance to the Filipinos. On June 14, 1942, President Quezon signed the United Nations pact on behalf of the Philippine Commonwealth, and a few weeks later he became a member of the Pacific War Council. These events naturally aroused great jubilation among Filipinos everywhere, since it meant that the national identity of the Philippines had been formally recognized. But they had a wider significance than the additional prestige which they gave our nation. They represented the principles of the Atlantic Char-

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ter in action. They reaffirm the belief that the pattern of relations between alien peoples which has been laid out by the United States and the Philippines can — and must — be applied to the entire postwar world.

In the world after the war the Philippines will have an importance out of all proportion to the size or military position of the islands themselves. Figuratively as well as actually they stand between two worlds. Our four centuries of close association with the West — particularly with Spain and the United States — have given us an Occidental outlook possessed by no other Oriental people. We must, therefore, expect to fulfil a rôle of intermediary between the advanced democracies of the West and those peoples of the southwestern Pacific which have had little chance so far to practise self-rule. That relationship must run in more than one direction. We cannot be content to bring to the Orient the "blessings" of the West. We must be on the alert to see that the legitimate aspirations of Asia are recognized by the rest of the world. This is a rôle for which our nation is well adapted.

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CONTROLLING TRADE AFTER THE WAR

By Percy W. Bidwell

DURING much of the period between the two world wars the search for economic solutions for the problem of world peace centered on methods of reforming international trade. Today, however, many economists, as they work on plans for reconstructing the world economy when this war is over, are focusing their attention on methods of developing industrially backward areas. They relegate trade policy to the background. In their view, the expansion of world trade is to be stimulated directly through capital investment rather than indirectly through removing the obstacles to importing and exporting.

The reasons for this shift in emphasis are not far to seek. The failure of attempts at tariff reform after the First World War either through multilateral or unilateral action was most discouraging. The World Economic Conference of 1927, for all its brave resolutions, produced only an abortive tariff truce. Within a few years, tariffs were moving rapidly upward. Then the onset of the Great Depression drove many nations to seek economic salvation by nationalistic policies. The United States in 1930, with the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, and the United Kingdom in 1932, with the Import Duties Act and the Ottawa Agreements, led the retreat toward autarky. Attempts to achieve international coöperation at London in 1933 ended in disaster, and from that date until the outbreak of the Second World War the increase in restrictionist measures of all kinds was practically universal. In the United States, it is true, trade agreements concluded under the Act of 1934 checked the upward surge of tariffs and facilitated the reduction of barriers to imports, both in the United States and in certain foreign countries. But it cannot be claimed that the Hull program accomplished a major and general reform in commercial policies.

A second reason for the recent neglect of commercial policy by many economic planners is their mistaken notion that the diffusion of technical knowledge to industrially backward countries will remove the *raison d'être* of foreign trade. They base it on the false assumption that international trade consists for the most

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part in exchanges between primary producers and industrial countries. Actually, the latter often find the best export markets for their manufactured goods in other industrial countries. For example, in 1938, about 40 percent of the exports of the industrial countries of continental Europe was marketed in the industrial countries in that same area. Technical progress stimulates trade among industrial countries, and, by reducing transportation costs, promotes all international trade.

It should be emphasized again and again that commercial policy must not be neglected if the purposes of postwar planning in the economic field, as announced in the Atlantic Charter and reiterated by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and other leaders of the United Nations, are to be accomplished. Full employment, higher living standards and greater economic security for all peoples everywhere are not impossible goals; but they cannot be attained except by the most effective use of the world's resources, both human and material. In other words, economic reconstruction cannot succeed unless means are found to take maximum advantage of the territorial division of labor through a progressive expansion of the volume of international trade.

Look at it from another point of view. Granting the necessity for a frontal attack on reconstruction problems by international development schemes, we should not forget that a large and expanding volume of export and import trade is essential to make such schemes fully effective. Unless the new investments are to be pure gifts, we must rely on trade, both bilateral and multilateral, to make possible the transfer of interest and dividends. Furthermore, we cannot expect the new enterprises established in backward countries to flourish unless they have access to markets wide enough to guarantee operation at optimum efficiency.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that the tariff-reform approach to economic reconstruction is not antagonistic, but rather is supplementary, to the investment or development approach. Action leading toward the removal or reduction of trade barriers, then, is an essential item on the agenda of reconstruction.

II. TRADE CONDITIONS AT THE END OF THE WAR

We must not make the mistake of framing programs and setting up new institutions to deal with conditions that no longer exist. We must keep our eyes focused on 1945–65, not on 1919–39.

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At the end of this war, foreign trade carried on by private enterprisers for their own account will practically have ceased to exist. The import trade of every great trading nation will be either in the hands of government trading agencies or of closely regulated quasi-government agencies. Export trade will be regulated by licensing systems.

We shall also find at the end of the war that all over the world — in the areas controlled by the United Nations as well as those still belonging to the Axis Powers — the exigencies of war, the blockade, the lack of shipping, the lend-lease agreements and the purchasing policies of the United States and of the United Kingdom will all have dug new trade channels and cut new patterns of geographical specialization. One obvious development has been the closer integration of the economy of the United States with that of Canada. The trade relations between the United States and the United Kingdom also will have become quite different by the end of the war from those prevailing in 1937 and 1938. English textiles, chinaware, cutlery and leather goods, for example, will have practically disappeared from our markets. On the other hand, through the operation of the lend-lease agreements, our farmers will have secured, temporarily at least, greatly enlarged British markets for their cheese, lard, eggs and milk products. Our trade relations with other parts of the world will also have greatly changed. Latin American economies will have been bound more closely to ours through the operation of the agreements to purchase rubber, tin, manganese, wool, hides and many other strategic materials, and through interlocking export controls.

We must recognize that the blocking of old channels of trade and the cutting of new ones are accompanied by far-reaching changes in national economies. Within the United States, the conversion of the automobile industry to the production of airplanes and tanks is only one of many similar but less spectacular transformations. Before the war ends, we may find comparable changes in American agriculture; wheat land, for example, may have been shifted to dairying. In South America, Australia, China and other industrially backward areas, the war will have stimulated the development of manufactures of many kinds. Which of these changes are to prove permanent, which are to be only "for the duration"? This question the policy makers in every country will have to determine; private enterprise will not be able to cope

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unaided with the huge task of demobilization, but will require assistance from government. The competent authorities will therefore have to make up their minds which of the new developments they wish to retain and which they will discard as economically or socially undesirable.

Many of the wartime mechanisms for the control of foreign trade will be maintained, but an attempt will be made to transform them into instruments for relief and for the rehabilitation of national economies. In the case of certain countries, such as the United Kingdom, the protection of the balance of payments will be a vital matter. Other countries will use import and export controls to procure, or to safeguard, supplies of indispensable raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as to protect the value of their currencies. In all cases, the action taken by the state will have its effects on the economy and the policy of others. In particular, the effects of the policies adopted by the United States will be felt all over the world.

We have abundant evidence from the experience of the years 1919–39 that, if the various nations act independently, each for himself and the devil take the hindmost, even the strongest cannot escape disaster. Hence, there will be urgent need for the coördination of national commercial policies, as well as of other branches of economic policy, by some international agency. Such a body should also provide the means whereby trade policies shall supplement and reënforce the plans which are internationally adopted for the development of industrially backward areas, for the stabilization of currencies, for facilitating migration, for improving nutrition and for other essential features of a general program of economic reconstruction.

The suggestion has been made that the agencies for economic coöperation already established to coördinate the wartime efforts of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom furnish the prototypes of postwar agencies. Among the wartime agencies cited are the United States-Canadian Joint Economic Committee, the tripartite Combined Production and Resources Board and the combined United States-British boards dealing with food, raw materials and munitions. The chiefs of these agencies and their personnel have gotten to know each other, have formed the habit of joint action, and have learned to operate wartime trade controls which can be adapted for reconstruction purposes. But the suggestion that these bodies merely should be

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perpetuated overlooks two grave defects in the present organization of economic warfare: (1) no effective coördination has yet been made of the efforts of the various boards and committees dealing with trade controls; and (2) no provision has been made for the uniform representation, on all the *ad hoc* bodies, of all four principal allies, the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China. To supply coördination and proper representation a new international body is needed. It is needed during the war for the more effective use of the economic resources of the United Nations; it will be needed after the war to prevent the recurrence of the exaggerated economic nationalism which wrecked the last peace.

The following pages outline the organization and functions of such a body, which might be known as the International Trade Authority. To confine the argument within practicable limits, two assumptions are made about the postwar world: (1) that there will be in existence a general international organization providing a considerable degree of political security, thus relieving any nation of the need to build up its self-sufficiency for military reasons; and (2) that measures of both national and international scope will prove reasonably successful in maintaining full employment, thus removing one of the reasons why nations exclude goods of foreign origin from their domestic markets.

III. AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AUTHORITY

The proposed International Trade Authority should be set up at once. It should be composed, provisionally, of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China (the constituent nations) and other countries. Eventually it should be reconstituted as a formal agency of the projected overall international organization.

During the war, the Trade Authority should attempt to bring about the reduction or removal of barriers to trade among the United Nations, particularly any which are hindering the war effort. President Roosevelt's Message to Congress of December 23, 1941, recommended that legislative and administrative barriers, including tariffs, import duties, customs and other regulations or restrictions of any character which impede the free flow of munitions and war supplies between Canada and the United States, should be eliminated for the duration of the war. Con-

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gress paid no attention to this request. On November 2, 1942, therefore, the President repeated and enlarged it. "The needs of the war effort," he said, "have multiplied our demands for a maximum and integrated war production not only at home and in Canada, but in every country of the United Nations. We must further take advantage of possibilities of procurement from every available source, foreign or domestic." He asked Congress to give him wartime powers to suspend laws hampering the free movement of persons, property and information into and out of the United States.[1]

The Trade Authority should also begin an immediate study of the plans which the United Nations, and especially the four constituent nations, are now making for postwar trade, in order to try to forestall restrictive measures and to stimulate interest in an expanding use of the world's resources. In this way the United Nations would begin preparations for the reform of their tariffs and trade policies in the period while the war is actually being fought and while the desire to bend all their energies toward a common goal is still strong.

In the years just after the war ends, the Trade Authority would coöperate with other agencies of the overall world organization (*e.g.*, an International Shipping Board, an International Development Corporation and an International Commodities Corporation) to direct the flow of trade among nations in such a way as to facilitate the transition everywhere from a war economy to a peace economy. Its basic activities in this period would probably be: (1) to assemble information regarding deficits and surpluses, in various countries, of the types of goods needed for relief and reconstruction; (2) to assist national governments and international agencies to arrange for transportation credits; (3) to study tariff systems and to lay plans for the abolition of injurious trade barriers; (4) to plan for the gradual elimination of directed trade and for the transition to operations of free enterprisers in a large segment of international trade.

In the transition period, it is true, continued wartime controls, the activities of government trading agencies, and government direction of the flow of imports and exports will limit the area in which private traders may operate and in which customs tariffs

[1] Congress still seems not to be impressed with the urgency of this matter. A bill embodying the Administration's desires was tabled on November 18 by the Ways and Means Committee of the House, which has named a subcommittee to frame a substitute bill.

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are significant. Even in the second period of reconstruction, after a wide area of action has been restored to private trading, the traditional methods of tariff reform will not prove adequate. Experience shows that we cannot rely upon the separate action of national states to adopt tariff policies which, in the long run, will further either their own interest or that of the community of nations. But the free flow of international trade is of such vital importance to all nations, and particularly to some of the smaller and weaker states, that no nation should be able, by its independent and arbitrary action, to interrupt trade or divert it into unproductive channels.

IV. POSSIBLE METHODS OF DELAYING ABRUPT TARIFF CHANGES

We cannot expect that national states would be willing to give any international body the power of absolute veto over their tariff laws and regulations. The tradition that tariffs are matters of national policy probably is too deeply imbedded in the national consciousness, and the pressure of vested interests is too strong, to make such a sweeping change possible. But does it seem too much to expect that an agreement could be reached whereby the member states of the general international organization would consent to *delay* putting new tariff legislation and regulations into effect until the Trade Authority could investigate the economic background of the proposed changes and announce their probable consequences?

To accomplish this purpose, the constituent nations and others which later joined them in the general organization, might agree to submit to the Trade Authority proposed increases in import and export duties, thirty days before these were to be put into effect, and to do the same with all proposed changes in quotas, licensing systems and in customs laws and regulations which would interpose new or additional obstacles to international trade. Further, they might agree that whenever the Trade Authority found that the proposed increases or changes seriously threatened to disrupt international trade, or to set in motion dangerous deflationary movements in another state, or otherwise to injure gravely another state's economic life, then the Trade Authority would have the right to require that their operation be suspended for a period of ninety days while it made further investigations and prepared recommendations.

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In order for such investigations to be effective, member states would have to give competent agents of the Trade Authority access to official records and in other ways to facilitate their work. The Trade Authority, for its part, would have to give all states involved an opportunity to present evidence and argument. At the conclusion, it would approve or disapprove the proposed changes and notify the competent national body. In case of disapproval, the Trade Authority should recommend modification or abandonment of the new legislation or regulations. If the competent national body did not accept the recommendation, it should be bound to reënact the original proposals before they become effective. The Trade Authority meanwhile would make its report public, outlining the significant facts in the case and giving its findings and recommendations. In this way it would be able to mobilize public opinion and to strengthen the forces in favor of liberal trade policies.

In the writer's opinion, the Authority ought not to be bound by any formula such as the cost-of-production rule which hamstrung the United States Tariff Commission. It should judge each case with reference to the conditions which gave rise to the proposal for changes, the possibility that alternative remedies might serve, and the probable extent of the injury to be suffered by other states. In particular, it should take into account the needs of industrially backward states for greater economic diversification, but it should avoid favoring a blanket application of tariff protection to all infant industries. It should recognize that diversification can often be brought about more effectively, and with less international friction, by the use of direct subsidies or other forms of assistance to producers (e.g., technical aid) than through customs duties and other restrictions on imports.

V. AN AGREEMENT TO LOWER TARIFF BARRIERS

It will not be enough simply to stabilize tariffs. Tariff duties will have to be reduced and international trade will have to be freed from other restrictions (particularly on the part of the older industrial countries) if the world is to attain the economic security and the rise in living standards which are the goals of the Atlantic Charter and the lend-lease agreements. Past experience, and particularly that of the years 1919–39, shows that it is a delusion to expect great commercial nations, *acting independently*, to make substantial reductions in the tariff walls which they have put up

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around their industries and agriculture. Vested interests in continued tariff favors are too strong and too concentrated to be overcome by a much greater but diffused general interest. Nor is the cumbersome process of tariff bargaining to be relied on to accomplish the extensive reduction in tariff barriers essential to postwar peace and prosperity. Inescapably we arrive at the conclusion that international action is necessary.

It therefore is proposed that the states belonging to the general international organization agree to undertake immediately after the close of hostilities: (1) the gradual reduction of all protective import and export duties; (2) the gradual elimination of the restrictive uses of licensing systems for imports and exports; and (3) the gradual abandonment of the use of import and export quotas, except such as might be necessary to facilitate the trade between a state with a liberal trading system and one having a planned economy, or between two planned economies, and except in so far as tariff quotas might be useful in facilitating the reduction of import duties. They should further agree to undertake (4) the gradual abolition of all import and export prohibitions except those necessary to protect public morals, public health and the health of plants and animals, and to maintain public safety. The drive to remove tariff barriers should be emphasized in the case of mature countries where the process of industrialization is well advanced. "Newer" countries should be allowed to retain tariffs necessary for the development of infant industries suited to their particular economic resources.

VI. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT

It should be the endeavor of nations to abolish customs discriminations so as to place those states with which they trade on an equal footing. Certain nations may claim that they must continue to make bilateral agreements in order to protect their balance of payments. Such claims should be given close scrutiny by the International Trade Authority, which should attempt to devise substitute policies more in line with the general aims of sound reconstruction policy on the basis of equal treatment. Hence the writer urges the advisability of an agreement that not later than five or ten years after the close of hostilities the nations will undertake to abolish all discrimination in their commercial policies and in the administration of exchange controls.[2]

[2] Exceptions should, of course, be made for frontier trade.

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The definition of "discrimination" raises the problem of preferential tariffs and customs unions. Present usage does not consider that the most-favored-nation clause is violated when a country accords tariff favors to another country with which it maintains especially close political relations, as for example in the Ottawa Agreements and in our reciprocal preferential arrangement with Cuba. But there is grave danger that the clause may become so weakened by these and other exceptions and interpretations that it will lose all real significance. The wise course, however, would seem to be not to attempt to prevent all discriminations of this type. If customs unions are properly organized they can be useful in promoting a diversification of industries in certain areas. But they and preferential tariff arrangements should be subjected to scrutiny by the Trade Authority, which should have power to recommend to the states belonging to the general organization whether or not they should waive their rights under most-favored-nation pledges.

VII. SUPERVISION OF CUSTOMS LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The Trade Authority should facilitate the formation of the agreements on commercial policy and supervise their execution. It should keep itself informed regarding changes occurring in the import and export duties of every country, and also in its "invisible tariff," *i.e.*, customs legislation and administration. It should call attention to any state's failure to live up to its obligations regarding trade policy. It should have certain powers, moreover, beyond investigating and reporting. If the agreements here outlined are to mean anything they must be expressed precisely. But there is danger that, in the desire to give them precision, they may be made too rigid. Circumstances may arise, such as a crop failure or a business depression, in which exact adherence to the terms of the agreement would cause serious hardship to a signatory state. In such cases, the state should apply to the Trade Authority for exemption, and the latter should have power to investigate such applications and, if it deems them justified, to grant the desired relief.

Multilateral agreements of the sort outlined above are legislative in nature. For them to be effective, there must be a judicial body to interpret them, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice, and also an administrative agency having ap-

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propriate powers and duties. The Postal Convention has its International Postal Union. The provisions of the I.L.O. agreements are administered by the International Labor Office. These and many other instances which could be cited furnish precedents for an International Trade Authority.

Tariffs have long been regarded as strictly national affairs. Proposals to control them internationally, even to the limited extent here suggested, will be resented on emotional grounds and will be bitterly fought by strongly entrenched industrial and agricultural interests. How to set up an international organ like the Trade Authority described in the foregoing pages, and how to enforce its decisions, are knotty problems that demand much more extensive consideration than is possible in a single article. But we seem justified in assuming that tolerably satisfactory solutions could be worked out if there were a real will to do so, that is to say, if the idea that some form of international control of trade policies is an essential ingredient in a durable peace had the whole-hearted support of the leading trading nations. The influence which the United States will exercise in all postwar economic developments makes it particularly important to inquire what its attitude may be.

VIII. WHAT POLICY SHALL THE UNITED STATES ADOPT?

The United States will have to choose among three broad alternatives. It may retain its traditional nationalist attitude, modified more or less by the bargaining processes of the Hull program. Or it may enter one or more regional tariff arrangements. Or it may join with many other nations, irrespective of their geographical location, in a global policy.

The continuance of a purely national tariff policy does not imply necessarily that our import duties will be raised after the war. Pressure in this direction will undoubtedly be exercised by both industrial and agricultural interests; some of them are already laying their campaign plans. But if by adopting wise anti-depression measures the party in power is able to provide full employment and to sustain the domestic price level, it might be able to resist the pressure groups and even, by concluding additional trade agreements, move in a direction contrary to their demands.

It should be recognized, however, that after the war the Hull program will in certain respects be inadequate. It lacks the flexi-

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bility which will make American trade policy effective in the critical months, possibly years, following the defeat of the Axis Powers. The past eight years have shown that the tariff bargaining process is too cumbersome, too cluttered with diplomatic and legal formalities, to be adaptable to emergency conditions. Recently, under war pressures, agreements have been carried through expeditiously with a few South American countries, but under normal conditions the time between announcement of the intention to negotiate (often preceded by extended diplomatic conversations) and the signature of an agreement has usually been between 10 and 16 months.[3] Furthermore, the Act of 1934 prescribed that no tariff duty can be cut by more than 50 percent of the existing rate, which seriously restricts the bargaining power of our negotiators.

The Hull program also lacks flexibility in another sense. It works fairly well when the bargaining parties are nations like Canada and the United States, where foreign trade is carried on by private individuals for their own profit. But it provides no satisfactory arrangement by which the United States may conduct and expand its trade with states like Russia and the new China, whose economic institutions and policies differ substantially from our own.[4] In fact, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that a premise of the program is that free enterprise is, or eventually will be, universal. But such an assumption now appears of doubtful validity. It is not the purpose of this war, nor does it seem likely to be its result, to convert all states to a uniform type of economic organization. If our trade policy is to be realistic, then, it must recognize the coëxistence and coparticipation in world trade of both "liberal" and "planned" economies. In trade between economies of such different types we may find that *ad hoc* agreements, periodically revised, specifying the quantities or values of goods which are to be purchased or exchanged within specified time limits, will prove the only feasible policy. When such agreements are used to regulate trade between states having liberal economies, they must be regarded as regrettable departures from the principle of equality of treatment; but when they are used between states whose foreign trade is directly controlled,

[3] A tabulation of 26 agreements shows that 13 took 12 months or longer; seven took from six to 11 months, and only six took less than six months.

[4] Trade with the U.S.S.R. is conducted under the terms of a special agreement, renewed periodically, which specifies the minimum value of United States goods which that country will purchase each year. In return, the United States grants most-favored-nation treatment.

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or between a liberal and a planned economy, they may be the only means of approximating equality of treatment.

Our national commercial policy might be modified after the war by our entry into regional agreements, or other agreements of a special character. This is the second of the three choices before us. In association with some or all of the Latin American republics, or, alternatively, with the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, we might form either a customs union or a preferential tariff arrangement on the general lines of the Ottawa Agreements.

Some such regional solution of our postwar trade problems has, it must be admitted, attractive features. It seems to provide a comfortable halfway house in the perilous wilderness that lies between the familiar, but now untenable, nationalism of the past and the Promised Land of a comprehensive world order. Passing over the practical difficulties, let us assume that the other American republics, or alternatively, the British Commonwealths would be willing to join us in the proposed association. Let us assume, also, that the necessary transitional adjustments (perhaps the temporary or permanent shrinkage of cotton production in the United States, or the discontinuance of automobile production in Canada) could be accomplished without excessive hardships. It still is not clear that we can rely on regional arrangements to accomplish the postwar purposes which the United States and the United Nations have announced. Dropping trade barriers *within* a region of preferential tariffs or of free trade would promote trade *among the member states;* but whether a net increase in the total volume of world trade would follow would depend largely on the policy adopted *toward non-member states.*

The foregoing should not be interpreted as a general condemnation of all attempts to lower tariff barriers on a regional basis. Areas which are now backward industrially might by forming a regional agreement (like that recently made between Brazil and Argentina) promote useful diversification. Certainly, industrially advanced nations ought not, *a priori,* to take the responsibility of preventing such arrangements by insisting upon their most-favored-nation rights. Each case must be decided on its merits; and here, obviously, a competent body such as the proposed International Trade Authority could perform an important function of analysis and recommendation.

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Finally, it should be observed that the regional approach to postwar reconstruction has a defect in common with the Hull program in that it side-steps a major problem of the transitional period after the war, the problem of effectively directing trade into channels best suited to the needs of relief and reconstruction.

Two years ago, in an article in these pages,[5] the author collaborated with Professor Arthur Upgren in suggesting an economic union of the United States, Latin America and the British Empire. At that time, some kind of regional tariff arrangement seemed a necessary stepping-stone to the restoration of liberal trading policies on a worldwide basis. But the events of the past two years have changed the picture. We no longer are non-belligerents, spectators at a struggle between Germany and the British Commonwealth; we are one of the principal belligerents in a world war. To win this war we have joined with the United Kingdom, Russia, China and 24 other countries in forming the United Nations. This constellation may be a new world organization in embryo. A third line of action for American commercial policy thus becomes worthy of consideration, namely, that the United States should join with the other leaders of the United Nations in the international supervision of trade policies through an organization such as the International Trade Authority here proposed.

In other fields of economic activity the need for international control has already been recognized. Wayne C. Taylor, in his recent address to the National Foreign Trade Convention in Boston,[6] suggested that an international authority might be set up after the war to administer the shipping facilities of the world. In a recent issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS,[7] Professor Alvin Hansen suggested an international corporation for capital investment, "a sort of international R.F.C." Other suggestions have been made to establish international agencies for the control of monetary and currency policies, and for dealing with agricultural surpluses. The activities of each of these agencies cuts across the field of international trade; its success or failure will depend in large measure on the commercial policies adopted by the leading trading countries. This points to the need for another agency, an International Trade Authority, to supplement and reënforce

[5] "A Trade Policy for National Defense," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1941, p. 282.
[6] *New York Times*, October 8, 1942.
[7] "Postwar Economic Tasks," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1942, p. 473.

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policies adopted in the fields of shipping, finance, and capital investment.

Clearly none of the projected international agencies can succeed without the active participation of the United States. Equally clearly, the political and economic interests of the United States demand that it participate. For its interests are global: they cannot be confined within the limits of any region, or to a special group of countries. Its trade relations, for example, are multilateral. They do not consist in evenly balanced bilateral exchanges with a series of countries. Huge surpluses of exports are characteristic of our peacetime trade with certain countries; great excesses of imports arise from our trade with others. These can be liquidated only through triangular or multiangular exchanges. Our trade policy, then, is not concerned only with our exchanges with each one of the various countries of the world; it is vitally concerned also to keep open the channels of their trade with each other.

The people of the United States are not fighting this war simply for a military victory. They want to accomplish something else; they want a durable peace, and they are beginning to understand that they cannot obtain it unless they are willing to take part in setting up and operating new international institutions. In planning such institutions, we meet a particular challenge to our ingenuity and our political abilities in the need for an International Trade Authority.

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HISPANIDAD IN SOUTH AMERICA

By William B. Bristol

WHEN General Franco decreed the establishment of a grand Council of Hispanidad on November 2, 1940, he took a major step forward in the Falangist program for unifying the Hispanic world under Spanish leadership. According to the decree, the Council was to work to unify the "culture, economic interests and power" of the Hispanic nations. On January 7, 1941, the organization began to take actual form with the appointment of 74 Spaniards as its initial members. They included the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as President; the holders of various governmental positions in Spain and of certain major diplomatic posts in Latin America; important officials of the Falange; a few military officers; and a number of prominent intellectuals and representatives of the Catholic Church. Further orders issued in the course of 1941 provided in detail for the Council's organization and functions.

One of the first moves made by the Council was to invite to Spain last year about twenty Spanish Americans who had shown most interest in the concept of Hispanidad as promoted by the Franco régime since the end of the Spanish Civil War. These Americans were asked to visit Spain so that they might help draw up in definite form the bases for the doctrine. They were mostly young men of the extreme Right who were not, on the whole, particularly outstanding figures in their native countries, although one or two were of considerable reputation, such as José de la Riva Agüero, of Peru.[1]

While the idea of Hispanidad promoted by the Franco régime has been actively supported in South America by certain limited groups, it has of course met with opposition and ridicule in anti-Fascist circles. To some persons unfriendly to the Franco régime both in South America and in the United States, it seems that Spain is nourishing fantastic imperialist dreams. Since the Franco régime and its Falangist supporters have had so much to say not

[1] Of those invited from South America, only two had gone to Spain by last summer. One was Carlos Real de Azúa, a young Uruguayan, who spent last February and March in Spain; the other was Juan Carlos Goyeneche, young Argentine nationalist, who went to Madrid in April for a seven months' stay. Three young Colombians planned to go by way of New York, but failed to obtain the necessary visas from the United States Government, according to their statements to the writer of this article.

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only about Hispanidad but also about reviving the "Spanish Empire" and creating an "Imperial Spain," some unfriendly individuals have suggested that the aim was to regain territorial possession of part or all of the lands once ruled by Spain in the Western Hemisphere. As a matter of fact, the aim is somewhat more subtle and less fantastic than that. The term "Empire" has sometimes been used by the Franquistas without any particular reference to America. For example, it has been employed to mean the forging of the unity and internal prosperity of Spain itself, or the building up of the Spanish Navy, or the annexation of Gibraltar and territory in Africa. As regards Latin America, the political aims of Spain's present rulers seem to be: (1) to convert Latin America to the Spanish form of Fascist ideology; and (2) on that basis to mold all the Hispanic states into a bloc of nations under the leadership of Spain but not under her sole political dominion.

In this plan, the bloc of Hispanic states would work together to defend their sovereignty and common civilization from outside enemies, especially the United States, and would also be expected, according to certain Spanish writers, to coöperate in offensive moves, such as demanding the return to the Hispanic world of the French, English and Dutch colonies in Central and South America and the West Indies. Stronger cultural and economic ties would also be promoted among the member states, with those on this side of the Atlantic looking to Spain for a much greater amount of cultural guidance than they have accepted in the past century. Finally, the Hispanic bloc would work to establish "Hispanic ideals" throughout the rest of the world — apparently meaning thereby the doctrines of Spanish Fascism and Spanish Catholicism. According to José Pemartín, in his "Qué es 'lo nuevo' . . . ," Spain and the other Latin nations of Europe must Catholicize the rest of Europe, while Spanish America has the mission of converting the United States to Catholicism.

Hispanidad is the concept with which Spain seeks to win the Latin Americans over to this policy. As promoted by the Spanish Franquistas, it involves two basic political and religious ideas: (1) a return of the whole Hispanic world to the Hispanic tradition and ideals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which means largely getting rid of the liberal, masonic, democratic, and Communistic ideas which have come into Spain and Spanish America since 1700; and (2) the formation of all the Hispanic

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states (which means Brazil and Portugal as well as Spain and Spanish America) into a bloc of nations for the purposes described above. The basic and most influential exposition of the first idea is contained in Ramiro de Maeztu's "Defensa de la Hispanidad," which appeared in 1934 and brought the word "Hispanidad" into wide usage for the first time. His thesis is that Spain and the Hispanic American peoples erred disastrously in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by imitating the liberalism and democracy of foreign countries, particularly France, England and the United States, and he urges a return to the Hispanic ideals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his mind, these ideals were above all the Spanish Catholic faith and the great missionary desire to carry that faith to all peoples. The present Spanish régime professes to be putting into effect an ideology in keeping with the older Hispanic principles; and it wants the Hispanic American nations to look to it as a model and follow in its steps.

The Falangists have used various means for spreading their propaganda in South America, but they were more active in this respect during and immediately after the Spanish Civil War than they are now. At that time there existed at least one organization of the Falange, made up mainly of resident Spaniards, in each South American country. Little by little, however, these have gradually ceased their activities, at least under the name of Falange. In some cases they have been succeeded by organizations of pro-Franco Spaniards under different names, such as the Fundación Española in Montevideo, the Casa de España in Buenos Aires, the Hogar Español in São Paulo, and the Círculo de Acción Española in Santiago de Chile. The first two, however, came to an end early in 1942, and the effectiveness of the group in Chile appeared to be decreasing.

This decline in activity has occurred for various reasons. In the first place, the interest and enthusiasm among the Falangists themselves naturally sagged somewhat after the fighting in the Spanish Civil War was over. Secondly, the political atmosphere in South America is less favorable now to Falangist ideas than it was before the outbreak of the present World War. Since 1939, the general trend has been toward closer Pan American coöperation and increasing sympathy for the democracies, with a resultant cooling in the attitude toward Spain, where the governing group is totalitarian and has been linked up pretty definitely with

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the Axis. The Franco régime's severe treatment of the Spanish Republicans since the end of the Civil War and its talk of "Empire" have also tended to alienate sympathy in South America. There are several examples of South American leaders who supported the Nationalist cause during the Spanish Civil War but who have now turned against it. One is the Uruguayan statesman Pedro Manini y Ríos, who until the *coup d'état* in Montevideo last February was one of the leading candidates for the Presidency of Uruguay. In September of 1936, reacting against the outrages to persons and property which had occurred in Spain under the Republic, he signed, along with other Uruguayans, a telegram of support for the Burgos régime on the understanding that the revolution was to establish a constitutional government along democratic lines. On January 18, 1942, however, Manini y Ríos publicly withdrew his approval of the Franco régime and denounced it for its dictatorial character, its "persecutions and violent reprisals" against Republicans, its foreign policy in harmony with the Axis, and its "incredible claims" to restore its "hegemony over what was the Empire of Charles V."

The growing opposition to the Falange has been illustrated recently in other ways in Uruguay, as well as in several other countries. In January 1942, the Falangist organization in Montevideo was dissolved by the Uruguayan Government. In Lima, the Peruvian Government suppressed a Falangist periodical called *Unidad* which had been published there since 1938. In Buenos Aires about the same time the Falangist organization dissolved itself voluntarily. In June, the Ecuadorian Government cancelled a contract under which the Franco régime had sent a pedagogical mission to their country.

The Spanish intention is that eventually, through agreement with the various Hispanic American nations, prominent citizens from each of them will be included in the Council of Hispanidad, which thus will become a supranational body. The American members, when named, are to meet as a separate branch of the organization in some American city; and sections of the Council are to be established, by diplomatic action, in all the Hispanic countries of the New World. Meanwhile, the Spanish branch of the Council, which has its seat in Madrid, has already carried out or initiated a number of projects. It has arranged for the publication of books dealing with relations between Spain and Latin America, and is planning for the exchange of newsreels and

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newspaper and other articles between Spain and the New World. It sends congratulatory letters to South Americans for speeches expressing an ideology in harmony with that of the Falangists. It also has a Political Section, the mission of which is to present "the common ideal" to Spanish and Spanish American youth.

The Franco régime has been accused of working on behalf of the Axis in South America, over and beyond the mere diplomatic representation of German and Italian interests which it assumed in the countries which severed relations with the Axis after the Rio Conference. The charge may quite possibly be true, but it is difficult to find direct evidence to support it. Falangist propaganda in Latin America has occasionally contained out-and-out pro-German statements and has been quite definitely anti-British, anti-United States, anti-Communist, anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Although such propaganda may have been inspired by Germany and may be intended largely to promote German aims, it may, on the other hand, be purely Spanish in origin, for Spain can find reasons of her own to dislike the countries concerned — for example, Britain's presence in Gibraltar, the Spanish-American War, the influence which the United States has acquired in Latin America, and the Soviet Government's support of the Spanish Republic during the Civil War. Whether or not the motivation comes from Berlin, however, the propaganda must be welcome to Germany, since it is directed against democracy and the enemies of the Axis. The rôle played by individual Falangists as German agents in South America in other fields than propaganda, and the possible pro-Axis activities of Spanish legations and embassies in the countries that have broken relations with the Axis Powers, must remain matters for conjecture.

Romantic, sentimental and cultural feelings for Spain, divorced from any bearing on current political questions, are naturally rather widespread among Spanish-speaking South Americans. Love of Spanish literature, affection for Spain as the "Mother Country," admiration for Spanish heroism and for other noble qualities of the race — such Hispanist traits are to be found among liberals and democrats as well as anti-liberals and anti-democrats, and are fostered by Spanish Republicans in exile as well as by Spanish Franquistas. But the clearly political idea of Hispanidad as promoted by the Franco régime, or related concepts of Hispanidad having current political and religious import, have been accepted and promoted in South America by only

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relatively small groups of intellectuals, generally zealous Catholics. In this type of Hispanidad there is very little popular or general interest. It has made headway mainly in certain intellectual circles in Argentina, Peru and Colombia, and, to a less extent, in Uruguay. Elsewhere it has found little echo. Certain extreme nationalist groups in Paraguay and Chile are influenced by it, but mainly because they like its principles in themselves quite apart from any association of these with the Hispanic tradition.

In Argentina, interest in the idea of forming a bloc of the Hispanic nations for political, cultural and economic purposes is found among some of the extreme nationalists, certain of the Catholic clergy, and a few lay Catholics outside strictly nationalist circles. The Argentine nationalists consist of eight or nine small groups of young men centered in Buenos Aires, with sympathizers in the provinces in some cases. Although generally approving of the Castillo Administration's foreign policy, most of them oppose the existing régime and wish to see it displaced by a more nationalist one. Their opposition to British and North American economic imperialism in Argentina, and their ideological affinities with Nazism and Fascism, make most of them wish to see the Axis win the present war. However, certain differences of opinion stand in the way of any union between them at present. Real interest in Hispanidad is limited to two or three of the most Catholic of these groups, one consisting of young intellectuals who have joined together in an institution called the Cursos de Cultura Católica in Buenos Aires. These young men of the Cursos, who come on the whole from well-do-do and rather aristocratic families, issue two reviews in which they set forth their political ideas. Their interest in Hispanidad goes along with their strong opposition to liberalism, democracy, masonry, Jewry, and British and North American "imperialism;" with ardent admiration of Juan Manuel de Rosas, an Argentine dictator of the past century; and with a desire for the restoration of the old Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, by which they mean the annexation by Argentina of Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.

These Argentine nationalists feel that Argentina's character and tradition are Hispanic, and that she must remain faithful to them as to her true being. They hold that the Argentine leaders of the nineteenth century, by imitating the liberal, democratic and materialistic ideas of France, England and the United States,

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committed a great error. Now Argentina must return to her true Hispanic nature, getting rid of the tenets and practices borrowed from abroad and reviving Catholicism, other spiritual values of traditionalist Spain and authoritative government. They feel, moreover, that in adopting foreign ideas Argentina laid herself open to the entry of British (and to a less extent, North American) economic interests, which they allege now dominate and exploit the country to a large degree and corrupt Argentine politics. The nation must get rid of this control by foreign capital, they say, and must take its resources and public services into its own hands.

Among the Argentine clergy there is rather widespread sympathy for strengthening the Hispanic tradition in so far as that means reviving and preserving Catholicism and traditional Spanish morality. Some of the clergy go beyond this point and favor the anti-liberal political concept of Hispanidad as well. Among these is the Archbishop of Salta, who took the initiative for a Congress of Hispanidad at Salta with representatives from Spain, Portugal and the Latin American nations. The proposal aroused considerable hostile criticism in democratic and socialist circles, but was supported by Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú, the Argentine Foreign Minister.

The present Argentine Administration, and especially Ruiz Guiñazú, has certain Hispanist tendencies, although one finds difficulty in saying to what extent it has any real interest in Hispanidad as a political concept. *La Fronda*, the Buenos Aires daily which is inspired by President Castillo, has expressed editorially the anti-liberal political and religious concept of Hispanidad. Unquestionably, the Administration is on very friendly and cordial terms with the Franco régime. Ruiz Guiñazú visited Spain last year, and in an interview while there spoke favorably of the present government and praised Franco highly, calling him "a true statesman in the fullest sense of the word." Moreover, in two recent speeches he has expressed an interest in cultivating certain traditional Hispanic values as a bond of union among the Hispanic American nations. One of the extreme Hispanist-nationalist groups in Buenos Aires claims to be in touch with him and says that he has more interest in Hispanism now than he did a while ago. But from such evidence it is difficult to decide just how far the Hispanism of the Administration really goes in a political sense.

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In Colombia, certain important elements among the Conservatives, who form the chief party of opposition to the Liberal Administration are active proponents of a Catholic, anti-liberal, anti-United States Hispanidad closely in tune with the Franco concept. Interest in this sort of Hispanidad has been shown by Laureano Gómez, the leader of the Conservative Party, both in his speeches in the Senate and in the pages of *El Siglo*, the Bogotá newspaper which he directs. Connected with Gómez is a group of young Conservatives far to the right who style themselves the Academia Caro and meet in the same building which houses *El Siglo*. They give much attention to Hispanidad in the review which they publish, entitled *Revista Colombiana*, and show great interest in Maeztu and Falangist Spain. Several years ago, moreover, there was formed in Colombia a small but active nationalist youth movement, distinct from the Conservative Party, which drew a great deal of its inspiration from Spanish Falangism and Hispanidad; but this nationalist movement now seems to be virtually defunct and some of its former supporters have lost their enthusiasm for Franco's policies and principles.

The interest taken in Hispanidad in Peru shows certain different characteristics from the movement as it exists in Argentina and Colombia, although supporters of the concept in all three countries of course have points in common. In Peru the movement does not stem from Maeztu, on the whole, although it has respect for him and some ideas in common with those expressed in his book. Here the current interest in Hispanidad goes back somewhat further and represents to a considerable extent a reaction against the Leftist and Indianist current rather than against liberalism. Peruvian supporters of Hispanidad are anti-liberal, but they use its anti-liberal teachings more to counter the assertions and claims of the Indianists than to attack liberalism as such. The Indianist current seeks to exalt the Indian and his civilization and denounces Spain's colonial policy in America in order to justify the effort to advance the political and social conditions of the Indians in Peru at the expense of the ruling white class. The Hispanists, who are whites belonging to the social aristocracy, seek to justify the continuance of white supremacy by exalting Spain's contributions to Peruvian civilization and picturing her activity during the colonial period in a very favorable light. Although the Hispanists are persons of considerable social, intellectual and political influence in Lima, it can hardly

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be said that the highest government authorities share their interest in promoting Hispanidad very definitely. When the Government invited a Spanish delegation to visit Peru for the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of the Amazon, their aim was not to promote Hispanidad but rather to gain Spanish support for Peru's claims in her boundary conflict with Ecuador. In this dispute, Peru claimed that the real point of departure of the expedition which discovered the Amazon was Cuzco, in Peru, rather than Quito, in Ecuador, and to back up her claims was planning to celebrate the discovery of the great river as the achievement of a band which had set out from the former city — in short, as a Peruvian not an Ecuadorean event. It was felt that the presence of an official Spanish mission at this celebration would lend weight to the Peruvian contention. The Spanish delegation arrived in Peru the latter part of November 1941 and was courteously received with many expressions of affection for the mother country. After Pearl Harbor, however, the continued presence of the Spaniards in Peru became rather awkward. The Government did not want to strike a discordant note in the policy of hemisphere coöperation and solidarity, and was embarrassed by having as its guests an official delegation from a totalitarian country with strong sympathies for Germany and Italy. The program of the Spanish delegation was therefore shortened, its activities were made less public, and it left Peru at the beginning of January 1942 instead of staying on into February as originally planned.

In Uruguay, Luis Alberto de Herrera, leader of the chief party of opposition to the present Administration, has done some talking in favor of Hispanidad, but of a rather vague type. He invoked it especially when he was opposing coöperation with the United States and calling attention to the dangers of Yankee imperialism. Two years ago, for example, while attacking the idea of North American coöperation in the establishment of bases in Uruguay, he argued the necessity of defending Uruguay's Hispanic heritage and character against outside encroachments. A section of Herrera's party, headed by Alejandro Gallinal Heber, have shown interest in a more clear-cut concept of Hispanidad in harmony with the wishes of the Franco régime; and so have a small number of extreme nationalists and members of the Catholic political party in Uruguay. But they remain a definite minority.

Certain Paraguayan nationalists who are close friends and

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supporters of the Higinio Morínigo régime draw some inspiration from Spanish Falangism. For example, Dr. Carlos Andrada, director of a newspaper in Asunción, belongs to this nationalist school and favors a government for Paraguay somewhat on the order of the Franco régime in Spain. However, the nationalists in Asunción draw their chief inspiration from the traditions of Paraguay itself in the period prior to 1870, especially from the career of Carlos Antonio López.

Taking South America as a whole, we see that the conception of Hispanidad often includes the idea of opposition not only to the political influence of the United States but also to its influence in moral and religious realms. Its followers think of it as standing for Catholicism as against the Protestantism of the United States and Protestant missionary activity in South America; for a spiritual concept of life as against the materialistic concept which the United States is considered to embody; and for the traditional Spanish code of morals as against the idea of greater liberty for women and other "corrupting" ideas which come from the United States, especially by way of the moving pictures.

Despite the variety of forces to which Hispanidad attempts to appeal, we can conclude that in the political form in which it is promoted from Spain by the Franco régime it has not won a large numerical following in South America. Its supporters are largely persons of considerable intellectual ability, good social position or significant political influence. But they are a good deal more important in their influence than in their numbers. On the whole, present political conditions in South America are not favorable for the propagation of Hispanidad in political terms. Pan Americanism and democracy, not Pan-Hispanism and Fascism, are the political watchwords of the day; and the régime of General Franco now seems to be even further from its distant goal of achieving political solidarity with the Latin American nations than it was on the morrow of its victory in the Spanish Civil War.

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UNITY OF POLICY AMONG ALLIES

By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice

IN TIME of war, strategy provides the means for implementing policy. Unified strategy between allies, then, is dependent for its effectiveness upon unified policy. This was overlooked in the Allied preparations before the war of 1914–1918. The nature of the *Entente Cordiale* between Great Britain and France precluded political preparation. It was not an offensive or defensive alliance but merely, as its name implied, a friendly understanding concerning matters in spheres where the interests of the two countries met. The British Government had permitted what were called "military conversations" between the British and French General Staffs, but on the strict condition that they should be secret and that they should not in any way commit the Government to action before the event. So while there were military understandings there were no political engagements. The full preparations which modern war requires could not be made.

I think it is true to say that the British did not realize that this was any handicap. Allied policy in the event of a war with Germany would be clear and simple — defeat her as soon as possible. Since the *casus belli* would be an aggression by Germany upon France or Belgium, or both, the war would take place on the Continent of Europe. Meanwhile, British naval superiority would make the mopping up of the German colonies a simple business requiring no great effort. In this view, there was no need for a special organization to deal with such political problems as the war might present. The ramifications of a great war were not foreseen. The French undoubtedly desired a definite alliance, precise commitments and detailed preparation, political as well as military; but they were far too anxious to obtain British help to do anything which might endanger its arrival when the crisis came, and they were well aware of the reluctance of British governments to commit themselves in advance. The upshot was that no preparations for the direction and control of Allied policy were made.

Even the military preparations, which were spread over several years, were perforce incomplete. This was true not merely as regards the size of the military force which would be needed to oppose Germany successfully, and which was underestimated. There was

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general agreement that if Germany attacked in the west she would invade Belgium, though there were differences of opinion as to the size of the forces which Germany would allocate to this task. It therefore was obviously desirable to obtain Belgian participation in the preparation of Anglo-French plans to meet a German attack. But Belgium hoped that if she observed the strictest neutrality she would be able to escape that attack, the more so as Germany was one of the guarantors of her independence. She therefore refused invitations to concert plans with Great Britain and France. Not until after Germany had sent her ultimatum to Belgium and King Albert had appealed to the British and French Governments for help did they know whether Belgium would resist German aggression or not. So it was necessary to improvise military plans to meet what had been long recognized as at least a very probable form of attack — an experience which was to be repeated with even more disastrous results 25 years later.[1]

In 1914, then, there were no definite arrangements for Allied political coöperation. When specific problems which affected both countries arose, conferences were held, usually either in Paris or in London. The Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and War Ministers attended, accompanied by their experts, and after they had reached agreement on the problem which had brought them together they went back to their offices and were quickly absorbed again in their own many and difficult questions. There was no permanent Allied organization to survey the war as a whole, no Allied secretariat to prepare well-considered agenda for these conferences or to watch over the execution of the decisions which they took. I do not think that anyone who reads the story carefully can doubt that, if there had been an effective permanent organization for the direction of Allied policy and strategy in 1915, the Dardanelles campaign would have succeeded, the road would have been opened for help to Russia and the length of the war materially shortened. Nor is there doubt that the many and often acrimonious disputes over the campaign in Macedonia and the long controversy between "Easterners" and "Westerners" would have been more speedily and more amicably settled.

[1] The blame for this does not rest wholly, or even chiefly, with Belgium. Her confidence naturally had been rudely shaken in 1936 when Great Britain and France allowed Hitler to march into the demilitarized Rhine provinces. Seeing Germany once more established in force on the Rhine, she denounced the Locarno Pact and returned to neutrality as at least a possible way of escape. Here policy had a very vital effect upon strategy.

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As the war spread and the number of Allies increased it became more and more apparent that the arrangements for the higher direction of the war were incomplete. When Joffre was Commander-in-Chief of the French armies he had endeavored to fill the gap by holding periodic conferences of the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and of the Chiefs of Staff or their representatives to make recommendations on strategy to the Allied Governments, and he had created a small staff to survey the war as a whole and prepare the way for their conferences. But this staff was purely military and entirely French. Moreover, these military conferences suffered from the same defect as the political conferences, namely that they were held at long and irregular intervals and there was no general Allied supervision between the meetings. By the summer of 1917 the number of the nations which were making direct contributions on varying scales to the conduct of the war had grown to eleven — the British Empire, the United States, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Japan, Portugal and Brazil. Both the political and the military conferences had become unwieldy and less and less capable of taking prompt and effective action.

In consequence, the leading generals meeting in conference in Paris on July 25 of that year, recommended that a permanent Allied military organization should be set up to unify the military operations. Since any such military organization would clearly need unified political direction, this proposal gave impetus to ideas which had already begun to form in the minds of the statesmen. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Painlevé, the British and French Premiers, had in particular begun to discuss means of improving the political direction of the war; and when in October the defeat of the Italians at Caporetto appeared to indicate serious defects in Allied coöperation, they seized the opportunity to obtain agreement to the creation of a Supreme War Council.

The Supreme War Council, with its seat at Versailles, was composed of the Prime Minister and one other Minister of each of the principal Allied Powers. It was advised on strategy by a committee composed of one military representative of each of those Powers. The military representatives had such staff officers as they required to help them, and so constituted an Allied General Staff capable of surveying the war as a whole and of advising the Council as to its military conduct. M. Painlevé wished Marshal Foch, then Chief of the French General Staff, to be the chairman

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of the military representatives. Mr. Lloyd George, however, insisted that they should be entirely independent of the Chiefs of Staff. The French got over the difficulty by appointing General Weygand to be their Military Representative, and Weygand spoke only as Marshal Foch's voice. Eventually Mr. Lloyd George's plan was found to be impracticable and was amended.

The Supreme War Council began, then, as an organization for the direction of Allied military plans. The military representatives presented their advice to the Council in the form of joint notes. These the Council could approve, amend or reject. Later the Council was supplemented by the creation of an Allied Naval Staff of the principal naval Powers, with its seat in London, while that of the Supreme War Council remained at Versailles. Experience showed that it would have been better if the two Councils had been brought together from the first. The lack of authoritative naval advice was felt by the Supreme War Council, especially as military plans became more and more dependent upon naval coöperation, above all as regards the supply and protection of shipping. True, a Naval Liaison Committee was established at Versailles to act as a link between the Supreme War Council and the Naval Council, but this could not speak with the full knowledge and authority possessed by the naval Chiefs of Staff. The preparation of Allied strategical plans further required full and authoritative information as to the supplies of war material available and the schedule on which they could be delivered. The Inter-Allied Technical Committees on Aviation and Tanks and the Inter-Allied Transportation Council were therefore brought into direct touch with the military representatives at Versailles.

The greater part of a year passed before the Supreme War Council was complete. The Government of the United States had at once been consulted when the decision to form it was taken in November 1917. President Wilson approved the proposal in principle and appointed General Tasker H. Bliss as the military representative of the United States. General Bliss rendered very valuable service; but for a long time he was alone, as no American members of the Supreme War Council itself were appointed. As has been stated, moreover, the functions of the military representatives were purely advisory. Until late in 1918 the Government of the United States was content to be represented by General Bliss on the committee of military representatives and

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by an observer, usually supplied by the American Embassy in Paris, to report on the proceedings of the Council. When the German Chancellor approached President Wilson in October with a request for an armistice, an awkward triangular correspondence started between Prince Max of Baden in Berlin, President Wilson in Washington and the Supreme War Council in Versailles. The delays and uncertainties which this involved caused the Supreme War Council to press President Wilson to appoint a political representative with full powers. Perhaps President Wilson had been loath to delegate political authority, as would have been necessary in view of the fact that although the other Allies were represented by their Prime Ministers it was clearly impossible that he should attend the meetings in person. However that may be, he now agreed to name a delegate, and appointed Colonel House. This ended a situation which had to some degree weakened the authority and influence of the Supreme War Council.

Looking back, we see that the value of the Supreme War Council was to some extent obscured by the fact that, as I have pointed out, some initial mistakes were made in the machinery, in consequence of which some decisions were taken which were open to severe criticism; but beyond that it was handicapped by the appointment of Marshal Foch to be Generalissimo on the Western Front. When the great German attack in the spring of 1918 created a highly critical situation in France, Allied operations in other theaters of war necessarily became defensive in order to release the largest possible reinforcements for the point of greatest danger. When, helped by these reinforcements and his own genius, Foch restored the situation, it was natural to conclude that the Allied victory had been due to the decision to create a unified command and place it in Foch's hand. The fact is, however, that Foch's control was limited to the Allied armies in Belgium, France and Italy and that he had no authority over naval operations or in the other theaters of war and no voice in deciding the problems of Allied supply and transportation. Therefore after his appointment the Supreme War Council still continued to exercise functions of the highest importance in directing and controlling the Allied effort. I do not think that anyone who examines its work carefully can fail to agree that it constituted a great improvement on all previous efforts to secure effective Allied action.

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That this was the general conclusion reached by the governments of Great Britain and France is shown by the fact that on the outbreak of the present war a Supreme War Council was set up at once. It held a number of meetings in the comparatively short period which intervened before the collapse of France. In accordance with the principle of unity of command which had been accepted before the outbreak of war, General Gamelin became Generalissimo on the Western Front and the British Expeditionary Force was placed under General Georges, who commanded the group of armies in Northern France. But, as had been the case with Foch, Gamelin's authority did not extend to the Middle East, nor did he have any control over naval operations. We have no authoritative information as yet regarding the working of the Supreme War Council in 1939–40, but it has been announced that, as in the last war, the meetings were usually attended by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France, with one other Minister from each country, and that they were accompanied by the Chiefs of Staff and that General Gamelin was also in attendance. As the number of nations concerned was so small, and as the problems to be dealt with were far less numerous and complicated than those which had confronted the Supreme War Council of 1917–18, the organization of the Council of 1939–40 naturally was simpler.

After the collapse of France the direction of the war against the Axis naturally centered in London, where the British War Cabinet was in direct political touch with the governments of the Dominions. As the smaller states of Europe were overrun, one after another, their governments took refuge in Great Britain, as did the political and military leaders of the Free French. The military contribution which all these could make at first was comparatively small, however, and their influence upon Allied strategy was proportionate to the size of their contribution. Today the situation is different, the war has spread into distant theaters, great and powerful allies have joined in. As a result, as in 1917, there again is a general feeling that the machinery for the direction of the Allied effort is incomplete. How is it to be made more effective?

Hitler's strategical method is quite clear and typically Prussian. By bluff, lying and unscrupulous breach of pledges he divides his enemies, isolates the one he has decided to attack from the others, concentrates the greatest possible strength against it,

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often running great risks to do so. In this procedure his central position in the European and Mediterranean theaters of war stands him in good stead: he has interior lines. The correct answer to this strategy is a similar concentration of power at the right time and place. When I speak of concentration of power, I mean the concentration of naval, military and air power in combination. I do not believe that any one of these can of itself produce the desired result. To apply the stock receipt for victory, we should concentrate against one of our enemies, while containing the others with the minimum of force. Dispersion of effort invariably adds to the length of the struggle and may lead to defeat. However, the political and geographical conditions of the Allies have made it peculiarly difficult for them to apply this strategy. Against which enemy are we to concentrate? Australia clearly cannot be left to defend her shores alone against Japanese attack, nor does it seem very probable that even if that were wise military American public opinion would tolerate a passive defense in the Pacific. On the other hand, distance and the lack of suitable bases make it impossible for Great Britain to concentrate her power in that ocean. Is she to drive the Japanese out of Burma, to reopen the road to China and help her to secure air bases from which Japan can be attacked? That seems an attractive program until one examines the length of the lines of communication involved and the shipping which would be required. Is Italy to be the main Allied target following the auspicious turn of events in North Africa? That would of course require control of the Mediterranean, which may involve political complications of which the position of Admiral Darlan is a sample. If Germany is to be the main enemy, then the landing and maintenance of armies of sufficient size on the continent of Europe will make demands on shipping which will affect every other theater of war. Even this bare and cautious outline of the strategical problems facing the Allies suffices to show their variety and complexity.

Clearly the prompt and effective solution of such far-reaching yet interrelated problems requires that there be some body capable of keeping the war as a whole under systematic survey. We have in the Pacific Council such a body to deal with the war with Japan; and indeed that war is so distinct and separate from the wars in Europe and the Middle East that I see no disadvantage in having a separate organization to direct it. But who decides the allocation of power between the Pacific and other

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theaters of war? Mr. Churchill has courageously and adventurously tried to fill the gap by his journeys to confer with President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin. Valuable as these conferences have been, they involve dangerous risks to an indispensable personality. Moreover, as the experience of the last war showed, intermittent conference cannot be as effective as a continuing and systematic survey.

It has been suggested that the Allies should solve the problem by appointing a Generalissimo with an adequate Allied staff to direct the whole of their operations. I do not believe that this is a possible solution. By all means let us have complete unity of command in each theater of war, just as General MacArthur is in Supreme Command in the Southwest Pacific and General Wavell was for a brief period in control of the Western Pacific. The record of 1939, I think, shows that whatever may have been the case in 1914, British *amour propre* will not stand in the way of our forces serving under the best man, from whatever country he may come, as is shown by the welcome given to General Eisenhower's appointment in North Africa. But it is not within the capacity of any human, even if endowed with Samuel Johnson's "extensive view," to command forces engaged in theaters of war which, whichever way one travels, extend literally "from China to Peru." Local conditions always affect military operations and no one can estimate these accurately from a distance. The Commander-in-Chief in each theater of war must be free to decide when, where and how to strike. All that a central Generalissimo could do would be to give the Commanders-in-Chief general instructions. In these he would require guidance as to Allied policy. He would therefore not be an effective substitute for a Supreme War Council.

There is, in fact, no effective substitute for a Supreme War Council when a grand alliance is conducting operations over the greater part of the globe. Is it not possible to create such an agency now? It is difficult, certainly, but it is not impossible. The fact that a team of Allied experts is able to advise on the coördination of naval, military and air plans for the Pacific theater of war, which in itself is very vast, shows that there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of bringing together a similar team which would be capable of surveying the war as a whole and advising as to its general conduct. The difficulty arises in the unification of political control. Clearly it is impracticable for

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President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin and General Chiang Kai-shek to join Prime Minister Churchill in regular meetings of a Supreme War Council in London; and the leaders involved would find it equally difficult to attend meetings if the spot chosen were in the United States. A solution would be for the chief political authorities of each of the chief Allies to agree to be represented on the Supreme War Council by plenipotentiaries. The advances made in means of communication since 1917 should make it possible for these plenipotentiaries to be in permanent touch with their political chiefs, to pass on information to them, and to receive instructions. A meeting of plenipotentiaries would not be so effective as one composed of the political chiefs themselves, but since the best seems impracticable, we must look for the next best. At any rate, it would much more nearly approach unified direction of the war than anything which we have at present. The success of Anglo-American coöperation in North Africa does not affect this view. That experience represents the easiest form of Allied coöperation and deals with only one part of a larger and more complicated problem.

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HITLER'S FIASCO IN THE UKRAINE

By Joachim Joesten

WHOLE generations of Germans have been brought up to think of conquest of the Ukraine as offering the surest road to a more abundant German life. Bismarck toyed with the idea of an "independent principality of Kiev." Kaiser William II and Adolf Hitler both have tried to exploit opportunities to bring to reality their dreams of a Ukrainian colony which would serve as "breadbasket" for a greater German Reich.

It is a matter of record that Imperial Germany failed in its endeavor to exploit the wealth of the Ukraine. Neither before nor after the peace of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), which turned that German-conquered territory into a nominally independent state under German overlordship, did it make any appreciable contribution to the German war economy. The German people found out that the Imperial High Command was sadly mistaken when it proclaimed that the worst was over now that their armies firmly held the Ukrainian granary.

What, now, has Hitler to show, after more than a year of occupation?

Complete data are not available, of course, but one good estimate is that Hitler may have got something like 500,000 tons of food grains from the Ukraine in 1941 — a mere fraction of the total German consumption. A more detailed report compiled during the past summer by British economic experts is even grimmer. According to this source, the total food production of the Ukraine last year consisted of 200,000 tons of bread, 450,000 tons of potatoes, 40,000 tons of sugar beets, 120,000 tons of meat and 15,000 tons of fats. Even if the Nazis did reduce the local population to a starvation level, they could not have secured for themselves more than one-third, or at best one-half, of this. When the needs of the army of occupation had been met, there can have been no surplus whatever for shipment to the Reich. The same report forecasts a 40 percent reduction from those figures in the Ukrainian output of food in 1942.

Contrast with this the figures for 1937, the last year for which Soviet statistics are available. In that year the rich black earth of the Ukraine yielded 10 million tons of wheat, of which about

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7 million tons were required to feed the 31 million Ukrainians. Thus, 3 million tons were left for consumption in other parts of the U.S.S.R. or for export. During the two years of Nazi-Soviet friendship, a sizable part of this surplus was shipped to the Reich — far more, undoubtedly, than the Germans are now seizing by force from the stolen breadbasket.

Early this year, the Nazi economic leadership gave vent to its disappointment that the Ukraine had failed to repay in dividends of golden corn the huge investment made there in the blood of German soldiers. In a remarkably frank statement from the *Reichsnährstand* (the official farmers' union headed until recently by Richard Walther Darré), published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of February 26, 1942, the German people were warned not to expect any additional food supplies from the Ukraine before the 1943 harvest was gathered. Transportation difficulties and the "stupid devastation" wrought by the retreating Russians were cited as the chief reasons why so little food was forthcoming.

With the approach of the fall of 1942, however, a new policy was adopted. In place of the former cautious appraisals the Nazi press began to feed its readers with glowing accounts of the Ukrainian richness. Thus Gauleiter Erich Koch, chief civil administrator of the Ukraine, declared in an interview with the *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung* on the first anniversary of the German occupation, that no less than 90 percent of the arable land in the territory under his rule had been sown last spring. Such a claim is incredible, as the Swedish paper *Socialdemokraten* pointed out, in view of the admitted shortage of agricultural machinery and fuel and the deportation of some 500,000 Ukrainian laborers to Germany. Still more recently, Nazi reporters and broadcasters have started to describe the arrival in Berlin of whole trainloads of food from the Ukraine. One newscaster spoke of a food train of 50 cars, another of "more than 20 trains." Still another, addressing Latin America, said "many trains arrive daily with products from the Ukraine." [1] This new theme, introduced at the opening of the fourth wartime Winter Relief Campaign, was in tune with the speeches made by Hitler and Göring on September 30 and October 4, respectively. Both dwelt at length on the supplies allegedly streaming into the Reich from the conquered territories, and promised that a new era of plenty was at hand.

Reports from neutral and underground sources paint a very dif-

[1] *New York Times*, October 4, 1942.

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ferent picture. And there are several reasons inherent in the situation which support those reports. For one thing, exploitation of the conquered Ukraine is bound to be more difficult now than it was in 1917–18 because of the intricacies of the Soviet economic system. If the farming methods in use last year had been the same as they were a generation ago the Soviet "scorched earth" policy would have had comparatively little effect. But an economy which had been organized, centralized and mechanized to the utmost degree in two decades of collectivization was completely paralyzed by the removal of indispensable machinery and its operators and the destruction of all control centers.

When the German armies moved into the Ukraine they found little more than the earth, ruined buildings and a hostile population composed chiefly of old men, women and children. The 67,000 tractors, 18,500 heavy trucks and 22,000 combines which the Ukrainian collectives possessed in 1937 had been wrecked. The army of 158,500 tractor drivers, 18,500 truck drivers and 15,000 mechanics who had been specially trained to handle and repair this machinery was gone also. All were serving with the retreating Soviet armies. And even if the machines and the men had remained, there would have been no fuel to operate the tractors and the trucks; for even now, over a year later, most of the oil of the Caucasus which had made possible the mechanization of Ukrainian agriculture is still in Russian hands. Thus the small amount of machinery which the conquerors have brought into the Ukraine — between 4,000 and 5,000 tractors and several thousand plows, according to the British report quoted above — must be run with whatever fuel the German armies can spare.

There is another and perhaps decisive reason why the Ukraine has been a disappointment for the Nazis. With his characteristic disregard of history, Hitler made exactly the same mistake that the Kaiser did. He thought he could rule his eastern colony *von oben* — from above, without the people. He did not even think it necessary to install a puppet régime and he made no attempt whatever to conceal the fact that he was planning to run the Ukraine as a real slave state: all the work for the natives, all the benefits for the conquerors.

Before the invasion, the Nazis had professed very different intentions. They were going to "liberate" the Ukraine from the double yoke of Russia and Bolshevism. They were going to set up an independent Ukrainian state and restore the former land-

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lords to their possessions. This program had naturally appealed to the thousands of Ukrainian émigrés living in Germany and the occupied countries. Among these were two principal rival factions: the henchmen of Paul Skoropadsky and those of Andrey Melnik.

Old General Skoropadsky, once a wealthy landowner in Tsarist Russia, had one advantage over his rival: he had "experience." He was the man whom German bayonets had kept enthroned as *Hetman* (prince) of the Ukraine for six months in 1918. After Germany's collapse, however, he was promptly ousted by elements friendly to the Entente, under the leadership of Simon Petliura and Eugene Konovaletz. These, in their turn, were ousted by the Bolsheviks and both died violent deaths in exile: Petliura was assassinated in Paris on May 25, 1926, Konovaletz in Rotterdam on May 23, 1938.

Skoropadsky fled to Germany and for many years lived in a villa at Wannsee, near Berlin, where he became a close friend of Göring. It seems certain that the Nazis promised him, as a reward for his collaboration in preparing their Ukrainian campaign, that he would be restored to his former dignity, unless he wished to delegate the title of *Hetman* to his 40-year-old son. At the same time, however, the Nazis, true to their policy of having at least two puppets on hand for each job, negotiated with Skoropadsky's rival, Melnik. The bitter enmity between the two men was based on the record of the past as much as on their present conflicting aspirations, for Melnik had been a close associate of Petliura and Konovaletz and always considered himself as their successor.

In the period immediately preceding the assault on Russia, Melnik's star seemed to be rising over Skoropadsky's. He had more partisans and a more firmly welded organization, the so-called O.U.N. (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), which sprang in 1929 from Konovaletz' U.W.O. (Ukrainian Military Organization). In contrast with Skoropadsky's frankly feudal tendencies, Melnik's program was in tune with National Socialism. But by the time the Nazi plans for the Ukraine came to fruition, Skoropadsky was, figuratively (and perhaps literally) speaking, a dead man. Nobody knows exactly what happened to him — he simply disappeared from the scene.

Beside Skoropadsky's *Hetman* organization and Melnik's O.U.N., there was in Berlin still another Ukrainian group, the

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so-called *Provid*. A great deal of mystery surrounds this organization and the men behind it. It seems pretty certain, however, that the *Provid* is, or was, a secret intelligence service working in close touch with the German General Staff, the Gestapo and the *Aussenpolitisches Amt* of the Nazi Party. On June 22, 1941, the *Provid* staged a big demonstration of the Ukrainian colony in Berlin and in an appeal to the Ukrainian nation promised that the hour had come for it to reënter the family of European nations under the leadership of the "revolutionary, warrior and statesman, Colonel Andrey Melnik." Shortly afterward, however, Melnik, too, vanished. It is reported that he fled from Berlin to Rome, where Mussolini is keeping him in reserve.

At any rate, when the Nazi armies captured Kiev on September 19, 1941, not one of the Ukrainian separatist leaders to whom the privilege of a triumphant entry into the capital had been promised was present. The final disillusionment of the Ukrainian nationalists came three weeks later when Berlin first made public the pattern of its civilian administration for the occupied territories of Russia. It was a hard blow for the émigrés who had been so helpful in preparing the invasion; and a new object lesson for any nation that might still think of entrusting its "emancipation" to Adolf Hitler.

Instead of the "Greater Ukraine" which the Nazis had promised to set up by uniting Ruthenia and Eastern Galicia with the Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainians saw the former division of their national territory carried still further and apparently perpetuated. Eastern Galicia was incorporated into the Polish Gouvernement General; Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathia) remained in the hands of Hungary; part of the Black Sea coast, including Odessa, was promised, if not actually turned over, to the Rumanians; while the rest of the Soviet Ukraine, now called *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, was placed under the jurisdiction of Erich Koch, Gauleiter and Governor of East Prussia. The dream of a united and independent Ukraine was gone.

The Ukrainian *Reichskommissariat* is one of the two large administrative regions carved out of conquered Soviet territory, the other being the *Reichskommissariat Ostland*, which comprises the Baltic states and White Russia, or White Ruthenia as the Nazis call it. Both are governed by the new Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories in the East, headed by Alfred Rosenberg, with headquarters in the former Soviet Embassy in Berlin.

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Not only is the direct administrative head of the Ukraine a German; all the five major subdivisions, *i.e.*, the districts of Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, Dnepropetrovsk and Poltava, have been placed in charge of German officials with the title of "Commissars General." No Ukrainian has been given a higher office than that of burgomaster.

Even though the Nazis had no further use for Ukrainian *Führers*, however, they continued to avail themselves of the services of Ukrainian underlings. The task of selecting and supervising these was given to Alexander Sevryuk, who now became Koch's principal native adviser and assistant. Sevryuk represents perfectly the type that the Nazis like best to employ in their dealings with conquered nations. In the course of his 48 years, he has had no fewer than five citizenships (Russian, Ukrainian, Soviet, French, German) and has embraced a variety of political creeds ranging from Communism to Nazism.

Sevryuk professed to be a Socialist when, on February 9, 1918, at the age of 24, he signed "on behalf of the Ukrainian Rada" the separate peace with Germany that hastened the débâcle of the Russian armies and thus led directly to Brest-Litovsk. (Since that time, Sevryuk has described himself as "Father of Ukrainian Independence.") Later on in Paris, where he turned up around 1922, Sevryuk led a Jekyll and Hyde life. During the daytime, he was Comrade Sevryuk, editor of a Ukrainian-language paper subsidized by the Soviet Embassy. In the evenings, as "Monsieur de Sevriuk," he played the exiled nobleman in Paris salons. After a while, he was found out by the OGPU and deprived of his Soviet citizenship. He then became a naturalized Frenchman. Denaturalized 11 months later, in December 1928, he left France in disgust and went to Berlin. There he made his way into the German secret service and into the Nazi Party. For many years he acted as adviser to the General Staff, to the Wilhelmstrasse and eventually to Alfred Rosenberg. In due course, "Herr von Sevryuk" became a German citizen.

Before the invasion of Russia, Sevryuk's principal job was to coördinate the efforts of the various Ukrainian organizations — he himself did not belong to any of them — and to transmit instructions to them from the German masters. In spite of an old grudge which he had against Skoropadsky — who in 1918 had run him out of Kiev — Sevryuk did his job well and in 1940 he contrived to unite nearly all Ukrainian organizations in the world

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(including, according to rumor, the powerful O.D.W.U., or Organization for the Rebirth of the Ukraine, in the United States) under the aegis of the Berlin *Provid*.

More subtle and self-effacing than Skoropadsky and Melnik, Sevryuk lasted a little longer than they did and was assigned, after the conquest, to organize a Ukrainian civil service under Erich Koch's administration. For this purpose, he summoned home Ukrainian émigrés from the far ends of the earth. It was he who made the two notorious O.D.W.U. leaders, Omelyan Senyk-Grebivsky and Nicolai Stziborsky, come to the provisional seat of administration at Zhitomir (where they were promptly assassinated by Soviet guerrillas). A little later, however, on December 27, 1941, Sevryuk himself died in a mysterious train crash between Berlin and Warsaw in which a great number of other Nazi officials also perished.[2]

All the leading Ukrainian separatists having thus been disposed of, or silenced, there were only nonentities left to help Gauleiter Koch and his German administrators. Some of these nobodies held a "Ukrainian Separatist Convention" at Zhitomir last March, with Nazi Commissar-General Klin presiding. The meeting produced no tangible results whatever.

The present German administrative set-up in the Ukraine is along distinctly colonial lines. There is very limited cultural and municipal autonomy, under strict German supervision. The judiciary has been organized into nine so-called "citizens' courts" and one court of appeal. Their jurisdiction, however, is limited to Ukrainian nationals (excluding *Volksdeutsche* as well as members of the occupation forces) and to offences carrying a maximum penalty of two years at hard labor and 5,000 rubles fine. More serious crimes are dealt with by the German military courts.

Thus far the Germans have introduced only minor changes, for the sake of efficiency, in the agricultural system. Contrary to expectations, the collective farms have not been abolished, but their managers have been replaced with German commissars or former Ukrainian émigrés. In practice, however, many collectives have ceased to function because of the lack of essential machinery and of able-bodied men. Requisitioning of a large part of the current harvest was announced by the *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung* late last August. All collectives and individual farms were obliged to

[2] Since then, still another well-known Ukrainian collaborationist, the composer Revutzky, has met a violent death. He was assassinated in Kiev early last August.

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deliver to the authorities fixed quantities of grain, the amount being determined by locality, size of farm and other factors. It was announced that stern punishment would be meted out, individually and collectively, to persons, farms and even whole villages that failed to fill their quotas.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the new economic order which the Nazis are trying to establish in the Ukraine as well as in the *Ostland* is the projected colonization of these territories with "model farmers," not from Germany but from kindred Germanic countries like Holland, Denmark and Norway.

Early this year, a truly monstrous scheme was hatched in the Rosenberg ministry with the help of a notorious Dutch Quisling, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen, the Nazi-appointed President of the Netherlands Bank. It aimed at transplanting 3 million Dutchmen — fully one-third of the nation — to White Russia and the Ukraine. To carry out this mass migration of unwilling settlers, the so-called "Netherlands East Company" (an obvious travesty on the old East India Company) was founded, with Rost van Tonningen as its president. A lying propaganda was begun in Holland on the theme that the country is too small to feed its present population. According to the Dutch Nazi paper *Nationale Dagblad*, Burgomaster Bouma of Emmen, in the province of Drenthe, recently declared that "10,000 people too many" lived in that province, though actually it is rather thinly populated. This Nazi-appointed burgomaster added: "Half of the population will be able to find work in industry. But the other half will have to find *Lebensraum* in the east. I myself have only one desire, that the first Netherlands settlement in the Ukraine be named "New Emmen." Although this scheme has met with universal disapproval and staunch resistance in Holland, many thousands of Dutch farmers have already been moved east and all the signs are that the Nazis intend to go ahead with their plan.

In Denmark, which has also been asked to provide "model farmers" for the Ukraine and *Ostland*, the Nazis found a willing tool in the Minister of Communications, Gunnar Larsen. He and Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius form the backbone of the collaborationist group in the present Danish Cabinet. Invited by the Rosenberg ministry, Larsen made a two-weeks' trip to the Baltic States last April. In Riga, seat of the *Ostland* administration, he met Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse and discussed with him at length the planned transfer of Danish farmers to the east. Noth-

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ing is yet known about the number of settlers Germany hopes to obtain from Denmark or about their exact destination. There is strong popular resistance in Denmark, too, but the Nazi organ in Lithuania, *Kownoer Zeitung*, recently announced that two agreements had been signed between the German and Danish Governments regarding the transplantation of Danish farmers to Nazi-held parts of Russia.

It might be asked why the Nazis are so anxious to settle foreigners in the *Ostland* and Ukraine instead of sending German farmers there. The answer is that in spite of all the ballyhoo about "folk without room" there simply are not enough German farmers to cultivate the land taken from the Poles, Czechs, French and Jugoslavs and all the newly-conquered territories in the east as well. Settlement by Germans, therefore, has been reserved in the main for the land now included within the boundaries of the Greater Reich. Here Hitler proposes to create his solid bloc of 100 million Germans.

On the outer fringe of the Reich, a number of German-controlled buffer states are to be set up. In the west and north, the "Germanic" states of Holland, Norway and Denmark have been earmarked for this purpose. A Germanized *Ostland* and Ukraine are to play the same role in the east. This does not mean that the Nazis intend to relinquish any of their conquerors' rights for the benefit of their Germanic cousins. The latter will merely be called upon to do the "model farming," under German supervision and for German profit.

The pattern of the new Ukraine — as of the *Ostland* — can therefore be described like this: at the bottom, the millions of native serfs, toiling 17 hours a day to produce the goods; over them, as nominal farm-owners or managers of collectives, a picked layer of Dutch, Flemish, Danish and other "racially kindred" overseers; on top of it all, the German Gauleiters and Commissars with their bureaucracy of *Unter-Führers* of all grades, collecting taxes, dividends and graft. Small wonder that the Ukrainian nation, even that part of it which has the bitter taste of the Bolshevist régime still in its mouth, shows little eagerness to coöperate with Herr Koch. One need not be a prophet to forecast that the kind of slave state which Hitler has set up in the Ukraine will never work.

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DENMARK UNDER THE NAZI HEEL

By Gunnar Leistikow

ON November 5, 1942, a new German Minister to Denmark, Dr. Karl Rudolf Werner Best, arrived in Copenhagen to replace von Renthe-Fink, a career diplomat who had represented the Reich in Denmark since pre-Nazi days. The new Minister, a high SS officer and Gestapo official, has been in the Foreign Service for only about six months and during this time is said to have elaborated a "European constitution" in accordance with the ideas he formulated last year in his "Grossraumordnung und Grossverwaltung." His arrival was greeted with the greatest apprehension by the Danes, who with their usual sense of irony muttered that they expected a "best-ial" future.

Everything indicates that these Danish apprehensions are justified and that the autonomy which the Germans have permitted occupied Denmark for more than two and a half years is ending. The Nazis seem to have concluded that the preferential treatment which they have accorded the Danes has not paid. It has not won their sympathy and recently has not prevented sabotage from increasing throughout the country. And with North Africa in Allied hands the German supply situation is now so tense that the Nazis cannot afford to look too far ahead and consider what will happen next year if they proceed to empty their Danish storehouse this winter.

Even before Best arrived with his ominous title of "special plenipotentiary of the Führer," the Germans had presented a list of far-reaching demands to Foreign Minister Erik Scavenius, whom they called to Berlin at the end of October. The most important demand was that a new Danish Government, in which the Germans "could have confidence," be formed not later than November 8. After long consultation with all parties, the Buhl Cabinet decided, on the night of November 7, to yield to German pressure and a Cabinet headed by Scavenius was formed.

Because of his signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact and because of several pro-German utterances Scavenius is one of the most unpopular politicians in Denmark today, and we can take it as certain that he was made Premier only at the explicit demand of the Germans. It is not true, however, that Scavenius is a Danish Quisling, as he is sometimes called by writers who

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should know better. He is not even a Laval. He has no personal lust for power and he is not himself either a Nazi or a Nazi sympathizer. It simply has always been his axiom that Denmark, geographically exposed and economically dependent on Germany, must never come into conflict with that country, no matter what its régime. When he became Foreign Minister after the invasion of Denmark, it was the opinion of many persons, as well as his own firm conviction, that Germany had already won the war. A cynic and a "realist," Scavenius believed that the only chance Denmark had to save anything out of the wreck of her independence in a German-dominated Europe was to accede to any German wishes, since, as he said, "we don't live in the moon." His self-assurance and disloyal behavior irritated his colleagues, but they were unable to get rid of him because the Germans would not accept any other Danish Foreign Minister except a Nazi.

Scavenius has succeeded on several occasions in dissuading the Germans from forcing Quislings upon the Danish Government, and his new Cabinet must be considered as a last attempt to stave off — for a time at least — the complete Nazification of the country. The new Cabinet includes not only a majority of the members of the Buhl Cabinet, but also the president of the Danish trade unions, Lauritz Hansen, and it was nominated by King Christian himself and not by Crown Prince Frederik, who was acting as regent during the King's illness.

The other most important demands of the Germans were that 150,000 Danish workers be sent to Germany; that what remained of the Danish Navy be handed over to the Germans; that "occupation Reichsmarks" be accepted in unlimited quantities as payment from members of the *Wehrmacht*, so that German soldiers could clean out stores in Denmark as they have done in other occupied countries; that Danish shipyards accept a two-year building program for the German merchant marine; that other Danish industries deliver large quantities of cement and metal; and that Denmark ultimately give in to the long-standing German demand for the institution of anti-Semitic laws on the Nürnberg model. It is quite possible that the Germans even demanded a Danish declaration of war against the Soviet Union; but if such was the case, Scavenius seems to have convinced the Nazis that the proposal could not be carried out by any Danish Government which was not out-and-out pro-Nazi.

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II

To understand the background of this turn in Danish affairs we must review developments since the German attack on Denmark on April 9, 1940. This attack had been expected in Danish political and military circles. The General Staff feared an invasion in the very first days of the war, and, beginning in January 1940, the Danish and Norwegian Governments were informed repeatedly by their legations in Berlin that the Germans were preparing a military expedition. These attacks failed to materialize; but during the first week of April the danger signals increased. The general uneasiness in Denmark mounted steadily. Then came, in rapid succession, the German ultimatum, its acceptance under protest, the end of the brief Danish resistance and the occupation of all of Denmark by the Nazis.

Why did the Danes give up so easily? Why did they not fight, even against hopeless odds, as did the Norwegians, the Dutch, the Belgians and so many others?

In the first place, Denmark has no natural defenses against modern warfare. The landscape is flat and devoid of natural barriers. The only really effectual modern defense is, as this war has shown, a mobile defense in depth, and Denmark is too small for that. Jutland, the largest section, is only some 150 miles long and from 30 to 100 miles broad; panzer divisions and motorized troops could cross it in no time.

In the second place, when Denmark allowed her armed forces to deteriorate after the First World War she was only following a general world-wide trend. Humanity, aghast at the results of militarism, took refuge in wishful thinking about permanent peace and the ability of the League of Nations to maintain it. The world woke late to a realization of the new danger and was slow to do anything about it. Even the Great Powers were reluctant to turn to arms again; it took a desperate situation to make up the minds of most of the democracies.

Denmark, as all small countries, received the concept of "collective security" with enthusiasm, and great was her disillusionment when the futility of the Geneva arrangements became apparent. One by one the weaker nations, China, Ethiopia, Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, learned that whatever collective security meant, it did not mean security for them. The world began to rearm, and even Denmark began to discuss

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defense problems again. But the viewpoint prevailed that the arms which a small, exposed country could obtain would hardly augment its security, and the development of the world situation strengthened this view. What was the good of rearmament, it was asked, when the most heavily armed of Europe's smaller countries, Czechoslovakia, had been forced, by its friends, to capitulate without striking a blow? Furthermore, private investigations in Britain furnished evidence that no help could be expected in an emergency from Denmark's best friend among the Great Powers. The utmost Danish military leaders could promise the Government was that even if the country rearmed they could hold out for a few days, perhaps a week or so, until help could arrive from abroad — help which, they had to add, probably would not come at all, or at least not in time.

So Denmark decided against rearmament. In 1864 she had shown the world that her population did not lack soldierly qualities when she defended herself heroically, if hopelessly, against two Great Powers, Prussia and Austria. But by 1940 the technique of modern aggressive warfare had outrun her defensive possibilities. Although more populous and richer, she was actually in a position similar to that of her sister nation, Iceland, which made not even a pretense that she would defend herself, but proclaimed in 1918 her permanent undefended neutrality in all future wars. It was Denmark's bad luck that geography had placed her next to Germany, and not, like her happier sister, near Britain.

But if Denmark was not in a position to defend herself, why did the Government not leave the country and direct resistance from abroad, as the Luxembourg Government did a few months later? Many Danes wish today that the Government had done so. There are several reasons why it did not.

In the first place, the idea apparently did not occur to anybody. Denmark was the first neutral country to be overrun in this war; and it was a novel idea that a government which was not able to wage war should go abroad to carry on some other form of resistance from foreign soil. Besides, the suggestion would hardly have appealed to the Danes. It would have been looked upon, even by the Cabinet members, not as a patriotic effort, but as primarily an unheroic flight from the Gestapo, who had been jailing and torturing Austrian and Czechoslovak cabinet ministers.

Moreover, the Danish Government, unlike the Dutch and the

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Luxembourgers some weeks later, really had nowhere to go. It was known that southern Norway was being attacked simultaneously by the Germans, and it was thought that Sweden might be in the same position in a few hours. In any case, a still neutral Sweden would hardly dare to allow a Danish refugee government to function from Swedish territory. And there was no time to try to get away to Britain. The Germans had started to bomb Danish airfields even before the ultimatum expired. Less than half the Cabinet had been able to assemble before the invasion began; the Minister of the Interior had been arrested in the street by German soldiers before he even knew the country had been attacked.

III

The people of Copenhagen learned of the invasion at 6:00 A.M. on April 9, half an hour after the acceptance of the ultimatum. Leaflets, printed in advance and signed "Kaupisch, commander of the German troops in Denmark," were dropped from bombers. Kaupisch had arrived the day before as a "tourist" and after the appearance of the first troops he transformed his hotel into German Headquarters.

The pretext for the occupation was the usual one. The Germans had come to protect the country against the British and to guarantee peace in Scandinavia. In addition to the usual invitation not to resist but to go peacefully about one's daily business, this document contained a statement of the greatest political and diplomatic importance. It was a promise that the Danish "Army and Navy shall be maintained, the Danish people's freedom respected and the country's future independence fully guaranteed."

Whatever the German Government's ultimate aim may have been, there seems no reason to believe that the signer of this proclamation did not mean to keep his promise. The main interest of the German Army was to get things done smoothly, and it knew that the least troublesome way to run an occupied country is to run it through native leaders. Even in Norway, where the whole country first had to be conquered, the Germans tried this method for some six months and gave it up only on direct orders from Hitler and against the wishes of his military advisers. It was the German Army which ran the show in Denmark, and it was some time before Himmler was even allowed to

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open an office in the Dagmarhus Building in Copenhagen. When enemy aliens and German refugees were rounded up, it was done by Danish police and not by the SS.

To the surprise of the Danes, several months passed before the Germans began any serious interference with internal Danish affairs. Whether the purpose was to impress the Swedes and other neutrals with the wisdom of not trying to oppose the Germans, or whether there were other reasons, the Danes have so far been spared open Gestapo terror, and living conditions in Denmark have remained better than in any other occupied country — until recently, in fact, better even than in many places in Germany. The Danes were accorded a preferential treatment which made them feel, as they themselves described it, like "the canary bird of a murderer."

IV

But if the Germans hoped to win the sympathy of the Danes they failed utterly. Germans have never been popular in the country. Their arrogance has always been antipathetic to the Danes, and Prussian oppression of the Danish population of North Slesvig aroused intense hatred. After Denmark's reannexation of this region in 1920, however, this hostility began to die down, and in the time of the German Republic the relationship between Germans and Danes became quite friendly, although never warm as in the case of Danish sentiments toward the British.

When Germany invaded Denmark less than a year after having pledged herself, in a pact of non-aggression signed upon her own initiative, never again to use force against Denmark, the old hatred reappeared, more intense than before. This feeling of hatred, mixed with disdain, has been growing ever since, nourished by the increasing German encroachments on Danish ideals and interests and by the people's impotent wrath and shame at having been unable to defend themselves.

During the first days of the occupation the Danes even turned against members of their own armed forces; in many localities these were spat upon by furious and uncomprehending civilians. Letters from Danish soldiers, published later, show that the general feeling in the armed forces was utter despair at having had to submit to disarmament at the hands of the Germans. Parts of the Army and Navy defied orders and found their way

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to Sweden with flags flying and bands playing, in the vain hope of getting a chance to fight the invader side by side with their Swedish brothers.

In general, however, the population have obeyed a personal appeal from the King "to show an absolutely correct and dignified demeanor," and have refrained from letting their feelings lead them to individual actions against the *Wehrmacht* and its members. On the other hand, they have rebuffed all German attempts to fraternize with them. German officers are never invited to Danish homes; when Germans enter Danish cafés, Danish customers leave; and the few Danish girls who make friends with the foe are exposed to drastic retaliation by their fellow-countrymen. On the street, Danes seem not to notice Germans; they ignore the public concerts given by the *Wehrmacht*, but applaud demonstratively the band of the Danish Guards. They often wore Union Jack badges until it was prohibited, and answered in English when spoken to in German. It is a favorite sport to invent new methods of irritating the "grasshoppers," as the green-clad Germans are called, and to make them feel uncomfortable. Judging by German complaints, this Danish war of nerves seems to have been effective. All German attempts to win the Danes over by the "cultural approach" have failed. "German music and literature are excellent," the Danes answer, "but we can wait to study them till you have left the country." In the editorial office of the biggest Danish daily, *Politiken*, the Germans are confronted with a huge portrait of Churchill. It is hard for them to do anything about it, because it is a front page from a Berlin illustrated weekly, with a German caption reading: "Churchill's hopeless expression on learning of the fall of France." A joke among the staff of the paper is to say that they are "hopeless like Churchill."

V

During the first months of the occupation the Germans restricted their interference to the sort of things that might be expected of any occupying Power. Censorship was established, but handled by Danish authorities under German guidance. Movement into and out of the country was also controlled. Anti-German writers were prevented from publishing their work but were not molested personally. The press was, of course, cut off from Allied sources of information, but it was allowed to print

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quotations from the London dispatches of Swedish papers. Several papers were able to continue printing stories from their own London correspondents by using Stockholm datelines and giving as sources Swedish papers for which the same men were also correspondents.

More menacing clouds began to appear in the Danish sky during the summer of 1940, when the Germans suggested a customs and currency union and what amounted to common citizenship. The Reich did not force the issue, however, when the proposal was rejected. A little later, the Germans started meddling with Danish internal politics. First, their restrictions on the Danish press became more severe. Danish papers were told, in more and more detail, not only what to suppress, but what to print and how. The editors were forbidden to relay British news via Stockholm and had to conform even their news of Danish events to German wishes. On October 3, 1940, the Trade Minister, Christmas Møller, a Conservative whose courageous and determined stand had long irritated the Germans, resigned in anticipation of new German pressure. A few days later his premonitions were shown to have been justified when the Germans demanded that he resign from the parliamentary foreign affairs committee. This was the first open encroachment on Denmark's political organization.

About Christmas, 1940, the Germans extended their interference to the structure of the Danish Cabinet, asking for the retirement of Premier Stauning and five other members of the Government and giving the Danes the choice of a number of candidates for each post. They did not persist, however, when the King and the parties resisted their demands. They did succeed in ousting Christmas Møller from the Lower House and in forcing him and two prominent Socialists, Hartvig Frisch and H. C. Hansen, to lay down their party offices. The German threat in these and similar cases was either to introduce a Gestapo régime or cut off German coal supplies, on which fuelless Denmark is entirely dependent.

Remarkably enough, among all the candidates of the Germans for the different ministerial posts there was not a single full-fledged Danish Nazi. Their original plan must have included the forcing of the Danish Quisling, Frits Clausen, into the Cabinet. But the Danish Nazi Party was, if possible, even more insignificant than the Norwegian one, and the German experience in

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Norway probably did not encourage repetition. The Germans staged a test, however, by letting their puppets call for "mass demonstrations" in Copenhagen and Haderslev, North Slesvig, on November 17 and December 6, respectively. In spite of extensive police precautions, the Quislings were soundly beaten up by the infuriated public. This seemed to convince the Germans that Denmark was not yet ripe for the full blessings of Nazism. Some months later the parliamentary elections were banned so that the weakness of the Nazi Party might not be revealed.

While the negotiations over the reconstruction of the Danish Government were proceeding, the German Minister suddenly came forward with a demand for ten of the modern torpedo boats which constituted a substantial part of the tiny Danish fleet. This was refused, and a reference was made to the German promise of April 9, 1940, that the Danish Army and Navy were to be maintained. The German Minister replied that he had been completely misunderstood; Germany wished to hire the boats, he said, and not for war operations, but only for the training of crews and for patrol purposes in the Baltic. The Danes answered that their Navy was not for hire. Then the Nazis started to threaten: if the boats were not handed over, they would be taken by force and the delivery of German coal would be stopped. Under this threat the boats were finally transferred and not scuttled, as their crews would have preferred. In order to make them as useless as possible, the ships were first disarmed and dismantled, and by a coincidence the shop where their equipment was stored burned to the ground in one of the numerous fires which have become frequent in occupied Denmark.

From this time on, the Germans have continued to interfere with Danish internal affairs, even though so far they have not attempted to change the country's fundamental political structure. They have required the adoption of laws which are contrary to Danish tradition in view of the incidents arising between the populace and the army of occupation. The police force has been increased and trained according to German methods and a Police Minister acceptable to the Germans has been installed. The Communists have been rounded up, some of their leaders condemned to Draconian prison terms and some confined in a concentration camp — operated, however, by Danish authority. Well-known authors have been imprisoned for writings deemed to "endanger Denmark's relations to a foreign Power." The Danish Govern-

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ment had to dismiss Henrik Kauffmann, its Minister in Washington, and accuse him of high treason when he put Greenland under United States protection, and it has had to repeat this procedure with a number of other Danish diplomats in the United Nations. After the German attack on Russia, Denmark had to break off diplomatic relations with that country and was even forced, some months later, to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

The Danish Government has managed to avoid participation in the war, but has had to endorse the recruitment of a volunteer "Free Corps Denmark" to fight whomever the Germans consider enemies of European civilization. The fate of this Free Corps illustrates the weakness of the German hold on the Danish mind. Apart from some few hundred Nazi riffraff, no volunteers could be found, and the ranks of the Free Corps, and of a similar organization, the "Regiment Nordland," had to be filled with recruits from among the German minority in North Slesvig. Later on, when the Free Corps visited Denmark on a mass furlough, the population showed open enmity and a number of encounters resulted, with casualties on both sides; great relief was felt when the "traitors" were sent back to the battlefield.

The signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1941, gave rise to further demonstrations, and the anger of the masses with "the traitor Scavenius" became so great that on his return from Berlin the Government took the precaution of having the Foreign Minister alight from his train at a way station. The demonstrators did not know what had taken place after the German Minister on November 21, 1941, informed the Government that Germany wanted Denmark to sign the Pact. The Government rejected the proposal by all but two votes. Under increasing German pressure, more of the Ministers gave in, and the King gave his consent provided that Parliament would back the decision. So far everything was clear. Then suddenly a German ultimatum was delivered: the Pact had to be signed the following Tuesday, and the decision of the Danish Government had to be unanimous. Otherwise Germany would consider herself freed from the promises she had given on April 9, 1940.

VI

Economically, the German occupation was bound to mean disaster for Denmark. The country's wealth was derived from its foreign trade, forage and manure being imported from overseas,

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and bacon and butter being exported to Britain (50 percent of the total Danish exports went to that country). All this trade was cut off.

Germany could to a large extent replace Britain as a customer, but she could not furnish the products Denmark needed to maintain her agricultural production. The mass slaughter of cattle followed in due course, and today only a fraction is left of the former herds. By the spring of 1942 the production of pork had been reduced to one-fourth of prewar days, of eggs to one-third and of poultry to one-seventh. The number of cows is estimated to have been reduced only by 13 percent, but because of the undernourishment of the cattle the production of milk has declined considerably more. In spite of the fact that Danish production is shrinking, Germany's share in it has been steadily increasing. Thus the Germans are reported to have asked for 1,300,000 head of live pigs in 1941–42, or the equivalent in slaughtered bodies, which amounted to practically the total current pork production.

The effect of all this on the economic life of the nation would not be so disastrous if the Germans paid for what they received. But payment is postponed till "after the victory." Except for the dwindling deliveries of coal for those industries which work for the Germans, the Danes get little from the Reich but promises. The German indebtedness forced on Denmark now exceeds two and one-half billion kroner, equivalent to nearly one-fourth of the national wealth. Inflation is thereby forced upon Denmark, for while the account of the Danish National Bank with the Reichsbank in Berlin is constantly increasing, the National Bank has to pay cash to Danish exporters and farmers; and the Germans have been extremely broadminded about the prices they grant, confident that whoever pay them it will not be they. This systematic robbery has many advantages for the Germans in addition to those of an economic nature. It enables them to sap Danish powers of resistance; to destroy the highly developed consumer goods industries in Denmark, which are potential competitors with the industries of postwar Germany; and to increase the number of unemployed, who can then be lured or forced to work in Germany.

According to the Danish trade unions, 42,000 Danes were working in Germany in May 1942, to which number must be added some 6,000 who were lured to Norway under the pretext of working on reconstruction jobs, but actually to build military

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works. Altogether, some 78,000 Danish workers have been employed in Germany at different times. This means that an astonishing number have managed to get home again in spite of all the Germans could do and in spite of the fact that homecomers as well as unemployed who decline to go to Germany receive no unemployment relief. Such workers have to depend on relatives and friends, whose standard of living is rapidly deteriorating because of the discrepancy between soaring prices and almost stationary wages.

This tendency reflects pretty well the feelings of the Danes toward Germany, but these are still better mirrored in the wave of sabotage which is sweeping the country and which, time and again, has caused the Danish authorities to advise caution.

No wonder that sabotage now sometimes takes spectacular forms, including attempts on trains, and mysterious fires which break out wherever stocks have just been sold to Germany. A big fire last Christmas, for example, destroyed 20,000 Danish-made blankets destined for the Nazi soldiers in Russia. Less perceptible methods of sabotage, such as the slow-down and careless or "erroneous" handling of machinery, are still more effective, because they continue steadily and on a nation-wide scale. In this class was the spontaneous disappearance of all copper coins a few weeks after the occupation. Word was passed around that the Germans intended to confiscate the coins in order to melt down the precious metal for munitions; immediately the hoarding of coppers started in order to prevent the Germans from getting them. When the Government started replacing the coppers with aluminum, the new coins disappeared, because aluminum is important for airplane production. In the end the authorities had to switch to zinc coins, popularly nicknamed "bathtub money."

VII

The irreconcilable attitude of the Danish population, as mirrored in the daily complaints of the Danish Nazi press, has made the position of the Danish Government extremely difficult. In spite of all provocations, it has remained docile in order to postpone for as long as possible the ultimate catastrophe of a Gauleiter and Gestapo régime like that in Norway and other occupied countries. To this end it has time and again had to make decisions which were bound to be extremely unpopular. But there are some demands which no nation could accept without committing

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suicide. It seems that the Danish Government has rejected many such German demands and left it to the Germans to decide whether or not they would smash their much-advertised "model protectorate." Thus the Germans have failed to induce the Danish Government either to declare war on Russia or to execute anti-Semitic legislation.

In successive crises the Government has had the full and determined support of King Christian. During the whole of his 30-year reign Christian X has never faltered in his loyalty to the constitutional and parliamentary régime; similarly, he has never dreamed of touching the constitution under the pressure of the invader. On several occasions he has rejected suggestions that he do so, whether they came from the Germans themselves or from certain Danes who accepted the New Order in Europe. When the German Government tried to influence him by appointing a nephew of the Queen, the Hereditary Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, as counsellor of the German legation, the King told the Prince that he was welcome to the Royal Castle as a member of the family but not to talk politics.

The King has never concealed his personal opinions. He has visited English prisoners interned in Denmark; he granted audiences to the historian la Cour and his publisher when they were condemned to prison terms because la Cour's writings had "endangered Denmark's relation to a foreign Power"; he sent flowers to a Danish policeman who was badly beaten up in a fight with Danish Nazis and German soldiers; and he decorated the police chief of Haderslev for suppressing Nazi riots. Several times he has taken steps to make sure that German encroachments do not pass unnoticed. When the Germans forbade the Danish press and radio to mention their acquisition of the Danish torpedo boats, he ordered flags hoisted at half-mast and insisted on shaking hands with every single one of the 800 crew members. At least once, after the Germans suggested the adoption of anti-Jewish laws, he attended service in a synagogue in Copenhagen. He is reported to have explained to German officials that there was no Jewish question in Denmark because the Danes "never had had any minority feelings toward the Jews." Since Hitler started flying his personal flag from his Berlin palace every day and every night, regardless of whether or not he is present, the Royal Danish standard flies permanently at Amalienborg Castle in Copenhagen, in contradiction to Danish tradition, a

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discreet but explicit hint that His Majesty considers himself head of a still sovereign state and as such on equal standing with the head of the German Reich.

Under these circumstances King Christian, who is elder brother of King Haakon of Norway, has acquired more popularity with his people than almost any other King in the thousand years of Danish history. This popularity gives him both an extremely strong position with relation to the Germans and a personal influence unparalleled for a constitutional monarch. He has shown great skill in making the best use of both. But just because his person is generally considered the country's strongest defense against the invader, his health and security are the preoccupation of his people, who feel that she will hardly allow them to retain their preferential status indefinitely, and that she would not hesitate to take advantage of the situation if her troops were still present when Denmark's strongest cornerstone dropped away.

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LATIN AMERICAN OIL IN WAR AND PEACE

By Frederick Haussmann

WITH most of the Far East already fallen to the enemy and the Caucasus and Middle East in danger, Latin America is the only important oil producing area outside the United States not yet seriously threatened by the war. Its importance is enhanced by the fact that supply lines from Latin America to the major theaters of war are shorter than those from the United States. Curaçao and Aruba — the hugh export bases in the Dutch West Indies — are 800 miles nearer London than are the oil ports of Texas. Close collaboration between the two Americas in supplying oil to the United Nations is therefore a vital strategic necessity.

This collaboration is imperiled by a smoldering antagonism between the various Latin American governments and the oil companies which operate in their territories.[1] No longer is the huge empire of oil autonomous in Latin America. In most countries the companies are subject to strict government control; in some of them competing state oil companies have been established; and the Bolivian and Mexican expropriations in 1936 and 1938, respectively, indicated the possibility of total expulsion. The United States Government took a hand in both of the cases of expropriation, and the conflicts were settled within a framework of broader negotiations. Nevertheless, the principle of expropriation with indemnification was upheld, and the owners of the fields were not permitted to influence the general settlements. Many Latin Americans believe that a further decline in the influence of "absentee oil capital" is inevitable. So far the movement has not made marked progress in the main producing countries of northern South America — Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. Everywhere, however, there is growing tension. Both sides have grievances, and the political and economic interests at stake are large.

How large the stakes may be is shown by the geological surveys of the past decade. These seem to indicate that the petroleum resources of the rest of the world are much greater than those of the United States, and that the U.S.S.R. and Latin America contain the largest areas of potential oil land.[2] Some geologists, on the other hand, believe that total Latin American reserves may not amount to more than 4 billion barrels, in comparison with about 18 billion in the United States and 5 billion in Russia.[3] But this estimate seems far too low, especially in view of the fact that oil exploration in Latin America is only beginning. A recent geological evaluation, for instance, quoted officially by the Venezuelan Ministry of Development,[4] states that new discoveries in that country justify the assumption of a reserve of 2 billion barrels in the eastern state of Anzoátegui alone. Promising new fields have also been discovered in

[1] *Cf.* D. M. Phelps, "Petroleum Regulation in South America," *American Economic Review*, March 1939, p. 48–59.
[2] *Oil and Gas Journal*, Dec. 25, 1941, p. 81.
[3] Estimate of Jan. 1, 1939. *Cf.* "Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1939," p. 60.
[4] "Informe del Ministerio de Fomento de Venezuela," March 28, 1940, p. 3.

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the state of Monagas. The possibilities for future oil development in Colombia's Magdalena River valley, in Mexico, Cuba and Trinidad and in the Chaco region are vaguer and more problematical.

It is only within the past 30 years that the oil wealth of Latin America has been tapped. In 1910 the area supplied only 1.6 percent of total world production, which was then not more than 330 million barrels. During the next decade the Mexican oil fields were explored and developed with speculative speed. Production reached its peak in 1921, when it amounted to 193 million barrels, 25 percent of the world output. Then the production suddenly began to decline, partly because of the flooding of the Mexican Eagle fields by salt water, and Mexico quickly lost its position as the world's second largest oil producer. By 1925 the Mexican output had dropped to 115 million barrels, and in 1929 it reached the comparatively low level of 40 million barrels, where it remained, on the average, until recently. All attempts to replace the loss by new discoveries were futile except in the case of the rich Poza Rica field.

It was after the Mexican disaster that the oil companies turned their attention to South America. They found unexpected treasures in Venezuela. Within five years (1921–25) Venezuela's annual oil production rose from 1 to 20 million barrels. In 1929 it reached 137 million and in 1941 it climbed to a new peak of 223 million. There were similar hopes for Colombia in the period 1921–25, when the first wells in that country began to produce. The highest expectations, however, were not fulfilled. The Colombian output reached 20 million barrels in 1928, but was still only 22 million in 1939. The Texas Company and Socony Vacuum,which operate jointly in the Barco concession not far from Maracaibo basin, were forced to write off a loss of more than $30 million in their last balance sheets. Development was less spectacular in the other South American countries. The production curve is rising slowly in Trinidad, Ecuador and Argentina. The latter country, however, still has to import nearly 40 percent of its total consumption. Peru's production, the oldest in Latin America, falls back every year in spite of all efforts at exploration.

The main production figures for Latin America are as follows:

World and Latin American Oil Production [5]

(*in millions of barrels*)

	1918	*1929*	*1941*
World Total	503	1,486	2,227
Latin American Countries	69.9	234.6	348.5
Venezuela	0.3	137	223.7
Mexico	63.8	44.7	43.8
Trinidad	2	8.7	21.2
Argentina	1.3	9	21.7
Colombia	...	20.4	24.5
Peru	2.5	13.4	11.9
Bolivia	...	...	0.2
Ecuador	...	1.4	1.5
United States	356	1,007	1,404
Russia	32.5	99.5	238

For the first half of 1942 the production figures show a sudden decline of 12.5 million barrels for Venezuela, of 2.95 million for Mexico, of 1.15 million

[5] *Oil Weekly*, May 12, 1941, p. 125; and July 27, 1942, p. 118.

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for Colombia and of 0.2 million for Trinidad. This does not indicate approaching exhaustion. It is merely a consequence of submarine warfare in the Caribbean, since production in these countries is regulated more or less according to facilities for export.

The proportionate share of South America in world production increased from about 7 percent in 1914 to 14 percent in 1918 and, with fluctuations, to 15 percent in 1929. This proportion remained constant during the following 12 years, when world oil production was increasing rapidly.

Very little of this oil is consumed in Latin America itself. Argentina, the most highly industrialized country of the continent, has a per capita consumption of 2.2 barrels annually, compared with 8.7 barrels in the United States. In Mexico, although the growing domestic oil needs absorb 50 percent of the total production, the annual per capita consumption amounts to only 1.09 barrels. Greater consumption in Venezuela is caused by the high degree of mechanization in the oil industry itself. Consumption in the other Latin American countries is rising slowly as industrialization expands.

The low level of domestic consumption helps to make Latin America the outstanding oil exporter of the world. A total prewar production of 300 million barrels and a domestic consumption of about 100 million barrels leaves Latin America with an annual net export capacity of about 200 million barrels. This compares with United States exports of between 120 and 195 million barrels in the period between 1933 and 1938 and with exports of 160 million from the Near East and the Far East. Although the oil requirements of the Latin American countries may be expected to rise as industrialization increases, the prospects for a further enlargement of their exports remain favorable, since Latin American (and especially Venezuelan) production seems capable of further expansion. The export-import situation of the Latin American countries is shown in the following table:

LATIN AMERICAN OIL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN 1938 [6]

(*in millions of barrels*)

Exports		*Imports*	
Venezuela	178 (mostly crude)	Argentina	15 (mostly crude and fuel)
Mexico	15	Brazil	9
Trinidad	17	Uruguay	3 (mostly crude and fuel)
Colombia	19 (mostly crude)	Chile	5
Peru	13 (mostly crude)	Cuba	5
Ecuador	1	Other Latin American	4
Total	243		41

In 1938 about 25 percent of the total Latin American oil exports were shipped to the United States.[7] Nearly one third of the remaining 75 percent was exported in 1938 to Great Britain. More than one third went to the European Continent.[8] The rest went to other regions or was used as bunker oil.

[6] The central refinery system of Latin America is located in the Dutch West Indies, where South American oil of various origins and qualities is mixed, together with some gasoline imported from the United States. This makes it impossible to trace separately the oil exports and imports of the various countries. The complications caused by this fact are disregarded in this table.

[7] "Memoria del Ministerio de Fomento de Venezuela, 1941," Introduction, p. xlvii.

[8] In 1938, 45.1 percent of total German imports came from Venezuela and the Dutch West Indies.

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United States imports from Latin America are mainly heavy oils from Venezuela. Since United States wells yield a rather high percentage of the more valuable light oils, United States and Latin American resources are to some extent complementary. Normally, however, Latin America is a competitor of the United States in the world oil market. Oil exports from the United States to Europe, which amounted to 61.6 million barrels in 1929, were in 1937 only 59.6 million; exports to Europe from the Dutch West Indies rose from 22.9 million in 1929 to 69.7 million in 1937.

Their rising exports of oil are of vital importance to the Latin American countries. Oil makes up 90 percent of Venezuela's total exports. In the case of Mexico and Trinidad the figures surpass 30 percent, and in the case of Colombia the figure is over 20 percent.[9]

In addition to being an outstanding exporter of crude and fuel oil, Latin America is also a refining center. The location of the main refineries was settled by the predominant position of Venezuelan oil. Curaçao and Aruba — small islands in the Dutch West Indies, a few miles off the Venezuelan coast — are today the center of Latin American oil refining. This apparently peculiar location was chosen because of a lack of deep-water harbors adjacent to the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela and because the political situation in that country was considered uncertain under the dictatorship of Gómez. The loss of processing profits hurts Venezuela, and the oil policy of the country is now directed toward building up a domestic refining industry by attaching special conditions in new concession contracts. The historic development, however, cannot now be changed fundamentally.

Curaçao and Aruba are the largest oil-refining centers in the world. Their total crude capacity of 480,000 barrels daily tops the Iranian refinery of Abadan (280,000 barrels), the refineries near Baku (about 230,000 barrels) and the largest United States refineries at Baytown, Port Arthur, Bayonne, Baton Rouge and Whiting, each of which has a daily capacity of more than 100,000 barrels. The capacity in Aruba may soon be increased further as a result of a $10-million investment by Standard Oil of New Jersey for the production of 100-octane aviation gasoline.

The refining capacity of the other Latin American countries was last reported [10] as totaling about 450,000 barrels daily, made up of 142,000 in Mexico, 112,000 in Venezuela, 94,000 in Argentina and 80,000 in Trinidad. The total crude oil refining capacity of Latin America is, therefore, roughly 940,000 barrels a day. This compares with 4,927,000 barrels in the United States(1941) and a world total of about 8 million barrels (with no allowance for war damages). Producing 15 percent of the world's oil, Latin America has 12 percent of its total crude refining capacity.

Turning from the production, distribution and processing of Latin American oil to its financing, we find that investments in the industry fall into three categories. First, there are the investments of foreign capital. The investments made by the United States in Latin American oil — including production,

[9] Nearly 70 percent of the oil imported by Latin American countries comes from Latin American sources, especially from the Dutch West Indies and Peru; more than 30 percent, however, comes from the United States. South America imports about 14 million barrels of United States oil, exclusive of the Dutch West Indies imports used for mixing purposes.

[10] *Oil and Gas Journal*, December 25, 1941, p. 107.

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refining and distribution — were estimated in 1936 [11] at $559 million, or 17 percent of the total of direct investments on the continent; by now they may well exceed $600 million. The British are estimated to have invested about half as much. Thus the total private, direct investments of foreign capital in Latin American oil can be estimated at about $900 million.[12] Of the total, $400 million is invested in Venezuela [13] (62 percent American, 38 percent British) and about $90 million in the refineries of Curaçao and Aruba.

The second type of capital is that invested by the Latin American governments. The chief government properties are in Argentina and Mexico. The capital of Argentina's state oil company, *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales* (Y.P.F.), amounts to the high figure of 474 million pesos; but that company has an annual output of only 14 million barrels as compared with the 43-million-barrel production of the Mexican enterprises.[14]

Finally, there are the direct investments of private Latin American capital. These, however, are insignificant. Domestic investments in Mexico were estimated in 1938 at 2.5 percent of all oil investments in that country.

In summary, a total of about $1.1 billion is invested in the Latin American oil business. Eighty-five percent of this is foreign capital, and most of the remainder is owned by Latin American governments.

Among the foreign companies with investments in Latin American oil the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Royal Dutch Shell are predominant. In Venezuela, for example, production is distributed as follows: Standard of New Jersey, 50.85 percent; Royal Dutch Shell, 38.35 percent; Gulf Oil (Mene Grande), 10.30 percent;[15] miscellaneous, .50 percent. The main production of Colombia and Peru is controlled by Standard of New Jersey. Shell has concessions in Trinidad, Colombia and Ecuador.

Latin American oil regions are, indeed, the main sources of supply for these companies. In 1938 the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and its subsidiaries produced 240 million barrels of oil. If we include 80 million barrels purchased from other producers by the Humble Oil Company — one of the Standard subsidiaries — we see that Latin America provided 45 percent of this total. The Latin American share of the total supply of Royal Dutch Shell is only slightly smaller. Venezuela, Trinidad and Argentina supplied 85 million barrels of the total of 210 million in 1938, Venezuela alone supplying 78 million. At the present time Latin America, primarily Venezuela, provides more than 60 percent of the total Shell supply.

Other oil companies interested in Latin American oil are Socony Vacuum and Sinclair in Venezuela; Texas and Socony Vacuum jointly in Colombia; Standard of California in Colombia and Venezuela; and Atlantic Refining in Cuba and Haiti. The production of fields controlled by these companies, how-

[11] Cleona Lewis, "America's Stake in International Investments." Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1938, p. 188, 588.

[12] This figure does not include investments in the expropriated oil properties in Mexico, for which a total indemnity of between $70 and $80 million may finally be paid.

[13] *Cf. Revista del Ministerio de Hacienda*, 1936, p. 45; *Revista del Ministerio de Fomento*, 1937, p. 134; and *ibid*, 1939, p. 184. The Venezuelan estimates vary between $320 and $360 million, excluding refineries and distribution organization.

[14] Complete figures on the oil activity of Latin American governments are not available.

[15] Originally Mene Grande's share was larger, but a recent pool agreement gave the other two companies half of the Mene Grande production for a payment of $100 million.

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ever, has been insignificant thus far compared with that of Standard of New Jersey and Shell.

In spite of occasional losses and setbacks, the investments of these companies in the Latin American oil business have, on the whole, proved highly profitable. Earnings have been large enough to cover any risk involved. The average costs of crude production per barrel, including deliveries to the Atlantic coast market, were officially calculated in 1932 as $1.90 for the United States, $1.60 for Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Trinidad and eastern Venezuela, $1.41 for Mexico's heavy oil, and 87 cents for Lake Maracaibo.[16] Venezuelan production costs, excluding transport but including royalties, etc., were calculated for 1928–30 at between 49 and 54 cents; today they may hardly exceed 40 cents in view of the considerable increase in production. The export value of Venezuelan oil, on the other hand, was established jointly by the companies and the Government at 82 cents per barrel for 1938; 18.5 percent of this value represents payments to the Government.[17] Total oil profits in Venezuela, therefore, exceed $60 million, or 15 percent on the invested capital. This estimate may be conservative in view of the present peak production. One Standard subsidiary alone, the Venezuelan Lago Petroleum Company, with total assets of $100 million, was estimated to have yielded $21 million net profit in 1938.[18] These earnings are tax free and the oil companies pay relatively low royalties, in some cases not higher than 10 percent. In Colombia, where drilling and transportation conditions are far more unfavorable than in Venezuela, the total levies on the oil companies amount to 39 cents per barrel, of which 22 cents represents direct taxation.[19]

The profits of the oil companies in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela, compare strikingly with the 6 percent return on the total direct American investments in Latin America and the 1.4 percent return on portfolio investments. They have more than compensated the companies, not only for their losses in Mexico and Bolivia, but for the risks caused by increasing government intervention in the other Latin American countries.

The intervention of Latin American governments in the oil business is not primarily, as is often said, the expression of a shortsighted, nationalistic policy designed to favor domestic groups working against foreign capital in Latin America and capitalism in general. Rather it is the result of a widespread feeling in Latin America that "absentee capital" is not sufficiently interested in furthering local interests and that the profits of the oil companies ought to be used to a greater degree for the development of the respective domestic economies. The companies are suspected — sometimes with justification, sometimes without — of not investing as much money and energy in exploration, production and the refining business as the interests of the countries require. The companies, on the other hand, complain that in spite of their valuable developmental work, their property is not protected against expropriation and other state intervention. These divergent viewpoints have given rise to deep-rooted misunderstandings which hamper friendly coöperation.

[16] "Average Production Costs of Crude Petroleum," 72nd Congress, House Document No. 194.
[17] "Memoria del Ministerio de Fomento de Venezuela, 1940," Introduction, p. xix.
[18] Lago does not publish its balance sheets; but *cf.* "Standard Oil Co. (N. J.)," III, *Fortune*, June 1940, p. 107. Mexico estimates the average yearly oil profits before 1938 at 17 percent.
[19] *World Petroleum*, September 1941, p. 33.

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In both Bolivia and Mexico, domestic dissatisfaction with the amount of exploration and production was one of the underlying reasons for expropriation. The Brazilian decree of May 12, 1940, which placed the entire oil business under the control of a National Petroleum Council, had as its purpose not only to achieve import and price control but also to increase exploration, which seemed too expensive and risky to the private companies, but which was urgent from the national standpoint. Six years of steadily declining production recently led the Peruvian Government to undertake exploration, refining and distribution in the Zorritos region. Colombia, whose output remains nearly constant in spite of the existence of allegedly rich reserves, has given notice to the Tropical Oil Company (Standard of New Jersey) that the De Mares concession will be terminated in 1946 in order to increase state control and enlarge exploration and production.

The situation is somewhat different in Argentina. Oil deposits were first discovered in that country in 1907 by the Government Bureau of Mines. The oil companies did not begin to operate in Argentina until after 1916, when the Commodoro Rivadavia field was already producing; as late as 1925 their production was not more than 25 percent of the country's total output. Consumption increased constantly, and Argentina now is the fourth largest per capita user of oil in the world (33 million barrels in 1941). Today, an adequate supply of moderately-priced oil has become a vital necessity for further industrialization in view of Argentina's lack of domestic coal mines. So-called "nationalistic" tendencies have increased with the need for oil. The state oil company, Y.P.F., controls all national reserves, more than 60 percent of the total production and more than 50 percent of the refineries, and holds a leading position in a kind of compulsory cartel which supervises imports, prices and distribution. The foreign companies have not been eliminated, but they are sharply controlled and their interest in Argentina is cooling. The Argentine-Bolivian agreement of April 4, 1940, was in line with the Argentine oil policy. By it Argentina will finance and carry out a new transportation program in the oil-bearing Chaco region. Argentina also proposes to become independent of foreign transportation and freight charges by expanding the Argentine tanker fleet, which in 1938 had a capacity of only 84,000 tons.[20]

As a part of its general public utility policy, Uruguay provided in 1931 for a government monopoly in alcohol, combustibles and cement and established its own oil refining industry. Chile's *Compañía de Petroleo de Chile* (*Copec*) was established in 1934, after the nitrate crisis, as part of a general program of economic and financial reforms. This is an import and distribution company, not government-owned but favored by the Government in such matters as exchange rates, the erection of retail outlets and freight rates.

In Venezuela, the divergence between the oil policies of the state and the desires of the companies has been covered in recent years under the fallacious appearance of prosperity. Governments hardly ever interfere in the oil business during periods of real prosperity. But in spite of Venezuela's great wealth of oil and the high rate of crude oil production, the economic condition of the country is basically unsound. Agriculture and industry, with the exception of oil, are completely undeveloped. More than 80 percent of the population of 3.5 million is very poor and conditions of health and education are primitive.

[20] Similar tendencies can be observed in Brazil, which has a tanker fleet of 40,000 tons capacity.

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The budget, however, which amounts to more than 300 million bolivares, is one of the highest in Latin America. Not more than one third of the state income of Venezuela is derived from royalties and other oil payments. The rest comes mainly from tariffs which increase import prices by an average of 70 percent. Cotton fabrics pay a duty of 90–185 percent of original cost and the duties on foods averaged 113 percent in 1937.

All this makes living costs in Venezuela the highest in the world. Furthermore, the bolivar was kept on the gold standard even after the devaluation of the dollar. Direct taxation of the oil industry is barred, according to the oil companies' interpretation of their contracts. Recommendations for fundamental changes in the economic system, worked out by various experts, have not yet had practical effect. A small income tax which was recently introduced seems not to affect the oil companies. The emergency agreement of July 1942 providing agricultural occupation for dismissed oil workers is not a major reform measure. Nor will the new Export-Import Bank loan of $20 million be more than temporarily helpful if it is not followed by a complete reorganization of the Venezuelan economy including, primarily, radical monetary, tax and tariff reforms and control of public utilities. The increased output of oil in Venezuela in 1941 — the outlook for 1942 is less favorable — brought additional income from royalties and somewhat alleviated the situation. But if a reform of the Venezuelan economy is not undertaken in time the oil companies may face, sooner or later, the same antagonism with which they found they were unable to cope successfully in other Latin American countries.

Thus we return to the point at which we began. The oil companies and many Latin American governments have reached an impasse. Only new forms, such as mixed companies, etc., and a new spirit of collaboration can help to overcome it. Oil is too important a factor in war and peace and especially in hemisphere relations to be neglected in the framing of a Good Neighbor policy.

Concessions by both sides are necessary. The two requisites seem to be greater security for additional oil investments in Latin America on the one hand, and a deeper understanding of the general needs of the Latin American oil exporting and importing countries on the other. It will be the task of far-seeing statesmanship in Washington to find the means to reach this solution.

A foundation was laid when an international South American Petroleum Institute was organized in Montevideo in 1941 with a membership including governments, private companies and oil experts. It will set up a permanent international council and further the exchange of technical and economic experience in oil among the South American republics. If the Institute could inaugurate a well-balanced oil policy, covering not only the domestic problems of the South American countries, but also their relations with the United States Government, and if the oil companies should show a willingness to understand the real needs of Latin America, an important step would have been taken toward the realization of a practical Good Neighbor policy as regards one of the most fundamental raw materials.

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Statements by eleven English pacifists.

TODAY WE ARE BROTHERS. By Leo Lania. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 344 p. $3.50.

The autobiography of a European journalist in which many of the ideas, prejudices and mistakes of his generation are revealed, casually and entertainingly.

THE MEDITERRANEAN. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Whittlesey, 1942, 635 p. $3.75.

A panorama of history around the Middle Sea from the Athens of Pericles to the Rome of *Il Duce*, written in the usual flamboyant Ludwig style.

A WREATH FOR EUROPA. By Paul Tabori. New York: Ives Washburn, 1942, 336 p. $3.00.

A young Hungarian writer, widely travelled on the Continent, seeks to reëvoke the essential spirit of that inter-war Europe, now blown to bits.

GEOPOLITIK: DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND EMPIRE. By Johannes Mattern. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942, 139 p. $2.00.

This little book should recommend itself to all those who want to know about the origins and development of the doctrines of geopolitics — German and non-German. Though not so long as several other recent works dealing with this subject, Mr. Mattern's survey is more comprehensive.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY. By Sir Halford Mackinder. New York: Holt, 1942, 219 p. $2.50.

This is a reprint, without alteration, of a now famous book which first appeared in 1919 in the hope that its point of view would influence the Allied statesmen then drawing up the terms of peace. Sir Halford's doctrines and geographic interpretations became historically important when they were in part adopted, twisted and exploited by Haushofer and the other German geopoliticians.

THE NEW FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. By W. Arnold-Forster. London: Methuen, 1942, 134 p. 6/.

This thoughful little book, somewhat broader in scope than its title would indicate, presents the thesis that a primary guarantee for international order in the future must rest in the control of the seas by a new "Commonwealth of Nations."

LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LA LOI NATURELLE. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Maison Française, 1942, 142 p. $1.25.

Essays by a leading French Catholic philosopher and publicist.

GOUVERNEMENTS NATIONAUX ET ACCORDS INTERNATIONAUX. By Théodore de Félice. Geneva: Georg, 1942, 168 p.

A profusely documented monograph on the competence of the executive branch of the Swiss, British and American Governments to negotiate international agreements.

PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By William E. S. Flory. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 179 p. $3.25.

A scholarly, thoroughly documented legal monograph.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILD LIFE. By Sherman Strong Hayden. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 246 p. $3.00.

"An Examination of Treaties and Other Agreements for the Preservation of Birds and Mammals."

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Stefan A. Riesenfeld. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1942, 296 p. $2.00.

A scholarly legal monograph.

CZECHOSLOVAK YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Edited by Václav Beneš and Others. London: International Law Association, Czechoslovak Branch, 1942, 236 p. 8/6. (New York: Hanč, $1.75.)

A revival — on English soil and in the French and English languages — of a publication which formerly appeared in Czechoslovakia as "Hlídka Mezinárodního Práva."

AIR POWER AND CIVILIZATION. By M. J. Bernard Davy. London: Allen and Unwin, 1942, 202 p. 8/6.

The author recites the history of man's conquest of the air, deplores the evil use to which this conquest has been put by the present generation of mankind, and seeks — without success — to find a formula for preserving the airplane but abolishing the bomber.

THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION. By Merze Tate. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 398 p. $4.00.

A methodical history of the abortive attempts, especially at the Hague Conferences, to effect substantial disarmament among the Powers.

LES GUERRES MODERNES ET LA PENSÉE CATHOLIQUE. By Luigi Sturzo. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1942, 233 p. $1.25.

Five essays on political and religious questions together with several documents in the appendix, by the former leader of the Popular Party in Italy, now an exile.

A STUDY OF WAR. By Quincy Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 2 v. $15.00.

This massive work represents the fruits of some fifteen years of coöperative research and study. Volume I examines the history of warfare from earliest times, while volume II analyzes war into its various political, sociological, economic, cultural and other causes and motivations. The treatise concludes with suggestions for the future control of war. In addition to voluminous appendices, there are over fifty charts and seventy-five tables.

THE WAR ON THE CIVIL AND MILITARY FRONTS. By Major-General G. M. Lindsay. New York: Macmillan (Cambridge University Press), 1942, 112 p. $1.50.

These comprehensive and well-informed essays on various aspects of modern war were originally delivered as the Lees Knowles Lectures for 1942.

MacARTHUR ON WAR. Edited by Frank C. Waldrop. New York: Duell, 1942, 419 p. $3.00.

A compilation of several reports, plans and other writings in which the military doctrine of the General is indicated.

A LAYMAN'S GUIDE TO NAVAL STRATEGY. By Bernard Brodie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942, 291 p. $2.50.

This is just the book for armchair admirals. In simple language, and with the help of a number of sketch-maps, it explains the rôle, the strategy, the tactics and the weapons of modern naval warfare.

THE SUBMARINE AT WAR. By A. M. Low. New York: Sheridan, 1942, 305 p. $3.00.

A popular introduction to the tactics and strategy of submarine warfare.

WHAT THE CITIZEN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SUBMARINE WARFARE. By David O. Woodbury. New York: Norton, 1942, 231 p. $2.50.

Another readable and reliable summary in a popular series. There are a number of sketches illustrating the text.

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SUBMARINES. By Herbert S. Zim. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 306 p. $3.00.

The story of the development of the submarine and of undersea warfare competently recounted for a non-technical audience.

ENGINEERS IN BATTLE. By Lieutenant-Colonel Paul W. Thompson. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1942, 108 p. $1.50.

German engineer tactics exemplified by various episodes in the present war, with illustrations and maps.

GUERRILLA WARFARE. By 'Yank' Levy. New York: Penguin, 1942, 120 p. 25 cents.

Practical advice on how to wage it, by an American who fought in the International Brigade in Spain and has recently been lecturing to the Home Guard in England.

GAS WARFARE. By Colonel Alden H. Waitt. New York: Duell, 1942, 327 p. $2.75.

A book for the layman concerning the use of gas and the means of protection against it.

PUBLIC POLICY, 1942. Edited by C. J. Friedrich and Edward S. Mason. Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1942, 275 p. $3.00.

This third annual issue of the Yearbook of the School contains eleven contributions, all on some aspect of the United States war effort.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1942. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 1474 p. $7.50.

This most recent issue of a standard annual is especially deserving of praise in view of the difficulties under which it was produced.

General: Economic and Social

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION. By Wilhelm Röpke. London: Hodge, 1942, 283 p. 21/.

An economist finds that the causes of the breakdown of economic and political relations between nations in the last quarter century cannot be explained except by study of the sociological background.

THE GREATEST SWINDLE IN THE WORLD: THE STORY OF THE GERMAN REPARATIONS. By G. Borsky. London: New Europe Publishing Company, 1942, 78 p. 1/6.

A somewhat polemical review of the reparations question, arguing that Germany got off very easily, particularly since she was able to borrow large sums abroad.

PRICE CONTROL: THE WAR AGAINST INFLATION. By Erik T. H. Kjellstrom and Others. New Brunswick (N. J.): Rutgers University Press, 1942, 171 p. $2.50.

Chapters on experiments in Sweden, Britain, Canada and Switzerland.

STRATEGIC MATERIALS AND NATIONAL STRENGTH. By Harry N. Holmes. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 106 p. $1.75.

Concise and easily assimilable information for the layman about dozens of products — mineral, vegetable and synthetic.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. Edited by Chester W. Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 197 p. $2.00.

Seven lectures delivered on the Walgreen Foundation at the University of Chicago early in 1942.

THE UNFINISHED TASK: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FOR DEMOCRACY. By Lewis Corey. New York: Viking, 1942, 314 p. $3.00.

One of America's leading ex-Marxist writers on economic and social problems seeks

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to define what are the democratic elements in modern economics and suggests how they can be strengthened.

DEMOCRACY AND FREE ENTERPRISE. By Thurman W. Arnold. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942, 81 p. $1.00.

Lectures by the trust-busting Assistant Attorney General on the evils of planning, cartelization and other hindrances to free production.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY. By W. A. McConagha. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942, 199 p. $2.50.

A serviceable review of the history of organized labor movements.

THE WOMEN'S TRADE UNION LEAGUES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. By Gladys Boone. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 283 p. $3.50.

A documented comparative monograph, with appendices.

SOCIALISM: NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL. By Franz Borkenau. London: Routledge, 1942, 172 p. 5/.

A provocative little volume which, after sounding the death knell of both Socialist and liberal-democratic internationalism, foresees the rapid development of new types of supernational groupings.

DOS TRANSFERIRN BAFELKERUNGEN VI A MITL TSU FARENTFERN DI PROBLEM FUN MINORITETN. By Mark Vishniak. New York: Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1942, 94 p. 75 cents.

This monograph on the transfer of populations as a solution of the minorities question contains a four-page summary in English.

THE RÔLE OF THE RACES IN OUR FUTURE CIVILIZATION. Edited by Harry W. Laidler. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1942, 112 p. 50 cents.

A symposium by representative white, Negro and oriental writers.

HOW TO LIVE IN THE TROPICS. By Virginia Lloyd Hunt. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 178 p. $2.00.

Practical advice for persons coming from the temperate zone.

CHRISTIAN EUROPE TODAY. By Adolph Keller. New York: Harper, 1942, 310 p. $3.00.

A first-rate documented survey of the state of the Christian churches and religion throughout Europe, by a leading Swiss Protestant teacher and writer.

The Second World War

THE FACE OF THE WAR, 1931–1942. By Samuel H. Cuff. New York: Messner, 1942, 290 p. $3.00.

A story of ten years of growing crisis served up in easily digestible pellets of journalistic prose and seventy-three sketch maps.

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN THE WORLD WAR. Volume I: 1919–1940. By Captain Norman Macmillan. London: Harrap, 1942, 239 p. 10/6.

This first volume of an authoritative, factual account deals with the organization of the R.A.F. and the campaigns in France and Norway.

WAR PLANES OF THE AXIS. By David C. Cooke. New York: McBride, 1942, 256 p. $2.75.

Numerous illustrations and descriptive text.

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RETREAT TO VICTORY. By Allan A. Michie. Chicago: Alliance, 1942, 492 p. $3.00.

A fascinating, well-informed review of the war on all fronts — outside of Europe and China — by an American correspondent who managed to get around at an amazing rate. Mr. Michie is convinced that the Near and Middle East hold the key to victory.

NAZI CONQUEST OF DANZIG. By Hans L. Leonhardt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 363 p. $3.50.

In this fundamental book we have chapter and verse on the methods by which the Nazis gradually infiltrated into the government of the supposedly Free City. The author witnessed this process as the legal adviser of the democratic opposition party in Danzig.

FLIGHT TO FREEDOM. By Barbara Padowicz. New York: Duell, 1942, 257 p. $2.75.

A highly personal story of how a Polish woman escaped from her native country just ahead of the Nazi invasion.

THE EAGLES ROAR! By Byron Kennerly, as told to Graham Berry. New York: Harper, 1942, 271 p. $3.00.

An account of the Eagle Squadron, until recently the American section of the R.A.F., by one of its members.

YANKEE FIGHTER. By Lieutenant John F. Hasey. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 293 p. $2.50.

A young American reports on his part, as ambulance man and then as a fighter for de Gaulle, in the campaigns of Finland, Ethiopia and Syria. An unpretentious yet revealing book.

THEY WERE EXPENDABLE. By W. L. White. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 209 p. $2.00.

The remarkable story of the achievements of Motor Boat Squadron 3 around Bataan as told by four of its survivors.

ACTION IN THE EAST. By O. D. Gallagher. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 300 p. $3.00.

A South African newspaperman's eyewitness account — forthright, often bitterly critical — of the war in Malaya and Burma. His picture of individual heroism and official unpreparedness and complacency is unforgettable.

I ESCAPED FROM HONG KONG. By Jan Henrik Marsman. New York: Reynal, 1942, 249 p. $2.50.

The author, a Dutch-born businessman many years resident in the Orient, was caught in Hong Kong on the day the Japanese struck there without warning. By a series of hair-raising adventures he managed finally to escape into Free China with this story of Hong Kong's fall and of the atrocities inflicted on its inhabitants by the Japanese Army.

STRATEGY AT SINGAPORE. By Eugene H. Miller. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 145 p. $2.50.

A scholarly study of Singapore's strategic situation, the rôle of the British base there and the implications of its loss. This book was published in collaboration with the American Council on Public Affairs.

LAST TRAIN FROM BERLIN. By Howard K. Smith. New York: Knopf, 1942, 359 p. $2.75.

An American correspondent, leaving Berlin on the eve of Pearl Harbor, reports that the war on Russia is bleeding Germany dry of men, machines and foodstuffs and that the days of Nazi domination are numbered.

FRANCE, 1940–1942. Compiled by Howard C. Rice. Cambridge: Harvard Co-operative Society, 1942, 224 p. $1.00.

A very useful collection of French documents on the disaster of 1940, the "National

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Revolution," life in occupied and unoccupied France (1940–42), the Free French, and the French colonial empire.

CAMPAIGN OF TREACHERY. By Henry Torrès. New York: Dodd, 1942, 256 p. $3.00.

A bitter exposé of the folly and treason in high places that facilitated the fall of France. Mr. Torrès, author of a blistering book on Laval, is no respecter of persons.

EINE GROSSMACHT FÄLLT? By Victor Vinde. Zurich: Europa, 1942, 221 p.

A restrained account of the fall of France and of its domestic and political background and repercussions, by a Swedish journalist.

A FRENCH SOLDIER SPEAKS. By Jacques. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 138 p. $1.25.

The poignant reflections of a young Frenchman who, like many of his generation, discovered how deeply he loved his country only after it had fallen.

THE PRISONER AT LAEKEN. By Emile Cammaerts. London: Cresset, 1941, 268 p. 10/6.

On the whole, a convincing vindication of the rôle played by King Leopold and his army in May 1940.

THE SIXTH COLUMN. New York: Alliance, 1942, 313 p. $2.00.

Representatives of ten Axis-occupied countries in Europe describe the courageous struggles which their peoples are carrying on against their oppressors.

THE BLACK BOOK OF POLAND. New York: Putnam, 1942, 615 p. $3.00.

A collection of documents illustrating the barbarities of German rule in Poland up to the end of June 1941. This book, a sequel to "The German Invasion of Poland" published in 1940, was compiled by the Polish Government.

GERMANY'S FIRST EUROPEAN PROTECTORATE. By Eugene V. Erdely. London: Hale, 1942, 252 p. 12/6.

This is an important contribution to our understanding of what the "New Order" signifies for the peoples on whom it is imposed. Dr. Erdely, using all available sources of information including the underground movements, has pieced together a comprehensive, and horrifying, picture of the manner in which Hitler is trying to "protect" the Czech people into oblivion.

PRAGUE BRAVES THE HANGMAN. By E. V. Erdely. London: "The Czechoslovak," 1942, 126 p.

A more popular and episodic treatment of the same subject.

VOLCANO UNDER HITLER: THE UNDERGROUND WAR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Jiří Hronek. London: "The Czechoslovak," 1941, 141 p. 4/.

A documented account of how the Czechs are resisting Nazi oppression.

A GERMAN PROTECTORATE: THE CZECHS UNDER NAZI RULE. By Shiela Grant Duff. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 295 p. $3.50.

This picture of Nazi-"protected" Bohemia is constructed from information obtained at long distance, particularly from German sources.

DENMARK IN NAZI CHAINS. By Paul Palmér. London: Drummond, 1942, 128 p. 4/.

A circumstantial account of how the Danes fought the Nazi invasion and how Denmark has fared under German rule.

LIFELINES OF VICTORY. By Squadron Leader Murray Harris. New York: Putnam, 1942, 160 p. $2.00.

Victory, the author seeks to demonstrate, is primarily a matter of communications and transportation.

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THE COMING BATTLE OF GERMANY. By William B. Ziff. New York: Duell, 1942, 280 p. $2.50.

Mr. Ziff, who has no patience with brass hats, is convinced that the way to bring Germany to her knees is by all-out aërial attack without waiting for a concomitant invasion by land.

PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION. Edited by Henry P. Jordan. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 292 p. $2.75.

Essays on various political and economic questions connected with the problem of how to make this a better world to live in.

AGENDA FOR A POSTWAR WORLD. By J. B. Condliffe. New York: Norton, 1942, 232 p. $2.50.

A realistic prognosis of the economic problems in store for us when hostilities end. Though Professor Condliffe devotes most of his analysis to the immediate postwar period, he has several good chapters on longer-range questions.

THE "EIGHT POINTS" OF POST-WAR WORLD REORGANIZATION. Compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1942, 126 p. 90 cents.

Material for the study of the question, conveniently arranged for ready reference.

FEDERALISM AND FREEDOM: OR, PLAN THE PEACE TO WIN THE WAR. By Sir George Young. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 204 p. $2.50.

In this forthright book the author has put forth a number of stimulating ideas on the rôle federalism has played in modern European history and the rôle it could play in Europe after this war. Sir George does not hesitate to issue numerous *obiter dicta* along the way.

EUROPE, RUSSIA AND THE FUTURE. By G. D. H. Cole. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 233 p. $2.00.

Speculations, of varying degrees of realism, on the shape of postwar Europe, by a well-known English economist and Socialist writer.

WE'RE IN THIS WITH RUSSIA. By Wallace Carroll. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 264 p. $2.00.

A sober interpretation of Russia's part in the war, among the United Nations and in the peace to come. Having been in Russia during the fateful days of Hitler's abortive Blitzkrieg in 1941, the author is able to lift the curtain on several hitherto obscure episodes.

WHAT TO DO WITH GERMANY. By Colonel T. H. Minshall. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1941, 240 p. $3.25.

This is definitely one of the saner, more balanced and therefore more effective books on the German problem. Colonel Minshall knows the German people well, and his analysis of their virtues and vices and his suggestions as to what must be done to exploit the former in order to overcome the latter are worthy of deliberation.

FREEDOM FOR ITALY! By Gaspare and Franco Nicotri. New York: Italian-American Press, 1942, 198 p. $1.25.

Italian history as the springboard for an appeal to Italian-Americans to do their utmost to free their homeland from Fascist rule.

POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES. By George B. Galloway. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942, 158 p. 60 cents.

A directory of the agencies, official and private, engaged in postwar planning, with short descriptions of their personnel and activities. There is an extensive bibliography.

LETTRES AUX AMERICAINS. By Gustave Cohen. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1942, 124 p. 50 cents.

Impressions of America and of France during 1940-41, by a former professor at the Sorbonne, later Dean of the École Libre des Hautes Études in New York.

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THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON AMERICA. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942, 159 p. $2.00.

Six timely lectures by members of the Cornell University faculty.

VICTORY OR VESTED INTEREST? By G. D. H. Cole and Others. London: Routledge, 1942, 97 p. 5/.

Rather miscellaneous lectures on some of the political, social and economic problems raised by Britain's war effort.

MESSAGE À DE JEUNES ANGLAISES. By André David. Montreal: Éditions de l'Arbre, 1942, 188 p. $1.25.

One of the leaders of the liberal movement in French Catholicism renders homage to the spirit of Britain, especially of women.

THE WIND IS RISING. By H. M. Tomlinson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 271 p. $2.50.

Occasional essays beautifully portraying the growing spirit of solidarity and dedication among the British people as the war has progressed.

The United States

HOW WAR CAME: AN AMERICAN WHITE PAPER FROM THE FALL OF FRANCE TO PEARL HARBOR. By Forrest Davis and Ernest Kidder Lindley. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942, 342 p. $2.50.

This "American White Paper" gives a running account of selected highlights in American diplomatic history from the fall of France up through Pearl Harbor. The authors throw new light on several episodes, and in general manage to do a good journalistic job of writing history before it has cooled off. Reservations must still be made, however, on several points which the authors imply they have disposed of finally.

A TIME FOR GREATNESS. By Herbert Agar. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 301 p. $2.50.

Here is a stirring call to the American people to seize their present and fleeting opportunity to lead the way to a better world where the "explosive idea" of equality will become a reality.

AMERICA SPEAKS. By Philip Gibbs. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 327 p. $3.00.

Another Englishman seeks to interpret the American scene, with not entirely convincing results.

AMERICAN DESTINY. By A. Powell Davies. Boston: Beacon Press, 1942, 120 p. $1.50.

Inspirational pieces on the need for faith in America.

THE UNITED STATES AND CIVILIZATION. By John U. Nef. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 421 p. $3.00.

What the American people have already contributed to Western civilization, and what they must still contribute if our culture is not to run into a dead-end and decay.

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Leonard D. White. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 274 p. $3.50.

Twelve essays on various aspects of American governmental and administrative problems, in honor of Professor Charles E. Merriam.

THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. By Eleanor E. Dennison. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942, 201 p. $2.50.

A readable and reliable monograph on how the powerful committee is organized, how it operates, and what influence it has exercised on American foreign policy. The author is Foreign Policy Program Secretary of the National League of Women Voters.

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THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Albert C. F. Westphal. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 268 p. $3.00.

The organization and functioning of a lesser organ in the conduct of American foreign relations.

WASHINGTON IS LIKE THAT. By W. M. Kiplinger. New York: Harper, 1942, 522 p. $3.50.

Few people know their way around the bureaucratic maze in Washington as well as Mr. Kiplinger, author of a weekly newsletter from that city. This book, packed with data of all sorts concerning official and non-official agencies, is compiled in a manner well adapted for reference purposes.

ADMIRAL SIMS AND THE MODERN AMERICAN NAVY. By Elting E. Morrison. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 547 p. $5.00.

This full-length portrait of the American naval commander in the First World War clearly brings out Sims's prophetic foresight concerning the development of sea warfare.

BILLY MITCHELL. By Émile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen. New York: Dutton, 1942, 303 p. $2.50.

A belligerent defense of an American military leader who prophesied a decisive rôle for air power in warfare.

WEST POINT: MOULDER OF MEN. By Major William H. Baumer, Jr. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 264 p. $3.00.

A history of the Academy and its place in American military history.

OUR FIGHTING SHIPS. By Mitchell D. Katz, Jr. and Others. New York: Harper, 1942, 101 p. $2.00.

The various types of vessels in the United States Navy illustrated and described in concise detail.

AMERICAN REVEILLE: THE UNITED STATES AT WAR. By Ward Morehouse. New York: Putnam, 1942, 263 p. $2.50.

Casual snapshots taken by the author on a recent tour of the "grass roots" in the American hinterland.

WARTIME PRICE CONTROL. By George P. Adams, Jr. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 153 p. $3.00.

A history of price control in the United States during the First World War and an expert appraisal of its lessons.

AMERICA'S TRADE EQUALITY POLICY. By Hugh O. Davis. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 137 p. $3.00.

A scholarly monograph on the history of the most-favored-nation policy and of its implications for domestic politics and foreign policy.

PARITY, PARITY, PARITY. By John D. Black. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942, 367 p. $2.00.

A somewhat technical investigation into the question of farm parity compared with parity for labor and capital. The author is professor of economics at Harvard.

CONSERVATION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES. By George T. Renner. New York: Wiley, 1942, 228 p. $2.75.

A systematic treatise on the need for conservation in the United States and on methods for bringing it about.

AMERICAN AGENCIES INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Compiled by Ruth Savord. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1942, 200 p. $2.00.

This handy reference book provides essential data on the organization and activities of 187 agencies and partial data on 21 foreign chambers of commerce and 17 foreign

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information bureaus. Special features are the listing of 186 dormant and discontinued organizations, a subject index which classifies the agencies under both primary and secondary spheres of interest, and a personnel index.

Western Europe

THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS (PARIS, 1920–1931). By Gerhard P. Pink. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1942, 293 p. 80 cents.

A scholarly history and appraisal of the work of the Conference from 1920 to 1931.

PROLOGUE TO APPEASEMENT. By Elizabeth R. Cameron. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 228 p. $3.50.

A documented review and analysis of the foreign policy of the Third Republic during its last years.

LIGHT BEFORE DUSK. By Helen Iswolsky. New York: Longmans, 1942, 253 p. $2.50.

The reminiscences and impressions, covering the period 1923–41, of a daughter of the pre-1914 Russian Ambassador in France who chose to stay in that country after the First World War.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LABOR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN. By James J. Robbins. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942, 367 p. $3.50.

A technical study of the collective contract system.

MEN OF CHAOS. By Hermann Rauschning. New York: Putnam, 1942, 341 p. $3.00.

Another book in which Rauschning seeks, by recounting his conversations with many Nazi and quasi-Nazi hierarchs, to give a picture of the mentality and methods of the Hitlerian régime.

THE GUILT OF THE GERMAN ARMY. By Hans Ernest Fried. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 426 p. $3.50.

The German military class cast in the rôle of the principal villain in the tragedy of Europe. A thought-provoking book, especially interesting to those who are thinking about the future of Germany.

THE MIND AND FACE OF NAZI GERMANY. Edited by N. Gangulee. London: Murray, 1942, 178 p. 5/.

Excerpts from the writings and sayings of Nazis intended to prove the moral and intellectual depravity of the German people.

NAZI GUIDE TO NAZISM. Edited by Rolf Tell. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 192 p. $2.00.

Hundreds of sayings — bright and otherwise — from the lips and pens of prominent Nazis, arranged by subject. If ridicule could kill, Nazism would now be extinct.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY, 1914-1939. Compiled by Waldo Chamberlin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942, 403 p. $5.00.

An exhaustive critical bibliography of material in the Hoover Library.

THE REAL ITALIANS. By Count Carlo Sforza. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 156 p. $2.00.

An English version of a charming little book reviewed in our July 1942 issue.

DIALOGUE WITH DEATH. By Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 215 p. $2.00.

This book contains those parts of the author's "Spanish Testament," published in London in 1938, which concern his three months of imprisonment by the Fascists after the fall of Malaga, during which time he was under the constant threat of execution.

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Eastern Europe

STALIN. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Putnam, 1942, 248 p. $2.50.

This is not one of Ludwig's better biographies, being marred, in addition to the usual inaccuracies, by the author's inconsistent attitude toward his subject.

JOSEF STALIN: MAN OF STEEL. By David M. Cole. London: Rich, 1942, 136 p. 6/.

A second-hand account of the man and the Russia he helped to create.

BORDERLINE RUSSIA. By H. Foster Anderson. London: Cresset, 1942, 238 p. 10/6.

These illuminating reminiscences of an Englishman who spent many years in Russia and the Baltic States from 1914 to 1940 throw new light on various important events.

CHILDREN IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Deana Levin. London: Faber, 1942, 196 p. 6/.

An enthusiastic description of Soviet educational aims and methods, by one who taught for several years in the Anglo-American school at Moscow.

THE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF LITHUANIA AFTER 1918. By Anicetas Simutis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 148 p. $1.50.

A factual account by a young Lithuanian scholar.

PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN. By C. A. Macartney. New York: Macmillan (Cambridge University Press), 1942, 160 p. $1.25.

A brief, competent background survey.

HUNGARY AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. By Francis Deák. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, 594 p. $5.50.

A scholarly reconstruction of the manner in which the Hungarian question was dealt with at Paris. The second half of the book is given over to documents, bibliography and a full index. The author is professor of law at Columbia University.

ALBANIA'S ROAD TO FREEDOM. By Vandeleur Robinson. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1941, 135 p. $4.50.

This profusely illustrated account of conditions in contemporary Albania goes into considerable detail about the circumstances and difficulties of the reign of King Zog.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE BRITISH TARIFF MOVEMENT. By Marvin E. Lowe. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 133 p. $2.50.

A scholarly history of British tariff policy from 1900 to 1932.

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND. By Frederick C. Dietz. New York: Holt, 1942, 616 p. $3.00.

An expert synthesis.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1805 TO 1918. By Christopher Lloyd. London: Methuen, 1942, 134 p. 5/.

A somewhat over-brief précis.

MONTAGU NORMAN. By John Hargrave. New York: Greystone, 1942, 239 p. $2.75.

A lively but hardly friendly picture of the man who for more than two decades has presided over the Bank of England.

THE BRITISH COLONIAL EMPIRE. By W. E. Simnett. New York: Norton, 1942, 255 p. $3.00.

A comprehensive, well-informed and up-to-date survey of the history, political organization and economic development of Britain's colonies, with a section on postwar plans and needs.

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THE NEUTRALITY OF IRELAND. By Henry Harrison. London: Hale, 1942, 191 p. 10/6.

Mr. Harrison would like Ireland to be a partner in the British Commonwealth, but he finds four good reasons for her present neutrality, of which the principal one is the secession of Ulster.

NOT AN INCH. By Hugh Shearman. London: Faber, 1942, 184 p. 6/.

The author seeks to explain and justify the policy of Lord Craigavon and the attitude of Ulster in general, yet without ignoring the case of Catholic Ireland.

NEEDLE TO THE NORTH. By Arthur C. Twomey. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 360 p. $3.50.

Explorations by plane, boat and on foot into the lower Hudson Bay region.

THE NATIVE LABOR PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA. By J. M. Tinley. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942, 281 p. $3.00.

A legal, economic and social investigation into one of South Africa's most complicated problems. This scholarly work is illustrated with numerous tables and maps.

INDIA WITHOUT FABLE. By Kate L. Mitchell. New York: Knopf, 1942, 296 p. $2.50.

A factual, undramatic attempt to present an objective picture of modern Indian politics and economy. The author is on the staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

INDIA TODAY. By W. E. Duffett and Others. New York: Day, 1942, 173 p. $1.75.

Three Canadian writers give a brief, liberal-minded survey of India's recent history and present problems.

THE CRIPPS MISSION. By R. Coupland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 91 p. 75 cents.

A brief, authoritative review of the political and constitutional situation in India since the outbreak of the present war, by a British colonial expert attached to the Cripps Mission in the spring of 1942.

I HEARD THE ANZACS SINGING. By Margaret L. MacPherson. New York: Creative Age Press, 1942, 354 p. $2.00.

A charming introduction to the country and people of Australia and New Zealand.

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN NEW ZEALAND. By W. B. Sutch. New York: Penguin, 1942, 160 p. 25 cents.

An account of the history and operation of the Dominion's social welfare legislation.

The Near East

OIL, BLOOD AND SAND. By Robert L. Baker. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 300 p. $2.50.

A popular exposé of Axis designs on the Near East and a summary of the resources and political complexes of that vital area.

BRITISH POLICY IN PALESTINE. By Paul L. Hanna. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942, 214 p. $3.50.

A factual study of the manner in which the British Government has administered its mandate in the Holy Land.

PALESTINE: A POLICY. By Albert M. Hyamson. London: Methuen, 1942, 214 p. 7/.

One of the more sensible and objective books on the "too much promised land," by a non-Zionist Jew who for a number of years served as head of the Immigration Department there. Mr. Hyamson concludes with a proposal for solving the Palestine problem.

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Africa

BRITISH AND AXIS AIMS IN AFRICA. By Kingsley Ozuomba Mbadiwe. New York: Malliet, 1942, 248 p. $2.75.

A survey of African history and of British colonial policy, by a young Nigerian scholar now in the United States.

GOD'S RAVENS. By Julia Lake Kellersberger. New York: Revell, 1941, 207 p. $1.50.

Life in the Congo as experienced by an American missionary long resident there.

DEAD MEN DO TELL TALES. By Byron de Prorok. New York: Creative Age Press, 1942, 328 p. $2.75.

An archaeologist's experiences, not all archaeological, in western Ethiopia.

The Far East

AMERICAN UNITY AND ASIA. By Pearl S. Buck. New York: Day, 1942, 140 p. $1.25.

Collected articles and speeches on the rôle of the United States, and of its political and social ideals, in the Far East and India.

AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN POLITICS. By G. F. Hudson and Marthe Rajchman. New York: Day, 1942, 207 p. $2.50.

A convenient source for up-to-date information, both on the maps and in the accompanying text.

CHINA AFTER FIVE YEARS OF WAR. New York: Chinese News Service, 1942, 233 p. $1.00.

An official resumé of the government, military affairs, economic efforts, administration, and educational and social problems of China at war.

DESTINATION CHUNGKING. By Han Suyin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 367 p. $3.00.

A personal account of the adventures of a young Chinese woman, writing under a pseudonym, caught up and whirled around in a China at war. This is one of the more human and more graphic books on the Far Eastern conflict.

JAPAN RIDES THE TIGER. By Willard Price. New York: Day, 1942, 228 p. $2.50.

Mr. Price knows Japan and the Japanese people well and he has travelled widely in Manchuria, Korea, Formosa and the mandated islands. What he has to say about all these things and about Japan's hitherto underrated power to wage war makes interesting reading.

JAPAN AND THE OPIUM MENACE. By Frederick T. Merrill. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, 1942, 170 p. $1.50.

A factual study of one of Japan's most dangerous weapons.

YEARS OF THE WILD BOAR. By Helen Mears. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1942, 346 p. $2.75.

Life in Japan, especially the feminine side, as observed by an American journalist.

SOVIET ASIA: DEMOCRACY'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE. By Raymond Arthur Davies and Andrew J. Steiger. New York: Dial Press, 1942, 384 p. $3.00.

An effort to present the vital facts about the geography, economic development and strategic importance of Siberia. Some of the data seems to have been gathered first-hand, but a large part depends on Soviet sources.

BRITISH RULE IN EASTERN ASIA. By Lennox A. Mills. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1942, 581 p. $5.00.

A scholarly description of the government and the economic development of British Malaya and Hong Kong.

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MEN OF MALAYA. By Clive Dalton. London: Eldon Press, 1942, 165 p. 5/.
The history of modern Malaya portrayed through the biographies of six British pioneers and leaders there.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIAN ECONOMY. By J. B. Boeke. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, 201 p. $2.50.
A comprehensive study by a professor of tropical economics at the University of Leyden in which emphasis is placed on internal economic and social questions.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. By Jan O. M. Broek. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942, 172 p. $2.00.
This book covers some of the same ground traversed by Professor Boeke, but its stress is rather on the international aspects of East Indian economics and trade.

THE AGELESS INDIES. By Raymond Kennedy. New York: Day, 1942, 208 p. $2.00.
An anthropologist's survey of the Indonesian peoples, their country and their history.

THE HOUSE IN THE RAIN FOREST. By Charis Crockett. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 300 p. $3.00.
Life among the cannibals of New Guinea.

Latin America

THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS. By Dana Gardner Munro. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 650 p. $5.00.
One of the better panoramas of our twenty southern neighbors. Against a sound historical background the author sketches in some of the contemporary problems of each republic.

AMBASSADORS IN WHITE. By Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Holt, 1942, 372 p. $3.50.
The inspiring story of the men, mostly American, who have helped stamp out tropical diseases in Latin America.

PAN AMERICAN PROGRESS. By Philip Leonard Green. New York: Hastings House, 1942, 214 p. $2.00.
A brief, somewhat popular history of the development of the idea and practice of Inter-American coöperation.

PAN AMERICAN TRADE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. By John William Lloyd. Danville (Ill.): Interstate Publishers, 1942, 345 p. $2.25.
This well-organized survey, illustrated with photographs and statistics, covers all the Latin American countries and West Indian islands.

THE EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN-OWNED PROPERTY IN MEXICO. By Wendell C. Gordon. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, 201 p. $3.25.
A documented investigation into the legal and economic aspects of the question.

PETRÓLEO MEXICANO: HISTORIA DE UN PROBLEMA. By Jesús Silva Herzog. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1941, 305 p.
A Mexican interpretation of the history, economics and law of the oil question.

THE NEGRO IN THE CARIBBEAN. By Eric Williams. Washington: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1942, 119 p. 50 cents.
A brief survey covering all aspects of Negro life.

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RIM OF THE CARIBBEAN. By Carol McAfee Morgan. New York: Friendship Press, 1942, 182 p. $1.00.

A Protestant missionary reports on a tour through the West Indies and Central America.

THE FACE OF SOUTH AMERICA: AN AERIAL TRAVERSE. By John Lyon Rich. New York: American Geographical Society, 1942, 299 p. $4.00.

A remarkable series of 325 aërial photographs, with commentary, beautifully illustrating the human geography of the territory along the commercial air routes on the east and west coasts of South America.

BY PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY THROUGH SOUTH AMERICA. By Herbert C. Lanks. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 205 p. $5.00.

This is a sequel to "The Pan American Highway from the Rio Grande to the Canal Zone," by the present author and Harry A. Franck. Like this previous work, the present one contains numerous photographs with running commentary.

HACIA UNA COORDINACIÓN DE LA ECONOMIA SUDAMERICANA. By Jorge Rios Igualt. Valparaiso: Universo, 1941, 165 p.

A synthesis of available data and ideas on the economic life of South America.

BRAZIL UNDER VARGAS. By Karl Loewenstein. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 381 p. $2.75.

This first-rate book — scholarly yet readable — on the most important of the Latin American republics is especially strong on its political side, where particular attention is given to the origins, development and structure of the "Estado Novo" of Vargas.

BRAZIL: IN CAPITALS. By Vera Kelsey. New York: Harper, 1942, 326 p. $3.50.

Not a superficial travelogue of a weekender but careful and useful descriptions of the two dozen leading cities of Brazil. The author spent several years there in study and travel, and her book is supplied with notes and a bibliography.

NEGROES IN BRAZIL. By Donald Pierson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, 392 p. $4.50.

This scholarly study on the problem of racial contact and mixture in northeastern Brazil is important because of the wide differences between American and Brazilian experience in this field.

AMAZING AMAZON. By Rose and Bob Brown. New York: Modern Age Books, 1942, 371 p. $3.00.

An entertaining travelogue of a trip in Brazil's hinterland.

POSICIÓN INTERNACIONAL DEL PERÚ. By Alberto Ulloa. Lima: Torres Aguirre, 1941, 404 p.

Chapters on Peru's relations with Ecuador, Chile and Japan as well as her general position in South America.

ARGENTINA: THE LIFE STORY OF A NATION. By John W. White. New York: Viking, 1942, 366 p. $3.75.

This is probably the best book in English on Argentina. As a long-time resident there and as a sincere friend of the Argentine people, Mr. White — formerly *New York Times* correspondent in Buenos Aires — enjoys a particularly advantageous position from which to interpret our somewhat incomprehensible southern neighbor, candidly but sympathetically.

LA ARGENTINA Y LA GUERRA. By José Picchetti. Buenos Aires: Librería del Colegio, 1941, 113 p. Pesos 3.

A concrete plan for giving Argentina a reasonable degree of autarchy.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Arabia

AGREEMENT of friendship and neighbourly relations between the Government of the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of H. H. the Sheikh of Koweit) and the Government of Saudi Arabia. [With schedule and exchange of notes containing lists of tribes.] Jedda, April 20, 1942. London, 1942. 8 p. (Arabia No. 1 (1942). Cmd. 6380). 2d.

Canada

AGREEMENT between Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics providing for the exchange of consuls, in force February 5, 1942. Ottawa, 1942. 3 p. (Treaty Series, 1942, No. 9) 25¢.

EXCHANGE of notes (March 30, April 6 and 8, 1942) between Canada and the United States of America concerning military service, in force April 8, 1942. Ottawa, 1942. 7 p. (Treaty Series, 1942, No. 7) 25¢.

TRANSFERS of citizens and former citizens between armed forces. Agreement between the United States of America and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes signed March 18 and 20, 1942. Washington, 1942. 4 p. (Executive Agreement Series 245.) 5¢.

FACING realities, by Elliott M. Little. Ottawa, Wartime Information Board, 1942. 15 p.

China

TREATY of amity between the Republic of China and the Dominican Republic. No place, no pub. [1942.]

Commerce

ANNUAL statement of the trade of the United Kingdom with British countries and foreign countries, 1940, compared with the year 1939. Vol. III. London, 1942. 212 p. 7s.6d.

FOREIGN trade of the United States in agricultural products by commodity and by country, 1935–36 to 1940–41. Washington, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, 1942. 57 p.

COMMERCIAL policy in the interwar period: international proposals and national policies. Geneva, Economic, Financial and Transit Dept., League of Nations, 1942. 164 p. (1942. II.A.6.)

NETWORK of world trade. Geneva, Economic Intelligence Service, League of Nations, 1942. 172 p. (1942. II.A.3.) $2.75.

EXCHANGE of notes (April 6, 1942) between Canada and Venezuela renewing the commercial *modus vivendi* of the 26th March, 1941, in force April 7, 1942. Ottawa, 1942. 4 p. (Treaty Series, 1942, No. 8.) 25¢.

EXPORT control. Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2558. June 5, 1942. Washington, 1942. 10 p. 5¢.

RECIPROCAL trade. Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador, modifying the Agreement of August 6, 1938, effected by exchange of notes, signed March 2, 1942. Washington, 1942. 5 p. (Executive Agreement Series 248.) 5¢.

RECIPROCAL trade. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, signed at Washington, August 24, 1934, as amended . . . December 18, 1939 and . . . December 23, 1941, and protocol and exchanges of notes. Washington, 1942. 56 p. (Dept. of State Publication 1787.) 10¢.

RECIPROCAL trade. Agreement between the United States of America and Haiti, construing certain provisions of the trade agreement of March 28, 1935 and modifying the agreement effected by exchange of notes, signed February 16 and 19, 1942. Effected by exchange of notes signed April 25, 1942. Washington, 1942. 4 p. (Executive Agreement Series 252.) 5¢.

TRADE agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of H. H. the Sheikh of Koweit and the Government of Saudi Arabia. Jedda, April 20, 1942. London, 1942. 4 p. (Arabia No. 2 (1942). Cmd. 6381.) 1d.

Cultural Relations

EXCHANGE of official publications. Agreement between the United States of America and Bolivia, effected by exchange of notes, signed January 26 and 31, 1942. Washington, 1942. 9 p. (Executive Agreement Series 242.) 5¢.

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EXCHANGE of official publications. Agreement between the United States of America and Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes, signed January 15, 1942. Washington, 1942. 6 p. (Executive Agreement Series 239.) 5¢.

EXCHANGE of official publications. Agreement between the United States of America and Panama. Effected by exchange of notes, signed November 27, 1941 and March 7, 1942. Washington, 1942. 7 p. (Executive Agreement Series 243.) 5¢.

ECONOMIC PLANNING

POST-WAR planning. Washington, National Resources Planning Board, 1942. 52 p.

EXCHANGE CONTROL

PROCLAIMED list of certain blocked nationals. Revision IV, November 12, 1942. 269 p. (Dept. of State Publication 1828.)

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AGREEMENT for the extradition of offenders between the Government of the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of H. H. the Sheikh of Koweit) and the Government of Saudi Arabia. With exchange of notes relating to smuggling offences. Jedda, April 20, 1942. London, 1942. 4 p. (Arabia No. 3 (1942). Cmd. 6382.) 1d.

TREATY for the extradition of criminals concluded between Canada and the United States of America, Washington, April 29, 1942. Ottawa, 1942. 8 p. (Treaty Series, 1942, No. 10) 25¢.

FINANCE

MONEY and banking 1940/42. Geneva, Economic Intelligence Service, League of Nations, 1942. 204 p. (1942. II.A.1.) $3.50.

FIRST WORLD WAR

HISTORICAL units of agencies of the first world war, by Elizabeth B. Drewry. Washington, 1942. 31 p. (National Archives Bulletin No. 4.) 10¢.

GREAT BRITAIN

ANNUAL report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the year 1941. Presented by the Minister of Labour and National Service to Parliament by command of His Majesty, September, 1942. London, 1942. 31 p. (Cmd. 6397). 6d.

EXPERT committee on compensation and betterment. Final report presented by the Minister of Works and Planning . . . September 1942. London, 1942. 180 p. (Cmd. 6386.) 2/6.

SUMMARY report by Ministry of Health, for the period from 1st April, 1941 to 31st March, 1942. Presented by Minister of Health to Parliament by command of His Majesty, October, 1942. London, 1942. 35 p. (Cmd. 6394.) 6d.

INDIA

STATISTICAL abstract for British India, with statistics, where available, relating to certain Indian states from 1929–30 to 1938–39. 71st number, presented by the Secretary of State for India to Parliament by command of His Majesty, January, 1942. London, 1942. 869 p. (Cmd. 6333.) 12s.

INTER-AMERICAN HIGHWAY

MILITARY highway to Alaska. Agreement between the United States of America and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes, signed March 17 and 18, 1942. Washington, 1942. 5 p. (Executive Agreement Series 246.) 5¢.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

MINUTES of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, March 20 to July 3, 1942. Vol. 1 (sessions 1 to 10). Washington, Pan American Union, 1942. 155 p.

LABOR

THE I. L. O. at work, No. 3, September 1942. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 40 p.

LABOUR responsibilities in wartime, by Elliott M. Little. Ottawa, Director of Public Information, 1942. 15 p.

UNEMPLOYMENT insurance benefits, agreement between the United States of America and Canada, effected by exchange of notes, signed March 6 and 12, 1942, effective April 12, 1942. Washington, 1942, 4 p. (Executive Agreement Series 244.) 5¢.

WARTIME transference of labour in Great Britain. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 163 p. (Studies and Reports. Series C, No. 24.) $1.00.

LATIN AMERICA

TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of Venezuela concerning the status of the Island of Patos, Caracas, February 26, 1942. (Ratifications exchanged in London, September 22, 1942.) London, 7 p. (Treaty Series No. 11 (1942). Cmd. 6401.) 1d.

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TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of Venezuela relating to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, Caracas, February 26, 1942. (Ratifications exchanged in London, September 22, 1942.) London, 1942. 7 p. (Treaty Series No. 10 (1942). Cmd. 6400) 2d.

ANUARIO del comercio exterior Colombia — 1941. Bogota, Contraloria General de la Republica, Dirección Nacional de Estadística, 1942. 606 p.

ANUARIO del comercio exterior del Perú correspondiente a 1941. Lima, Departamento de Estadística General de Aduanas, 1942. 353 p. $5.00.

INFORME financiero del contralor general de la Republica: vigencia de 1941. Bogota, 1942. 381 p.

MEMORIA de la dirección general de estadística correspondiente al año 1939. [Republica del Paraguay] Asunción, Imprenta Nacional, 1942. 180 p.

ROTEIRO de uma viagem, a missão econômica Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, 1942. 256 p. (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Serviço de Publicações, 24)

PARECERES do conselho de estado e do consultor do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1842–1889. Rio de Janeiro, 1942. 194 p. (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Serviço de Publicações, 25)

LISTA do corpo consular estrangeiro, março de 1942. Rio de Janeiro, 1942. 58 p. (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Serviço de Publicações, 26)

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REPORT to the Council on the work of the joint session, London, April 27th–May 1st, 1942, Princeton, August 7th–8th, 1942. Geneva, Economic and Financial Committees, League of Nations, 1942. 23 p. (1942. II.A.4.)

MILITARY AND NAVAL MISSIONS

MILITARY mission; agreement between the United States of America and Bolivia, signed August 11, 1942, effective August 11, 1942. Washington, 1942. 12 p. (Executive Agreement Series 267.) 5¢.

NAVAL mission; agreement between the United States of America and Brazil, signed May 7, 1942, effective May 7, 1942. Washington, 1942. 12 p. (Executive Agreement Series 247.) 5¢.

MILITARY mission; agreement between the United States of America and Colombia, signed May 29, 1942, effective May 29, 1942. Washington, 1942. 12 p. (Executive Agreement Series 250.) 5¢.

DETAIL of military officer to serve as director of the Polytechnic School of Guatemala; agreement between the United States of America and Guatemala, extending the agreement of May 27, 1941, effective by exchanges of notes, signed June 9 and 22, and July 21, 1942, effective from May 27, 1942. Washington, 1942. 3 p. (Executive Agreement Series 264.) 5¢.

DETAIL of military officer to serve as adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, agreement between the United States of America and Panama, signed July 7, 1942, effective July 7, 1942. Washington, 1942. 10 p. (Executive Agreement Series 258.) 5¢.

MINORITIES

INTER-AMERICAN Indian Institute. Convention between the United States of America and certain other American Republics . . . Proclaimed by the President of the United States, February 12, 1942. Washington, 1942. 46 p. (Treaty Series 978.) 10¢.

OPIUM

ADVISORY committee on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; summary of illicit transactions and seizures, reported to the Secretariat of the League of Nations between January 1st and March 31st, 1941. Geneva, 1942. 38 p. (1942. XI.)

——— Between April 1st and June 30th, 1941. Geneva, 1942. 27 p. (1942. XI.)

PASSPORT

WAIVER of passport visa fees; agreement between the United States of America and Argentina effected by exchange of notes, signed April 15, 1942, effective June 1, 1942. Washington, 1942. 5 p. (Executive Agreement Series 266.) 5¢.

POLAND

CONCISE statistical year-book of Poland, September 1939–June 1941. London, Polish Ministry of Information, 1941. 160 p. 3/6.

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

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ANIMAL and vegetable fats and oils; production, consumption, imports, exports, and stocks quarterly for calendar years 1937 to 1941. Washington, 1942. 29 p. (Bureau of the Census Report.) 10¢.

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BRAZIL coffee in 1941, report submitted on the 30th day of April, 1942, to the Advisory Council of the National Coffee Department of Brazil by its President, Jayme Fernandes Guedes. Rio de Janeiro, Departamento Nacional do Café, 1942. 72 p.

COAL. Presented by the President of the Board of Trade to Parliament, 3rd June, 1942. London, 1942. 12 p. (Cmd. 6364.) 2d.

EXCHANGES of notes between the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America following upon the conclusion of the wheat discussions at Washington, April 24, May 18 and June 27, 1942. London, 1942. 17 p. (Cmd. 6371.) 3d.

PRODUCTION of gasoline from coal and other products. Hearings before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Mines and Mining, House, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, 1942. 115 p.

PROTOCOL to enforce and to prolong after August 31, 1942, the international agreement regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, signed in London on May 6, 1937, London, July 22, 1942. London, 1942. 4 p. (Miscellaneous No. 1 (1942) Cmd. 6395.) 1d.

REPORT of the rubber survey committee, September 10, 1942. Washington, 1942. 75 p. [Baruch Report.]

SECOND WORLD WAR

TREATY for an alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe and providing also for collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter, concluded between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. London, May 26, 1942. [Ratifications exchanged at Moscow, July 4, 1942.] London, 1942. 9 p. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1942). Cmd. 6376.) 2d.

REPORT of the Committee on amenities and welfare conditions in the three women's services . . . August 1942. London, 1942. 58 p. (Cmd. 6384.) 1/.

UNITED States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942. London, 1942. 6 p. (5&6 Geo. 6, Ch. 31.) 2d.

SECOND WORLD WAR — ECONOMIC ASPECTS

REPORTS from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, Session 1941–1942. 13th–15th, 23rd July–8th October, 1942. London, 1942. Paging and prices vary.

CANADA'S billion dollar gift to Britain, by Hon. J. L. Ilsley, Minister of Finance. Ottawa, Director of Public Information, 1942. 22 p.

CONDITIONS in occupied territories; a series of reports issued by the Inter-Allied Information Committee. London, 1942. 3d.

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